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This dissertation investigates why some attempts at pacted transitions from non-democratic 
rule fail while others succeed. Using a mixed-methods design, the research determines the 
composition and characteristics of opposition organizations that enable pacting. The thesis 
draws on a data set compiled by the author comparing forty-five attempts at negotiations that 
resulted in three different outcomes: (1) an agreement was concluded, but one of the parties 
failed to comply with its provisions; (2) an agreement was concluded, and the parties followed 
through on the terms (successful negotiations), but it did not lead to democratization, and (3) 
an agreement was concluded, leading to democratization (a successful pact leading to 
democratization). The QCA analysis shows that almost always, only those negotiations that 
include an opposition with strong organizational capacity succeed and end up with 
democratization. In addition to the existing theoretical explanation that pacted transitions only 
happen in party regimes, my analysis shows that the strong organizational power of the 
opposition can be drawn from trade unions or the Church participating in negotiations, even if 
the initial regime is personalistic. All negotiations that included trade unions ended up with 
democracy. Likewise, all attempts at negotiations where the Church was present never failed, 
even if they did not always lead to democratization. The two paired comparisons using the 
most similar design approach show the two ways in which attempts at a pact can succeed (or 
fail). One path—shown by the paired comparison of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions 
during the Arab Spring) —indicates that the presence of a strong trade union can facilitate a 
successful pacted transition even when the rest of the opposition is poorly organized. The 
second path — exemplified through a paired comparison of the Ukrainian revolutions of 2004 
and 2014 — indicates how the organizational capacity of the opposition movement can 
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Constitutional Assembly (Tunisia)—temporary popularly elected body in Tunisia from 2011 
to 2014 that at the same time shared the parliamentary functions (including the appointment of 
the government) with the function of constitution writing. 
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for the Constitutional Assembly, and the institutional design for the transition period. IT 
consisted of the RCD elites and opposition members and was formed on February 18, 2011, 
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Maspero Massacre—a SCAF-led massacre on October 9–10, 2011, against Coptic protesters, 
resulting in the deaths of twenty-four people and about 200 injuries. 
MB—The Muslim Brotherhood, or The Society of the Muslim Brothers, the international 
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Republican Christian Party; Solidarity; Youth Party of Ukraine” (Sager 2009, 597). It had 
23.6% in 2002. Later its popularity started to fade. 
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brunch. 
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“With whom should they make a pact?” 
Adolfo Suarez1 
Introduction 
Successful pacted transitions—those led by negotiations between the ruling elites and the 
opposition2 —were once argued to be the most effective way toward democracy (O’Donnell et 
al., 2013, 1986; Colomer, 2000; Huntington, 1993a; Karl, 1990; Linz & Stepan, 1996b; 
Stradiotto & Guo, 2014). However, the concept of pacted transition comes from the early wave 
of studies of regime change—“transitology”—that assumed every serious attempt at building 
democratic institutions ends up with democratization. Therefore, while successful pacted 
transitions attracted the attention of scholars, there has been far less analytical attention paid to 
the numerous cases where attempts at pacts failed, or democratization did not follow. For 
instance, attempts to negotiate pacts broke down in some cases and finished in violence (e.g., 
Ukraine in 2014). In other cases, seemingly successful pacted transitions brought about only 
turnover of leadership but not democratization (e.g., Nepal in 2008). 
Why do attempts at pacts fail? Relatedly, what are the preconditions for a successful pacted 
transition? Whereas there is abundant literature on which types of non-democracies are likely 
to end up with pacted transition (Geddes et al., 2014, 2018a; Linz & Stepan, 1996b), little has 
been written about which types of opposition organizations are more likely to facilitate 
successful pacting. This dissertation analyzes the composition and characteristics of the 
organizations representing the opposition during pacted transitions in order to uncover what 
determines the success or the failure of negotiations and subsequent democratization. 
The main argument of this dissertation is that a successful pacted transition either occurs as a 
result of trade union involvement in the negotiations or in a regime that permits some degree 
of pluralism (i.e., a party dictatorship). In those settings, the established opposition party must 
be present to ensure a successful outcome, while the mediation of the Church in the negotiations 
does ensure their success but not democratization afterward. In other words, only those 
opposition movements that have high organizational capacity—that is, a capacity for credible 
 
1 Translation from Spanish by Linz & Stepan (1996a, p. 94)  
2 See full definition on page 10. 
2 
commitment and credible threat (which can be achieved in several ways)—can negotiate pacted 
transitions. 
Different organizations facilitate negotiations in their ways. Trade unions can survive in those 
authoritarian contexts where opposition parties are already banned. Having an established 
practice to bargain with the state in the economic realm, they are also good at organizing 
dialogue on political matters. At the same time, strikes are more dangerous to the regime than 
protests because of their ability to harm the country’s economy instead of just occupying the 
streets. The Church can also survive in almost any political setting and, leveraging its symbolic 
authority, can play an important mediator role when the political crisis becomes too violent. 
Finally, established political parties are beneficial to pacted transitions when they come from 
a relatively pluralist party or military dictatorships. However, even if they are supported neither 
by the Church nor a trade union, these political parties alone should have enough organizational 
capacity to persuade the leaving leader that he will not be prosecuted in the future, which is 
only possible in highly liberalized party autocracies. 
Knowing the exact preconditions for pacted transitions helps bridge the gap between the 
structure-based and agency-based theories of democratization. Pacted transitions are more 
likely to lead to democratic outcomes than any other mode of regime change (see, among many 
others, Geddes et al., 2018b; Stradiotto & Guo, 2014). At the same time, the preconditions for 
pacts seem potentially demanding but also favorable for democratization, even though no study 
formulates and tests those preconditions.3 If the preconditions for pacts turn out to be 
demanding, it is arguably not the interactions of actors (i.e., pacts per se) that foster 
democratization via pacted transitions. The success of pacts might merely be a consequence of 
the presence of strong opposition organizations. If the preconditions for pacts are not 
demanding and successful pacts are likely to happen despite the weak organizational capacity 
of the opposition, then it is agency that makes pacts so effective. 
This thesis applies a mixed-methods research design. The first part presents a mid-N QCA 
analysis of historical attempts to negotiate pacted transitions backed with conventional 
statistical analysis. In the second part, the results of the QCA analysis are further elaborated 
through two case studies. In so doing, the thesis draws on a unique database of forty-five 
successful and failed attempts at pacts, covering all countries in which an attempt at a pacted 
 
3 Except for those that say that pacted transitions happened only from certain categories of political regimes. 
3 
transition was made since 1974. Cases are selected based on the presence of attempts to 
negotiate a solution to a political crisis, which generally implies the terms of exit for the 
incumbent elites. The results are also supported and tested further with more conventional 
statistical analysis that reveals the linear connection between the size of a trade union involved 
in pacting and a further increase in the level of democracy. 
The QCA analysis shows that whenever trade unions are present, successful negotiations and 
democratization follow. However, neither the QCA nor any statistical methods allow us to 
establish the causality behind the variables. Therefore, the causal mechanisms and possible 
alternative explanations are elaborated further with qualitative methods. The two paired 
comparisons—Ukraine in 2004 and 2014; and Tunisia in 2010-2013 and Egypt in 2011-2013—
compare attempts at pacts in the societies that are very similar. However, a significant factor 
differed in each pair and led to entirely divergent outcomes. In the North African pair, the case 
study demonstrates why and how the presence of a strong independent trade union in Tunisia 
was the most critical factor of its success. In the Ukrainian pair, the explanation lies in the 
organizational capacity of particular movements. Namely, the analysis shows that the 2014 
movement was too decentralized to negotiate. At the same time, of course, there was another 
crucial case-specific factor: the stakes were higher in 2014. 
The thesis is organized as follows. The first chapter presents an overview of the debate between 
voluntarist scholars and scholars of modernization, the theories on modes of regime change, 
and, particularly, pacted transitions, and, finally, the preconditions for pacted transitions. It also 
outlines the research question. Then, it discusses possible ways to conceptualize and 
operationalize the organizational capacity of the opposition and the way that is chosen in this 
research. It then details the theoretical expectations and hypotheses. 
The second chapter presents my database and research design. It touches on the 
operationalization and calibration of variables and then shows how the data was collected. 
Finally, it discusses research design—namely, a combination of QCA and case studies. The 
third chapter is the core of this dissertation—the QCA analysis. It presents a truth table and 
analyses of necessity and sufficiency. The QCA shows that it is sufficient for successful 
negotiations and democratization to have a trade union involved in negotiations or that they 
take place in a party regime that has established opposition parties or an independent Catholic 
Church. The results of the QCA analysis are further elaborated with regression analysis and t-
4 
tests. The analysis yields a result that the stronger the trade union is, the more significant the 
increase in the level of democracy that follows. 
Chapters 4 and 5 are the two paired case studies of Tunisia and Egypt and two Ukrainian 
Maidans. Chapter 4 shows how the participation of a strong trade union, the Union Générale 
Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) in Tunisia helped to organize negotiations and solve three 
political crises and how Egypt clearly lacked this power. Chapter 5 shows how the vertical, 
hierarchical organization of the 2004 protests ensured successful negotiations that failed in 
2014 because of the decentralized network structure of the protest. The conclusion summarizes 
the results of this thesis, discusses the contributions to the existing literature, and, finally, points 





Chapter 1.  
Theory, research question, and argument 
 
This chapter reviews the theories on pacted transitions, formulates the research question, and 
outlines the theoretical expectations and hypotheses. The first part details the treatment of 
pacted transitions in the literature on democratization. In so doing, it touches upon the debate 
between structure and agency in regime change, namely, between “transitology” and 
modernization theories. It then summarizes the various understandings of pacted transitions 
and the concepts of modes of regime change these definitions come from. Finally, it 
summarizes the preconditions for pacted transitions in the existing literature and stresses the 
gaps. 
The second part of the chapter spells out my hypotheses: first, how the presence of observed 
organizations is expected to facilitate negotiations; second, what characteristics are expected 
to facilitate pacting, and for which of them the data is available. 
1.1. State of the art: Pacted transitions in the literature 
1.1.1. “Transitology” versus modernization theory 
Why are some countries democracies while others are not? Depending on where answer for 
this question is sought for, the democratization scholarship remains divided between the 
structuralist and agency-centric traditions. For the former, political regimes are mostly 
predetermined by economic development, whereas for the latter, actors' actions play a central 
role in the choice over a country’s political regime even when the preconditions are absent. 
The general structuralist argument is that the modernization process—the spread of 
urbanization, literacy, mass education, and the emergence of mass media, the change in class 
structure, and so on—increases the likelihood states will democratize (Inglehart, 2018a; Lipset, 
1959; Przeworski, 1999; Vanhanen, 2003). According to this logic, poor, undeveloped 
countries are prone to be autocratic, while their wealthy, developed counterparts are very likely 
to be ruled in a polyarchic way. In contrast to the modernization approach, the “transitologists” 
argue that at least part of the “regime decision” also depends on the interactions and choices of 
actors—for instance, over the mode of regime change. 
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The ideas of the structuralist approach date back to nineteenth-century social theory. In modern 
political science, it was first implemented by Lipset. In his pathbreaking article “Some Social 
Requisites of Democracy” (1959), he showed the correlation between economic development 
and democracy. Dividing countries into two categories— democratic and non-democratic — 
he then compared numerous indicators of their economic development and culture, starting 
with the number of cars per capita and finishing with religion. His argument expanded beyond 
mere economic development. For instance, he argued that the Catholic and Orthodox Christian 
religions, as well as Islam, are counter-productive for democratization. While it was truly 
pathbreaking and influential, Lipset’s work was criticized for its failure to specify causal 
mechanisms and ex-post determinism. 
Fifteen years after this paper was published, ironically, it was exactly the Catholic Church that 
changed its policy and started to promote democratization across Southern Europe, Latin 
America, and, eventually, Eastern Europe. For instance, the Catholic Church played a 
significant role in democratizing Portugal, Spain, and Poland. Most of the “Latin American 
Stable Dictatorships” that had once been considered too backward to democratize followed. It 
turned out that in certain conditions, the choices of actors were crucial for the political regime. 
The avalanche of authoritarian breakdowns began in 1974, democratizing numerous countries 
that were once thought to be incompatible with democracy. The breakdown of military regimes 
in Southern Europe and Latin America in the late 1970s was later followed by the end of the 
Cold War with the Soviet Union and the collapse of its satellites regimes, starting with 
communist dictatorships of the Warsaw Pact and finishing with the pro-communist regimes in 
Central Africa. 
Drawing on these numerous transition cases, an entire branch of literature emerged to describe 
and analyze those processes. O’Donnell and colleagues (1986) were the first to systematically 
compare the different typical scenarios in which authoritarian regimes collapsed—that is, the 
modes of regime change. They noticed that cooperative transitions, as opposed to 
confrontational and violent revolutions, more often lead to successful democratization. 
Huntington (1993b) noticed that societies learn from each other and that the example of 
democratization in one country can inspire new transitions in neighboring ones. Many other 
works that have described choices of actors had followed. Rejecting the determinism of 
modernization theories, these studies could provide some guidelines to democratic activists.  
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Thus, by the 1990s, the consensus appeared to be that democratization in fact required no social 
and economic prerequisites and, indeed, that most if not all countries would eventually 
democratize.(Fukuyama, 1989). 
However, many countries failed to democratize. The main problem in transitology studies is 
that contrary to theoretical expectations, most authoritarian breakdowns have not led to 
democratization (Bunce, 1995; Geddes, 1999a). I discuss the problems of this approach in 
detail in the following sections. Moreover, those countries that did not democratize were also 
less economically developed. The choices actors make are important, but they mostly play a 
role within structural limits. 
More contemporary modernization theories have hewed close to the initial assumptions made 
by Lipset while specifying more closely causal mechanisms. From any point of view, it is now 
an established fact that a level of democracy is a function of GDP per capita (Boix, 2011). GDP 
per capita is connected with many variables, and therefore, many theories exist that explain 
this connection with different causal mechanisms, from cultural attitudes to economic 
inequality and social classes. For instance, Inglehart (2018b) connects economic growth with 
individualistic values of self-expression that lead to demands for democracy and eventually to 
democratization. Vanhanen (1997, 2003) has connected the distribution of the means of 
production and literacy in a country—what he calls power resources—with its level of 
democracy. Przeworski (1999) claims that democratic stability is connected with economic 
prosperity and equality. For Putman (1994) it is social capital—the density of the civil society 
organizations—that ensures the proper functioning of democracy. Though the explanatory 
mechanisms are different, in general, the original direction has not changed much from 1959—
processes of economic development, such as industrialization and urbanization, are also 
beneficial for democratization. 
At the same time, the problems inherent in the modernization approach—namely, ex-post 
determinism and numerous outliers—remain. The first is an assumption that the countries that 
are non-democratic now will hardly democratize later, and therefore all the features that 
distinguish them are claimed to lead to autocracy. The outliers of these theories are the states 
that have reached a certain level of development (such as China and Russia) but have not 
actually democratized and the states that have democratized despite being underdeveloped 
(such as Ghana and Mongolia). In these cases, the explanations exist at lower levels of 
aggregation, such as actors and their iterations. 
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The contemporary voluntaristic scholarship also embeds some structural prerequisites. 
Although the interactions of actors can vary, the theories assume certain preconditions need to 
be fulfilled before negotiations even begin. For instance, according to some theories, elites start 
to negotiate over democratization only when inequality decreases, and thus the costs of 
maintaining autocracy exceed the costs of democratization (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2009; 
Rosendorff, 2001). In addition, the literature that analyses different modes of regime change 
now requires certain preconditions for each of those modes going that far that can also require 
a particular type of incumbent regime (Geddes et al., 2018b; Linz & Stepan, 1996b). Therefore, 
the current trend is to integrate the structural and actor levels into one explanatory model. 
1.1.2. What is a pacted transition? 
The actor-centric theories of regime change share one pivotal concept—the pacted transition. 
As opposed to bottom-up revolutions or transitions imposed by the elites, a pact is considered 
to be the most plausible (albeit not the only) path to democratization. In different theories, the 
concept of pacted transition has taken different names: cooperative transition, pact, 
transplacement, transition by agreement, and the like. The understanding of pacted transition 
that is more or less common for all the theories is a regime change driven by an agreement 
between the leaders of the opposition and regime elites that touches upon at least the procedure 
of transfer of power (but can also sometimes be that extensive that it includes constitution 
writing). Classifications of modes of regime change from which pacted transitions come about 
are also numerous. This section compares the understandings of pacted transitions most 
commonly presented in the literature and summarizes them in Table 1.1. 
The classic typology is offered by O’Donnell and colleagues (1986) and specifies four modes 
of regime change. Transitions are divided using two scales—the driver (regime elites or the 
opposition) and the degree of cooperation between regime elites and the opposition 
(cooperation or confrontation). This results in different modes of regime change: “(1) reform; 
(2) revolution; (3) pacted; and (4) imposed” (Schmitter, 2014, p. 7, citing O'Donnell et al. 
1986). For O’Donnell and colleagues, reform change occurs when a protest movement 
demands liberalization, eventually forcing the regime to democratize, while revolutions refer 
to the physical displacement of elites. Moreover, pacted transitions are driven by negotiations 
between elites and the opposition. Finally, imposed transitions are initiated and undertaken by 
the government alone without the participation of the masses or opposition groups. 
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Other classifications are different mostly in their fragmentation of modes of regime change. 
The number of modes of regime change depends on the number of actors and the number of 
steps they make. One of the simplest versions has two actors that play once resulting in  three 
modes of regime change , starting from the one imposed by regime elites and finishing with a 
revolution (Casper & Taylor, 1996). Adam Przeworski (1999) further divides regime elites and 
the opposition into moderates and radicals, thus ending up with four actor types. Joseph 
Colomer (2000) offers the most complex classification that indicates six actor types—three 
from the opposition and three from the government. These actors negotiate through various 
steps across different games played in multiple scenarios. Also, classifications vary in what 
preconditions are needed for a pacted transition to take place, from absolutely no preconditions 
in extreme cases (Colomer, 2000; Huntington, 1993b; Stradiotto & Guo, 2014) to a specific 
type of incumbent regime4 (Geddes, 1999b; Linz & Stepan, 1996b). In general, the theories 
would require a certain level of pluralism within the elite bloc and the existence of an 
opposition (O’Donnell et al., 1986; Przeworski, 1999). The chapter devotes a section below to 
this debate. Again, Table 1.1 summarizes the various understandings of pacted transitions: the 
labels given to different types of transitions, the number and names of actors initiating and 
participating in these transitions, and, finally, the preconditions for those transitions (with a 
separate column for liberalization criterion). 
The concept of pacted transition was later criticized, first, for lacking the criteria that can help 
understand whether a transition belongs to one mode of regime change or another (Bunce, 
1995, p. 113). Second, the idea of pacted transition is vulnerable to concept stretching: every 
transition includes negotiations within the regime elite (Geddes, 1999c, p. 5; Przeworski, 1999, 
p. 80), and that is why one could ascribe the “pact” label to virtually any transition, if not guided 
by criteria that are far stricter than those from the early transitology literature. For instance, 
Rosendorff (2001) goes so far as to lump together the concepts of “democratization” and 
“pact,” thereby understanding elite pacts on democratization as a natural continuation of the 
elites’ desire to democratize and assuming a pact to be the only route to democracy. Geddes 
(1999c, p. 5) solved this problem by distinguishing between the two understandings of pacts 
depending on who signs them—one implies two competing groups within the elite bloc; the 
other suggests any elite agreements struck among any group of elites. 
 
4 Although, these two theories are less actor centric. 
10 
This thesis adopts a definition of pacted transitions adapted from O’Donnell and colleagues 
(1986) for the following reasons. First, this work is central in the transitology literature, and 
every new “transitology” theory is derived from this understanding of the concept, developing 
more elaborated or simplified classifications and, consequently, definitions, with the original 
definition still retaining its central stance. Second, unlike all other definitions, this one offers 
us the tools to distinguish between a “pacted transition” and one that is merely cooperative, 
without a pact (a “reform,” in their terms) by pointing out the explicit character of negotiations. 
This concept is thus easier to operationalize, as it allows us to look for the instances of 
negotiations while avoiding arbitrary judgments on how cooperative a transition is. This way, 
I take care of the difficulty of distinguishing between the different modes of regime change. 
In Transitions From Authoritarian Rule, O’Donnell and colleagues (1986, p. 37) define pacted 
transition from non-democratic rule as “an explicit, but not always publicly explicated or 
justified, agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define (or, better, to redefine) 
rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the ‘vital interests’ 
of those entering into it.” Taking the above-mentioned critique into account, I narrow down a 
“select set of actors” to both “elites-in-government and elites-in-opposition” to exclude 
agreements merely within the opposition or within the ruling elites, which are of course 
immanent to any regime change. To avoid arbitrary judgments, I understand the explicit 
character as an occurrence of both elites-in-power and elites-in-opposition sitting in the same 
room. Therefore, my understanding is: pacted transitions are transitions from the non-
democratic rule that are led by (1) explicit negotiated agreements among (2) elites-in-power 
and elites-in-opposition that are (3) rule-setting and based on (4) mutual “vital interest” 
guarantees.5 
1.1.3. Why are only successful attempts at pacts studied? 
There is an inherent bias in the “transitology” tradition that means it has overlooked negative 
cases. Much is written on successful attempts at pacted transitions that have produced 
democratic results. Strikingly, attempts at negotiating transitions that eventually failed are 
much less analyzed. Most democratizations in which attempts at negotiations failed at some 
point are treated as revolutions as if the actors never even attempted to pursue a cooperative 
strategy. Those transitions that did not lead to democracy are not considered instances of 
 
5 Vital interests are personal freedom, safety, and property rights. 
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regime change and are only studied outside the “transitology” paradigm. This section 




Table 1.1 Different approaches to modes of regime change
 
 
7 Three stages—namely (1) critical juncture, (2) sorting out, and (3) deal cutting. 
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The early voluntaristic branch of the studies of regime change was criticized for two things—
selection on the dependent variable and the “electoralist fallacy.” It selected cases based on the 
occurrence of successful democratic transitions and compared those transitions among 
themselves. This approach made a great deal of creating sensible categorizations of modes of 
regime change. At the same time, it overlooked those political crises and contentious actions 
that did not remove authoritarian leaders, or where such leaders were removed, it did not lead 
a country to democracy. Therefore, no matter whether it is a pacted transition or any other 
mode of regime change, little attention was paid to the negative scenarios. The “electoralist 
fallacy” (Bunce, 1995; Geddes, 1999a) is another bias of this branch of literature on transitions 
that emerged from the very narrow definition of democracy and democratization that has 
essentially taken it for granted that whenever democratic institutions are established, 
democratization happens. For instance, Huntington (1993b, pp. 6–7) adhered to an abridged 
version of Schumpeter’s definition of democracy. This potentially could lead scholars to 
overlook those cases of pacted transitions that were successful at bringing about the façade of 
democratic institutions but eventually did not lead to democracy. 
In the contemporary literature in the field, it is also common to identify attempted 
democratizations in the country-year data sets through the rapid increase in levels of 
democracy. In other words, most of those studies tend to consider only those cases where an 
increase in the level of democracy was above a certain threshold (Treisman, 2020a, 2017; Guo 
& Stradiotto, 2014; Stradiotto & Guo, 2010a; Rosendorff, 2001). Although this approach does 
not yield unplausible results per se, it leaves little room to study less successful attempts at 
democratization— among them, failed attempts at pacted transitions. At the same time, recent 
studies of authoritarian regimes that are not focused on democratization, and, therefore, do not 
select on the instances of an increase in the level of democracy, sometimes point out that there 
are instances when attempted negotiations failed, for instance, in Congo in 1992 and Togo in 
1991 (Geddes et al., 2018b, p. 208). 
Therefore, agency-focused studies of democratization have concentrated chiefly on successful 
cases of democratization. Unfortunately, this has left many transitions where the actors failed 
to democratize understudied. At the same time, having the data on actors in failed attempts at 
democratization (and in failed negotiation attempts) would allow for a systematic comparison 
with more successful cases. Closing this gap will enrich our knowledge of democratization. 
 
 14 
1.1.4. Pacted transitions and democratic outcomes 
Societies that undergo pacted transitions from authoritarian rule are known to have excellent 
chances of democratization. The explanations behind this phenomenon vary. Early 
“transitologists” (see, e.g., Casper & Taylor, 1996; Huntington, 1993b; O’Donnell et al., 1986, 
and many others) see the reason for the success of such transitions in the path dependency they 
create. Pacted transitions provide the most efficient and the least violent path toward 
democracy because they level the playing field, exclude radicals, and help forestall violence. 
Contemporary scholars of regime change connect the mode of regime change with the type of 
authoritarian regime in question, and pacted transitions happen in those autocratic regimes that 
are anyway likely to be followed by democracy (Geddes et al., 2018b; Linz & Stepan, 1996b). 
In their famous Transitions From Authoritarian Rule, O’Donnell and colleagues (2013, 1986) 
argue that elite-led transitions—pacted and imposed—are the easiest route to achieve 
democratization, and that “[pacts] enhance the probability that the process will lead to a viable 
political democracy.” (2013, pp. 42–45, 1986). Pacts help avoid the dominance of a single actor 
and prevent violence as changes are adopted In the situation of a pact, “competing groups are 
interdependent,” and by negotiating, they can come to a solution that is the second-best option 
for every actor but does not allow any of them to dominate. That is why pacts help to level the 
playing field for further competition. Also, by reaching a formal agreement, pacted transitions 
help make a roadmap to follow. Having the guarantees that such a roadmap offers in mind, the 
actors involved in a pact are interested in limiting the potential that one or more actors will turn 
to violence to achieve their desired outcomes. 
This idea is supported by Munk and Leff (1997) and by Huntington in his Third Wave (1993b). 
In addition, Joseph Colomer (2000) argues that “transitions by agreement” are the best and the 
safest way of democratization, which can lead to democratic results even when some 
preconditions for democracy are not favorable. 
Przeworski (1999) describes the disadvantages of the non-pacted modes of regime change. He 
writes that although pacts make democratic transitions “more problematic and longer,” more 
radical modes of regime change—“transitions by extrication” in the author’s terms—can give 
too much influence to a certain actor or social group, and, most dangerously, to the military. 
Later, this can undermine democracy. Huntington (1993) suggests that negotiating and 
reaching compromise is the very essence of every democratization. For him, as well as for 
 
 15 
Przeworski, the main advantage of the pacted transition is that it helps exclude radical forces 
because the regime elites will never agree to negotiate with them. On the contrary, in 
noncooperative modes of regime change, after the incumbent regime collapses suddenly, it 
leaves a power vacuum. This causes a struggle within the opposition that can eventually bring 
more radical forces to power. 
For those theories that connect modes of regime change with regime types, pacted transition is 
merely a confounding variable. In other words, pacting does not foster democratization per se 
but is rather one of the consequences of a favorable type of incumbent regime. Geddes (1999; 
2018) does not test whether the presence of pacts fosters further democratization, but she 
argues that military and single-party authoritarian regimes are more likely to be followed by 
democracy. At the same time, these regimes are more likely to end up with pacted transitions—
but the negotiated character of the transition appears to be just a confounding variable. 
Therefore, she does not test its pure effect. Linz and Stepan (1996) have a similar stance: those 
regimes that are likely to be followed with democracy also end up in pacted transitions. At the 
same time, they do not write that a pacted transition is necessarily the better way to achieve 
democracy. 
Guo and Stradiotto (2014; 2010a) provide quantitative analysis and conclude that the mode of 
regime change influences the results of transitions. They argue that pacted transitions are more 
likely to end up with democracy, whereas imposed and revolutionary ones tend to bring more 
autocratic results. The empirical observations support this argument. During the twentieth 
century, pacted transitions were both numerous and successful in terms of their outcomes.8 
Whereas on average, only 30% of the attempts at democratization during the Third Wave led 
to democratic outcomes (Geddes, 1996), most of the pacted transitions from authoritarian rule 
ended up with democracy. More precisely, within this list of twenty-six pacted transitions 
offered by Stradiotto and Guo,9 only one (Malaysia) remained a closed autocracy, and six (Fiji, 
 
8 According to the data, provided by Stradiotto and Guo (2014), twenty-six pacted transitions occurred during the 
twentieth century: Albania (in 1992), Benin (1991), Bolivia (1982), Botswana (1966), the Central African 
Republic (1993), the Dominican Republic (1978), Fiji (1970), Finland (1917), Hungary (1990), India (1950), 
Madagascar (1992), Malawi (1994), Malaysia (1957), Moldova (1991), Mongolia (1992), Nepal (1990), the 
Netherlands (1917), Nicaragua (1990), Poland (1989), Slovenia (1991), South Africa (1994), Sri Lanka (1948), 
Sweden (1917), Trinidad (1962), Uruguay (1985), and Zambia (1991). 
9 The definition offered by Stradiotto and Guo is different from mine. Therefore, their cases of pacted transitions 
do not necessarily overlap with mine. 
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Madagascar, Nepal, Albania, Central African Republic, and Zambia) failed to consolidate into 
full democracies, according to V-Dem data. Again, in all cases except for Malaysia, pacted 
transitions brought about significant increases in the level of democracy. 
The literature has developed three main arguments about the shortcomings of pacts. The first 
holds that, by their nature, pacts are oligarchic vehicles that can potentially serve undemocratic 
purposes. The second contends they can slow down the transition process, while the third 
argues they may limit the inclusiveness of a new regime. More concretely, according to 
O’Donnell and colleagues, a pact per se is an undemocratic vehicle: “[modern pacts] are 
typically negotiated among a small number of participants representing established (and often 
highly oligarchical) groups or institutions” (2013, p. 43), and it is somewhat a paradox that 
pacts facilitate democracy because they can “alter power relationships” (2013, p. 43). Linz and 
Stepan (1996a, pp. 56–61) hold the same position, arguing that pacts have different purposes, 
producing varying consequences, even if they are unintended. Indeed, they may even exclude 
some actors from the playing field, leading to undemocratic outcomes. Przeworski writes that 
pacts can slow or even freeze the process of democratization, making it “more problematic and 
longer” (Przeworski, 1999, p. 81). Finally, Casper and Tailor (1996) also argue that those 
transitions where both sides behave too cooperatively and conflict is entirely absent can lead 
to a limited democracy (in their terms, to a “democratic installation” without a “democratic 
consolidation”). 
To sum up, pacted transitions are argued to be the best and the safest (although not necessarily 
the fastest) way to achieve democracy, and most of the critique concerns the character of a 
pact, not its outcome. The empirical evidence supports these theoretical expectations. At the 
same time, one must keep in mind that any pacted transition stems from a paradox. A small 
number of elites-in-power and elites-in-opposition negotiate an outcome in an undemocratic 
way—excluding both citizens and many other political actors from the decision-making 
process—but in a way that helps avoid violence and agree new democratic power relationships. 
1.1.5. The preconditions for pacted transitions 
The connection between the character of opposition organizations and the mode of regime 
change is understudied by democratization scholars. In the earlier literature, the requirements 
for the opposition were sometimes posed but were never tested. In the later scholarship, the 
presence of an opposition is always understood as a part of a “regime” bundle. 
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While the regime change scholarship generally emphasizes the role of agency over structural 
conditions in transition processes, some authors still stress the presence of preconditions for 
pacted transitions. These requirements can be divided into two groups—those that are based 
merely on agency (i.e., previous events), the “liberalization” argument, and those that present 
more “structural” arguments about the incumbent regime’s type (see summary Table 1.1). 
While it is hard to operationalize liberalization, there is a lot of room to research what features 
of the “type of the regime” bundle allow for pacted transitions. This section will introduce an 
overview of these arguments and present their conceptual advantages and shortcomings. The 
preconditions required from elites-in-power and elites-in-opposition will also be presented. 
The early wave of studies of regime change asserted that the opposition would need some 
degree of achieved development before pacting could occur (Casper & Taylor, 1996; Colomer, 
2000; O’Donnell et al., 1986). Nevertheless, this requirement never assumed a central place in 
such theories, being neither operationalized nor tested empirically. In addition, this opposition 
requirement has its roots in the “liberalization” argument. Most of the theories10 have assumed 
that a certain phase of liberalization, “the process of redefining and extending rights” 
(O’Donnell et al., 2013, p. 6), always precedes pacted transitions to democracy (Colomer, 
2000; Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007; Geddes, 2005; Karl, 1990; 
O’Donnell et al., 1986; Przeworski, 1999). During this phase, the mass public understands that 
protest activity is no longer repressed, opposition organizations can achieve some degree of 
development, and elite actors secure certain freedoms (Casper & Taylor, 1996; Colomer, 2000; 
O’Donnell et al., 1986). 
Later this argument was found problematic mainly because, in reality, some regime 
breakdowns happen without a liberalizing phase (Bunce, 1995; Geddes, 1999a), while other 
regimes exploit the limited existence of opposition parties to maintain autocratic stability (Boix 
& Svolik, 2013; Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007; Geddes, 2005). 
Second, this argument assumes that every society has the potential to develop strong civil 
society organizations as soon as restrictions are lifted. However, not all countries are developed 
enough to have a vibrant civil society, even if one is allowed in principle. Third, the degree of 
liberalization “is not […] measurable according to a common scale for all cases” (O’Donnell 
et al., 2013, p. 9). 
 
10 Except for Casper and Tailor (1996), Linz and Stepan (1996), and Rosendorff (2001). 
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More recent scholarship on pacted transitions understands the existence of the opposition as a 
built-in feature of the regime. In a nutshell, leaders of more personalistic and deinstitutionalized 
regimes are less incentivized and less likely to negotiate their exit (Geddes et al., 2018a; Linz 
& Stepan, 1996b). Leaders in more depersonalized non-democracies—party dictatorships, 
including their post-totalitarian subtypes and military dictatorships—are known to be more 
pluralistic both within the elites and the opposition (ibid.). In the most recent studies, where 
regimes are understood as a continuous scale between military and personalistic, 
personalization decreases the chances a regime will end up with a pacted transition. In contrast, 
more institutionalized party dictatorships are very likely to have a pacted transition (Geddes et 
al., 2018a, p. 212). 
Barbara Geddes argues that military and single-party regimes are more likely to negotiate their 
exit. The main causal mechanism is political elites’ incentives. Power may not be the primary 
goal for military officers—they are also chasing corporate military gains or the furtherance of 
their military careers. Therefore, officers are likely to cede power to civilians if it helps them 
achieve subsidiary goals (Geddes, 1999c, pp. 11–16; Geddes et al., 2018a). In single-party 
regimes, party cadres are interested in staying in office, and they can do so even after 
democratization, especially if the party has guarantees it can participate in subsequent free and 
fair elections (Geddes, 1999c, pp. 24, 25). That is why the elites-in-power of both kinds of 
regimes are interested in negotiating exit. This approach offers very specific preconditions—
connected with motivation—that are impossible to analyze separately from the regime type. 
As mentioned, Linz and Stephan (1996b, p. 61) argue that specific conditions are required to 
make pacts possible. As long as a pact occurs among moderates from the government and 
moderates from the opposition, there are two requirements. First, moderates from the 
government group should have some freedom to negotiate. Second, “the moderates in the 
opposition need a degree of continued organizational presence, power and followers in the 
polity to play their part in the negotiation pacts” (1996b, p. 61). These conditions can only be 
met in “post-totalitarian” or “authoritarian” regimes; they never exist in “totalitarian” and 
“sultanistic” ones. 
Also, some literature provides specific requirements pertaining to elites-in-power that enable 
pacted transition. Rosendorff (2001) claims that elites should have certain economic incentives 
to initiate pacted transitions. Concretely, they are likely to negotiate when the level of 
inequality is decreasing, when economic growth is stagnating or when the cost of maintaining 
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the status quo exceeds the cost of toleration. Linz and Stepan (1996a) also assume that the 
elites have some degree of internal pluralism such that moderates are given ample scope to run 
the negotiations. Geddes (Geddes et al., 2018b) writes, again, that there should be incentives 
for the regime elites—military or party members—to negotiate transitions. Such incentives 
guarantee that incumbent elites will not be excluded from the new system, but it might also be 
a chance for parties to win subsequent free and fair elections. Casper and Tailor (1996) note 
that the elites-in-power11 must feel sure that they will lose power anyway. 
While the criterion of opposition organizational capacity has been mentioned in the existing 
literature, it has only ever been in passing and has never been tested empirically. The reason is 
the theoretical design: the liberalization argument neither allows for any operationalization nor 
does it account for structure, and a regime type argument does not allow (or require) these 
criteria to be tested separately. Instead, regime type theories analyze the entire regime bundle. 
To sum up, the literature highlights different requirements enabling pacted transitions. One 
branch bases its arguments on prior conditions (i.e., liberalization), while the other branch 
concentrates on the nature of the incumbent regime. The common point of those theories is that 
to make a pacted transition possible, the opposition needs to acquire a certain degree of 
organizational capacity. At the same time, elites should be heterogeneous and incentivized 
enough to surrender office peacefully. Nevertheless, the existing research has never 
operationalized or tested the preconditions regarding the opposition in pacted transitions. 
1.2. Research question 
1.2.1. Why is it important to analyze the preconditions for pacted transitions? 
Pacted transitions require at least two things—a high degree of pluralism among elites in the 
incumbent regime and significant organizational capacity within the opposition. Moreover, 
echoing the modernization theories, this high organizational capacity of the opposition might 
reflect a high level of social capital, which is beneficial for democratization regardless of the 
mode of regime change. Thus, what remains uncertain here is the origin of these democratic 
outcomes—is it agency per se or the high organizational capacity of the opposition that enables 
these pacted transitions? To approach this question, one needs, first, a more precise 
 
11 The “Defender” actor in the authors’ terms. 
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understanding and operationalization of the organizational capacity of the opposition, and, 
second, an empirically based knowledge of the extent to which the opposition should be 
organized to enable the negotiated transition. 
The operationalization of structural preconditions for pacted transitions can help bridge 
modernization and voluntaristic theories of regime change. The argument that a certain regime 
type is more likely to end up with pacted transitions and to democratize comes very close to 
the structural argument. However, it is still impossible to build it into the modernization branch 
of theories of democracy. The fact that a country has one or another type of non-democratic 
regime does not necessarily mean that it is more (or less) developed and, consequently, more 
or less likely to be democratic. However, the preconditions for the organizational capacity of 
the opposition steer close to the concept of social capital and, thus, to modernization theories. 
In many cases, the bundle category of regime type is unable to predict the mode of regime 
change, whereas the organizational capacity of the opposition provides a plausible explanation. 
For instance, in Egypt in 2011-2013, the regime was somewhat close (see below) to what 
(Geddes et al., 2014) call military dictatorship and was therefore likely to end up with a pacted 
transition. Nevertheless, the weakness and the internal divisions of the opposition allowed 
military elites to abandon the results of negotiations. Eventually, the Egyptian transition ended 
with a coup d’état. On the other hand, in Geddes’ (ibid.) understanding, the pre-2011 Tunisian 
regime was closer to a personalist dictatorship, and therefore, elites were less likely to 
negotiate. Nevertheless, strong trade unions, professional associations, and civil society 
organizations made a pacted transition possible in Tunisia. 
Categorization omits a part of reality, which in this case implies that a regime may, in fact, 
embody different party, personalistic, and even military dictatorship characteristics at the same 
time. For instance, the above-mentioned Egyptian regime exhibited characteristics of all three 
types. Some of the latest studies in the field also unpack the “regime type” variable and delve 
into the characteristics of a regime. For example, in their most recent book, Geddes et al. 
(2018a) describe a regime’s probability of undergoing a pacted transition and take into account 
not the regime type but the degree of regime personalization, where less personalized regimes 
are more likely to negotiate a pact. Thus, they create dummy variables to account for a civilian 
or military origin of dictatorship instead of lumping them together into a categorical variable. 
Another example of unpacking the “regime type” variable in the field is a study by Wright and 
Escriba-Folsch (Wright & Escribà-Folch, 2012), which shows that the existence of 
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authoritarian opposition parties and parliaments helps ensure a better post-office fate for 
dictators—in contrast to regimes that lack these institutions. My research takes another step in 
this direction by unpacking what is understood by “opposition”—in terms of its presence and 
organizational capacity—rather than relying on the “regime” category. 
Against the backdrop of this discussion, my research question is the following: 
What sets and features of opposition organizations account for the success and failure of 
attempts at pacted transitions? 
1.3. Argument: expectations for features of the opposition 
organizations 
1.3.1. Characteristics of opposition organizations 
In the opposition camp, very few organizations are interested in negotiations even though all 
of them would benefit from democratization. According to most texts in the mainstream 
transitology paradigm (Colomer, 2000; Levitsky & Way, 2010a; Przeworski, 1999), the 
opposition is divided between “moderates” and “radicals.” Additionally, Casper and Taylor 
(1996) point to the “Mass Public” actor. Let us assume these three players—“moderates,” 
“radicals,” and “mass public”—exist inside the opposition camp. 
They have different preferences. The preference of most of the people on the streets—the “mass 
public” — is to establish democracy and punish the dictator while keeping violence as low as 
possible. The preference of a democratic movement and its leadership—“moderates”—is, first, 
to secure its position after democratization, second, to achieve democracy, and third, to keep 
the level of violence as low as possible. The organization itself has little or no interest in 
punishing the dictator, especially if this punishment increases the transaction costs of achieving 
democracy. Small organizations in these huge alliances share the same goal as the whole 
movement—first, securing their positions, and second, achieving democracy. However, they 
are not likely to be represented in a pact. In addition, some of the stakeholders in the opposition 
alliance—namely its radical flanks—“radicals,” prefer first to secure their position in a new 




Thus, each of the actors above is interested (to a greater or lesser extent) in the principal fruit 
of the pacted transition—democratization. At the same time, only those organizations and 
leaders are interested in achieving it through negotiations that are actually present during these 
negotiations—that is, the “the moderates.” How do the others react when the leaders of the 
democratic movement, the “moderates,” start to negotiate? The very essence of any pacted 
transition is to exclude radicals (within both the government and the opposition) from the 
negotiations. Huntington once formulated this as follows: ''You get your radicals under control, 
and we will control ours" (1993b, p. 160). In fact, due to a limited number of participants in 
these pacts—from 3 to 300, but typically around 30 (Paffenholz et al., 2017, p. 31)—small 
organizations, even if they are moderate, might also not make it to negotiations. The radical 
opposition, being aware that it will be excluded from the pact and the authoritarian leader will 
avoid punishment, will resist the negotiation initiative as much as possible, persuading the 
others that any negotiation with incumbent elites is an act of collaboration. For instance, in 
Ukraine in 2014, the radical wings of the opposition—the Right Sector and some of Maidan`s 
field commanders—fiercely rejected the agreement signed between the president and the 
opposition. In Poland in 1989, after the first round of Magdalenca talks, Fighting Solidarity, 
the radical wing of the Solidarity movement, strongly opposed the very idea of further 
negotiations. People on the streets are also generally not happy when their leaders are 
negotiating with autocratic elites. For instance, in Ukraine in 2014, the opposition leaders were 
forced to beg forgiveness from the crowd for the mere fact of shaking hands with the president. 
Despite all the participants of a democratic movement sharing a common goal (i.e., to establish 
democracy), only its leaders—those represented during the talks—are actually interested in 
negotiations with incumbent elites. And thus, some institutional power and symbolic authority 
over the opposition movement are needed to persuade its members that pacting with 
authoritarian elites is better than a forceful solution. More than that, the leaders of a democratic 
movement must persuade the incumbent elites that they will keep their promises. This task is 
easier to accomplish if there is a record of previous negotiations with autocratic elites. 
Therefore, being able to do negotiations with incumbent elites requires opposition 
organizations to have certain characteristics. 
The democratization literature has developed a set of opposition organizational characteristics 
that make them capable of participating in a pacted transition. Thus, the opposition should have 
“sufficient strength”(Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 168) and “a degree of continued, organizational 
presence” (ibid.) Another argument requires the opposition to be “unified” to participate in 
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negotiations because unity helps it resist repression and be a better counterpart in the later 
stages (Friedheim, 1993, pp. 494–495; Jenkins, 1983). These arguments come very close to the 
more modern understanding of organizational capacity, which “determines whether regulations 
are enforced, revenues are collected, benefits are distributed, and programs are completed” 
(Ting, 2009). 
Also, these arguments follow the same direction. To make the negotiations possible, the 
opposition needs sufficient organizational capacity to offer credible commitments and make 
credible threats. To be capable of credible commitments requires that the opposition convince 
incumbents that it will hold to its promises—persuading the masses to stop violence, lifting 
sieges of government buildings, or ensuring that the incumbent is not prosecuted after leaving 
office—once the pact is settled. Likewise, the capacity to make credible threats allows the 
opposition to persuade incumbents that it will follow through on actions that will likely harm 
them—namely, mobilizing mass-scale protests, organizing nationwide strikes or eventually 
prosecuting or sanctioning incumbents once they depart from office. 
1.3.2. Types of opposition organizations 
By definition, negotiated transitions involve two counterparts among the political elite—those 
who rule and those who are in opposition (Casper & Taylor, 1996; Colomer, 2000; Geddes, 
1999a; Geddes et al., 2014, 2018a; Huntington, 1993a; Linz & Stepan, 1996b; O’Donnell et 
al., 1986; Przeworski, 1999; Stradiotto & Guo, 2010b, 2014). Among those who represent the 
opposition, the presence of political parties, trade unions, and the Catholic Church are 
expected to benefit the success of negotiations and the chances of subsequent democratization. 
Among the ruling elites, the leaders of party and military dictatorships are expected to 
contribute to the success of the negotiations and the chances of subsequent democratization. 
Political parties in authoritarian regimes, if they are permitted and can participate in 
parliament, are known to increase the chances of incumbent elites negotiating exit guarantees 
and to foster further democratization (Wright & Escribà-Folch, 2012, p. 40). However, since 
parties are present in virtually every pact, it is impossible to test how their absence would affect 
the negotiations. Consequently, this analysis only focuses on their continued organizational 
presence instead. 
Trade unions can create space for a protest that can delegitimate the regime and foster the 
democratic transition (Collier, 1999, p. 165). Moreover, at the stage of negotiations, trade 
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unions can help increase contestation by forcing the incumbent to allow left-wing parties (ibid.) 
Also, the “proletarianization” argument in the literature says that trade unions are especially 
active during certain stages of economic development when labor becomes strong (Collier, 
1999; Collier & Mahoney, 1997; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992). Rueschemeyer and colleagues 
go even further, arguing that the reason underlying the correlation between modernization and 
democratization is that the former begets an industrial working class, which is the most 
consistent proponent of democracy. That argument, however, is mainly associated with the first 
wave of democratization. 
Trade unions tend to endure for quite a long time, sometimes for many generations, and thus 
often have a long legacy of existence even under authoritarianism. Their participation in 
transitions shows that they manage to preserve at least part of their bottom-up origins. In this 
sense, trade unions have experience in negotiating solutions to enduring conflicts with the state. 
During the regime's collapse, this legacy ensures the political elites that the trade union’s 
promises are credible. In addition, having existed for decades (potentially), trade unions have 
leaderships that are less personalized and more institutionalized. This depersonalization of the 
opposition movement is expected to work precisely as the depersonalization of the regime`s 
leadership (see below). In addition, they tend to have a very subordinated, hierarchical structure 
that makes them capable of credible commitment. 
Depersonalization and hierarchical organization are even more valid for the Catholic Church. 
During the transitions of the Third Wave, it was frequently the case that the Church participated 
in round tables.12 Traditionally avoiding association with opposition movements, the Church’s 
position shifted during the Second Vatican Council in 1965, and it started to promote 
democracy in those parts of the world where Catholic congregations lived under authoritarian 
rule (Mantilla, 2010). Nowadays, the Catholic Church is understood as an important mediator 
that increases the chances that the negotiated outcomes are, in fact, implemented (Paffenholz 
 
12 In my research, the representatives of Islam participated in negotiations on three occasions. The two actors from 
the Islamic world who participated in pacting and are religious, Mohamed Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 
2011-2013 and Ayatollah Khomeini’s National Front in Iran 1978-1979, are considered as political parties 
because they were striving for political power and offices. Neither country ended up with democratization. In 
addition, Imams participated in negotiations in Sudan in 1985. But there, the new regime only lasted for four 
years. Additionally, they did not seem to play much a role. I believe that it is due to the decentralized and at the 
same time personalized character of Islam that it has never facilitated negotiations. 
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et al., 2017). What makes it different from any other religious organization is Catholicism's 
centralized and hierarchical character that ensures its credible commitment. 
Speaking of the ruling elites, the literature argues that the leaders of party and military regimes 
are more likely to negotiate their exit (Geddes et al., 2018b). First, in bureaucratized 
dictatorships, it is very hard to attribute policies or actions in a bureaucratized dictatorship to 
one particular institution or actor. Thus, it is unlikely that party members or military officers 
will be punished after the autocratic breakdown. The same is not the case for a personalist 
dictator. Second, party and military cadres are likely to preserve their jobs after the regime 
collapses. If a party of an incumbent regime is allowed to participate in democratic elections, 
party bureaucrats can avoid losing their jobs. Third, bureaucratized regimes normally allow for 
more pluralism both within the elites and within the opposition. Thus, each of the three 
opposition actors is more likely to participate in negotiations in party regimes. 
1.3.3. Problems measuring the characteristics of opposition organizations 
The literature on parties, social movements, and trade unions does seek to measure their 
organizational capacity. Yet, none of those measurements applies straightforwardly to this 
research because of the inherent diversity of non-democratic regimes. First, the literature on 
political parties normally operationalizes their capacity with votes earned during elections 
(Hale, 2015; Tavits, 2008). However, this assumes some degree of free and fair elections in the 
incumbent regime, which is obviously not the case in dictatorships. Second, the extent to which 
some elements of elections are present in these regimes varies dramatically. Therefore, it is 
impossible to compare them with each other. The literature on social movements measures the 
organizational capacity through the ability to mobilize people and resources, with a trade-off 
between the two (Della Porta & Diani, 2011). Although the number of people on the streets 
can be measured, it is unclear in many cases whether they were mobilized by organizations or 
came on their own. For instance, in both Egypt (in 2011-2013) and Ukraine (2013-2014), most 
of the people were brought onto the streets by friends and relatives (Onuch, 2014; Warkotsch, 
2014, p. 176). Moreover, there exists no data on the quantity of resources—such as money, 
offices, or employees—that would cover the whole sample of countries. Finally, the number 




Unlike with parties, the strength of trade unions can be measured via membership. Although 
the established trade unions also have the same problem with losing popularity and ability to 
mobilize when they become too institutionalized, as social movements do, each of the trade 
unions that participated in negotiations organized major strikes before the regime breakdown 
and therefore was not co-opted into the regime. 
Social movements theories suggest that the protest movements might not have any 
organizational form when they emerge, but after the initial wave fades, with time, they either 
disappear or turn into organizations (Della Porta & Diani, 2011). Those organizations might 
have less support, but they normally have resources—cadres, offices, and money—instead. 
Therefore, this research considers parties' organizational existence, which is approximated by 
the age of the oldest party that participated in the negotiations. 
Since the existing theories mostly explain both occurrences of pacted transition and subsequent 
democratization with the incumbent regime type, it is also included in the analysis. This 
condition, first, controls for ruling elites` will to negotiate because Geddes and colleagues 
(2018a) expect ruling elites to be willing to negotiate in party regimes rather than in 
personalistic ones. Second, this will show whether moving from a party regime overlaps with 
high opposition organizational capacity. 
To sum up, I claim that the opposition movement’s solid organizational capacity of can be 
reached when it includes established parties participating in the pact, trade unions, and the 
Catholic Church. In line with the literature, party and military regimes are also expected to 
contribute to the probability of successful negotiations. 
Therefore, in the next chapters, I will test the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: the presence of strong organizations fosters the success of negotiations 
and subsequent democratization. Three types of organizations contribute in this sense: 
a) Trade unions 
b) The Catholic Church 
c) Established opposition parties. 





Chapter 2.  
Research design and data collection 
This chapter describes the research design and data. It is divided into two parts. The first part 
outlines the methods: namely, a combination of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and 
case studies for the most typical cases. It discusses the choice of the fuzzy-set QCA method 
supplemented with statistical analysis. It then describes the methodology applied in the 
qualitative case studies of Ukraine, Tunisia, and Egypt and the hierarchy between the levels of 
aggregation. The second part is devoted to the database on successful and failed attempts at 
pacting created for the QCA and quantitative analysis. It presents the unit of analysis, the choice 
of dependent and independent variables (conditions and outcomes, in the language of QCA), 
and the procedure used to collect the data. Then it introduces the instructions employed in the 
data collection process—namely, the coding rules for successful and failed attempts at pacts, 
the search procedures for the cases, the rules for the exclusion of cases, and finally, the bias 
implied by the adopted design. 
As discussed in detail in Chapter 1, this research aspires to tease out what sets and features of 
opposition organizations account for the success and failure of attempts at pacted transitions. 
First, I expect the organizational capacity of established opposition parties—that is, those older 
than five years, as opposed to newborn ones—to facilitate the success of negotiations attempt 
and further democratization. Second, considering trade unions, they are likely to survive the 
time of the authoritarian regime and then turn against the dictator when the regime collapses. 
Thus, their long experience of negotiations with the regime makes their commitment to 
incumbent elites more credible, whereas their leadership is less dependent on a personality. 
Finally, religious organizations, especially the Catholic Church, are known to successfully 
mediate the negotiations. 
2.1. Methods 
To support my argument and test these hypotheses, I adopt a research design that combines 
quantitative and qualitative methods. Namely, I first employ QCA and regression analysis to 
show which organizations are present in successful and failed attempts at pacts. To do this, I 
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collected data on the organizations that participated in forty-five pacting attempts. Then, the 
pathways to success and failure of an attempt at pact that result from QCA analysis and 
statistical analysis are expanded further with case studies. 
2.1.1. QCA and regression analysis 
In Chapter 3, I will present the results of the QCA and quantitative analysis. I use fuzzy-set 
QCA (fsQCA). The choice of Boolean methods—and, therefore, the fsQCA analysis—is 
determined by the logic of my argument, which implies equifinality. I expect that there might 
be different constellations of organizational features that give the opposition a high 
organizational capacity and lead to similar outcomes. In addition, my argument assumes 
conjunctural causation— namely, that combinations of explanatory factors matter. The logic 
of QCA analysis is well-equipped in teasing out these combinations. More than that, the 
available mid-N data set of forty-five observations and the dichotomous character of most of 
my variables do not allow for the full power of more conventional regression analysis. In 
addition, my negative outcome cases are skewed toward the more well-known ones, and this 
problem is less serious for set methods. The analysis of sufficiency from the QCA family 
compares positive outcome cases with each other while only using negative outcome cases to 
calculate the consistency scores, which partially mitigates this problem. In my research, the 
QCA analysis reveals the sufficient and necessary conditions that determine the two outcomes 
of interest: (1) further democratization and (2) failure of negotiations. 
In the statistical analysis part, the main finding of the QCA analysis—the effect of the presence 
of a trade union during the negotiations—is investigated further with regression models and t-
tests. The statistical analysis seeks to test (1) whether the effects of membership of trade unions 
are a mere result of economic development and (2) the character of the connection between the 
participation of a trade union and democratization. In addition, use the regression models that 
copy the two pathways from QCA. Then, the pathways to successful negotiations are 
elaborated further with case studies. I will first discuss the case studies and then describe the 
database used for QCA and statistical analysis. 
2.1.2. Case studies 
Neither the QCA nor any other known method of mid-N analysis allows us to build an 
inductively determined causality. In addition, the mid-N analysis does not show the relevant 
mechanisms at play—that is, it cannot demonstrate exactly how the participation of trade 
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unions or other opposition organizations helped reach the agreement and then supported 
democratization. In other words, the QCA analysis alone cannot guarantee that it is the 
organizational capacity of the opposition and not other, more structural, or procedural factors 
responsible for the successes of pacts and further democratization. Therefore, after the 
arguments are supported with the QCA analysis, they are further elaborated with more 
conventional statistical analysis and, most importantly, with the two extensive qualitative case 
studies. 
Chapters 4 and 5 detail the case studies and shed light on the causal mechanisms offered in the 
QCA model. The case studies are used to unpack causal mechanisms in “well-explained” cases 
and also to check for alternative explanations that cannot be operationalized in a quantitative 
way, such as the independence of organizations from the state or the presence of charismatic 
leadership. I undertake two paired comparisons (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 151–181; 
Rohlfing, 2012; Tarrow, 2010) with a most similar systems design. Tarrow argues that this 
method has some limitations, but most of them can be solved by combining paired comparison 
with statistical analysis (Tarrow, 2010, p. 250).13 
The first pair sheds light on the failed attempts to negotiate a pact in Egypt and Tunisia`s 
successful pact. Concerning the results of QCA analysis, both cases are most typical—one is 
not a part of a solution formula and has a negative outcome, while the other is a part of a 
solution formula and has a positive outcome. Despite similar historical and cultural heritages, 
levels of economic development, political regimes, the same sets of opposition organizations—
and even almost identical sequences of events—the negotiations failed in one case and were 
successful in another. The QCA reveals that the difference lies in the participation of a strong 
trade union in the Tunisian negotiations. The presence of the Union Générale Tunisienne du 
Travail (UGTT) gave the Tunisian opposition movement the vital capacity to negotiate, and 
the case study illustrates precisely when and how it intervened. At the same time, the analysis 
reveals many case-specific variables, such as the strength of military factions in Egypt, that, 
together with the high militancy of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (as opposed to its 
Tunisian counterpart the Ennahda), ruled out the option of a compromise solution between the 
two. 
 
13 Tarrow (2010, p. 250) calls it a strategy of “expanding methodological plurality.”  
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The second pair compares two Ukrainian attempts to negotiate a solution for the two political 
crises in the years 2004 and 2014. Since the events happened in the same country within the 
same political regime, all structural variables, including the opposition organizations, are the 
same. Regarding the results of QCA analysis, in both cases, the set and characteristics of 
organizations proved not sufficient for successful negotiations, but neither was failure 
necessary. Thus, both are Individually Irrelevant сases (IIR) for the results of the analysis of 
sufficiency (Schneider & Rohlfing, 2013). 
The case study shows that the difference lies in the variable not included in the QCA analysis 
but still relevant to my explanatory model— namely, the organizational capacities of the two 
particular movements. The 2004 movement was organized in a top-down way and was 
therefore hierarchically subordinated to one leader. In contrast, the 2014 movement was a 
network that emerged spontaneously that was not subordinated to anyone and also failed to 
negotiate a pact. The case study shows the process of the collapse and success of negotiations. 
It indicates at which points the 2004 movement demonstrated credible commitment and 
credible threat and at which points the 2014 movement failed to do this. 
2.2. Data collection 
 
The QCA and quantitative analysis parts of this research use a database of attempts at pacted 
transitions that I have collected. This section describes the database, first in terms of variables 
and unit of analysis, and second vis-à-vis the procedure used to identify and code the cases. 
The complete list of variables is in the Codebook in the Appendix, while the database is 
published in an open access repository (Iakovlev, 2021) in two parts. The first is a database, 
and the second is a collection of my text descriptions of the processes in each of the transitions. 
2.2.1. Outcome variables, calibration, and unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis is an attempt at pacted transition—namely, an episode where, amid a major 
political crisis, elites-in-power explicitly initiate negotiations with opposition forces, and at 
least one round of negotiations occurs. The universe of cases of interest includes all the 
attempts at pacted transitions since 1974 (Huntington, 1993a). The outcome14 is the result of 
an attempt at pacted transition—whether it is a successful pact with subsequent 
 
14 The QCA vocabulary speaks of “conditions” and “outcomes” instead of the more conventional notion of 
“dependent” and “independent” variables employed in statistical analysis. 
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democratization, a pact without democratization, or a failed attempt at negotiations. Again, my 
understanding of a pacted transition, adopted from O’Donnell and colleagues, is a transition 
from non-democratic rule that follows (1) negotiated agreements among (2) elites-in-power 
and elites-in-opposition that are (3) rule-setting and based on (4) mutual “vital interest” 
guarantees.15 If it leads to democratization, it is coded as a successful pacted transition. If it 
does not lead to democratization (i.e., the rule-setting (part 3 of the definition) component is 
weak or absent), the case is coded as a pact without democratization. If the negotiations 
collapse because either the incumbent or the opposition does not hold to its promises—in other 
words, significant guarantees on vital interests (part 4 in the definition) were not delivered 
either by elites-in-power or elites-in-opposition after the pact was signed—the case is coded as 
a failed attempt at negotiations. Figure 2.1 summarizes the episodes of a pact and its outcomes. 
This thesis does not have a separate section on calibration because three out of five variables—
namely, the success and failure of negotiations, the presence of trade unions, and the Church—
do not require calibration. On the other hand, two variables out of five—the age of the oldest 
party and the increase in the level of democracy—require calibration. Furthermore, in both 
cases, the decision on calibration was not problematic because cases fall into two logical 
categories. 
The level of democracy is operationalized by the Liberal Democracy index of V-Dem that 
ranges from 0 to 1. In QCA analysis, it is treated as a fuzzy variable and calibrated accordingly. 
A.10 increase in this democracy index three years after the pact is concluded is coded as partial 
inclusion, whereas a.15 increase is understood as full inclusion (i.e., democratization). 
Although these thresholds seem rather low at first glance, they are very demanding because 
they reflect a very short time span (i.e., three years). Every country in the data set that passed 
a.15 threshold has later completely democratized (see Table 2.1 on calibration below). Some 
of those with a.10 increase in the first three years may have later backslid, such as Ukraine, 
which experienced backsliding in 2010 after democratization in 2004. However, these 
backslides resulted from an explicit event in which a leader perverted already established 
democratic practices and were not directly connected with the earlier pacted transition. Since 
the outcome falls into several categories and the extent of democratization is important, it is 
treated in QCA analysis as a fuzzy outcome. 
 
15 I add the second criterion on the presence of both elites and opposition actors in order to exclude those cases 





Figure 2.1. Outcomes of attempts at pacts. 
 
Table 2.1. The calibration decisions. 
Variable Cutoff points Reasoning 
Democratization 
(Fuzzy) 
.10;.15 (points on 0 
to 1 scale 3-yearly 
increase of 
democracy score) 
Every country with 
a.10 increase 
democratized, some 
of the backslid later; 
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2.2.2. Conditions and calibration 
Data has been collected on the organizational capacity of parties, unions, and Catholic Church. 
Established parties are operationalized by their age based on the Political Parties of The World 
encyclopedia (Day et al., 1996; Day & Degenhardt, 1984; Day & Degenhardts, 1980; Sagar, 
2009; Szajkowski, 2005). Parties older than five years count as established (see Table 2.1 and 
the discussion on p. 24). They fall into two types: (1) those that were created as the regime 
started to open up, or its foundations began to fracture, normally even after the mass protest 
that would eventually overthrow the regime started, and (2) those that have a long history of 
coexistence with a regime and became what Della Porta and Diani (2011) call organizations 
rather than movements. The parties fall into two types, and there is no intermediate category. 
Therefore, the crisp set approach is used. Membership and age of the trade unions that 
participated in pacted transitions is based on the Trade Unions of The World encyclopedia 
(Blackburn, 2015; Harper, 1987, 2005). The presence of the Catholic Church, is coded based 
on the case material. 
The regime type variable is based on the GWF data set (Geddes et al., 2014). Using several 
assumptions and pursuing QCA-friendliness, I dichotomized it into two categories—
party/military and personalistic/hybrid. Since military and party dictatorships are known to 
affect the mode of regime change in the same way (ibid.), I have merged these categories. I 
collapsed the “monarchy” type of regime with the “personalist” category, although, of course, 
they have different types of legitimacy. Four regimes were coded as “democracy” in the GWF 
data set —namely, Albania (in 1997), Ukraine (2004 and 2014), and Kenya (2008). I treated 
them as competitive authoritarian regimes because although they had facade elections, none 
were regular, free, and fair (i.e., conducted on an even playing field). Competitive authoritarian 
regimes tend to have super-presidential constitutions, which leads to the inherently high level 
of patronalism—that is, “the personalized” (as opposed to impersonal, institutionalized, 
organizational) “exchange of concrete rewards and punishments” (Hale, 2015, p. 22) and low 
state capacity. I have lumped competitive authoritarian regimes with the personalist/hybrid 
category. 
2.2.3. Data collection procedure 
The cases where at least the negotiations were successful were collected in four steps. In the 
first step, potential cases were identified based on existing databases. In the second step, each 
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case was individually checked with the existing literature to see whether it fits the criteria of 
pacted transition used in this analysis. In the third step, the data on organizations was collected. 
For the first step, I first identified the cases that were coded as pacted transitions in the existing 
databases: Stradiotto and Guo (2010b, 2014), the GWF data set (Geddes et al., 2014), Daniel 
Treisman (2017, 2020a, 2020b), and the “What Makes or Breaks National Dialogues?” report 
(Paffenholz et al., 2017). Because the definitions of pacted transitions employed in these 
databases were different from mine, each case had to be manually checked for the fact of 
negotiations. In addition, I searched for those cases that include typical consequences of a 
pacted transition. For instance, I manually checked those cases where the authoritarian leader 
was not prosecuted after losing power, looking for the facts of explicit negotiations. 
During the second step, for each case identified in these databases, I analyzed in detail two or 
three most cited academic papers or books16 to check whether negotiations really took place 
and whether a case did not fall under the exclusion rules (see below). Those sources normally 
also mention the organizations and personalities that represented the opposition in negotiations. 
During the third step, after identifying the cases that fit the definition of a pacted transition, I 
collected information on the organizations that participated in the negotiations analyzing the 
existing academic literature. 
The procedure for the first two steps was more complicated with the failed attempts at pacts—
those where the incumbent or the opposition did not deliver on their promises. I have checked 
the cases of regime change that are coded as revolutions in the existing databases. It was 
frequently the case that those political crises that ended up with a forceful solution had initially 
included an attempt at negotiations. Typically, these attempts were later forgotten or only 
briefly mentioned in the literature. The Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes 
(NAVCO) database offers a second way to check major political crises that did not lead to an 
authoritarian breakdown and see whether they included attempts at negotiations that failed. 
Among about five dozen checked cases, nine revolutions and political crises turned out to 
include a failed attempt at a pact. 
2.2.4. Selection bias 
My research design has a built-in selection bias toward more prominent and more successful 
pacts. Since there is no scholarship on failed pacting attempts, the field has tended to miss those 
 
16 A list of sources can be found in the Codebook in the Mendeley repository (Iakovlev, 2021). 
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cases of failed pacts where negotiations took place but are not mentioned (or even poorly 
mentioned) in the existing literature in English. Moreover, some cases where the pact was 
successful but not explicit enough might also be excluded. As a result, the database skews 
toward the most prominent and well-known cases of failed negotiations in countries with 
relatively large populations. The solution could be a large-scale research project that employs 
regional or even country experts, but this goes beyond the scope of a doctoral thesis. 
Most importantly, one can expect some kind of preliminary negotiations to occur often between 
elites-in-power and elites-in-opposition. Whether or not these grow into more explicit 
negotiations depends on their initial success. Therefore, those negotiations that failed at the 
very early stage are impossible to identify. It is most likely that the number of serious 
discussions between authoritarian leaders and opposition representatives worldwide between 
1974 and today would be far higher than 45. 
2.2.5. Exclusion rules 
An attempt at pacting should meet several requirements to be included in the analysis. First, 
the subject of negotiations is democratization, not a civil war or gaining independence. Second, 
both elites-in-power and elites-in-opposition should be present in the negotiations. Third, the 
negotiations should not be commanded by a foreign power, and fourth, they should take place 
inside the country. Finally, they have an explicit character, which means that the counterparts 
are present in the same room. The following section presents the explicit description of these 
criteria. 
Negotiations do not necessarily take place only to resolve the issue of democratization and 
peaceful transfer of power to the opposition after a political crisis. They can also help to settle 
the issues of peace agreements after a civil war and the issues of independence or 
decolonization. These cases are not included in the sample. When there is too much foreign 
influence, to the extent that a transition was commanded, which happens mostly with French 
colonies, the case is excluded (i.e., the Central African Republic, Fiji, Comoros). 
I exclude cases of independence and decolonization. First of all, in most of these cases, 
negotiations took place outside of the relevant country. Second, the situation is complicated by 
issues different from the peaceful transfer of power from elites to the opposition. Third, it is 
hard to distinguish between elites-in-power and elites-in-opposition in such cases. Fourth, in 
such cases, foreign influence often overwhelms. 
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If negotiations took place outside the country, the case is excluded. For instance, negotiations 
about El Salvador’s future in 1992 took place in Geneva, and the decision on Fiji`s 
independence in 1970 was made in London. In such cases, success or failure of the negotiations 
depends more on international and less on internal actors.   
Both elites-in-power and elites-in-opposition must be present in negotiations.17 If there are no 
elites-in-opposition actors in a pact (i.e., those political elites who were not taking any offices 
in the incumbent regime do not participate in negotiations), the case is excluded. One such case 
is the aforementioned Fiji, where the UK government directed the transition, and none of the 
people who participated in the pact belonged to the opposition. Likewise, if there are no elites-
in-power (i.e., those political elites occupying office in the incumbent regime) participating in 
negotiations, which thus only occur among the opposition, the case is excluded. 
Negotiations are expected to have a more or less explicit and formalized character to be 
analyzed as an attempt at a pacted transition. While it is too much to expect every attempt at a 
pacted transition to end up with a publicly available formal document, one can still require the 
representatives of the counterparts to be present in the same room during the moment of 
negotiations. That is why transitions in which elites-in-power and elites-in-opposition were not 
present in the same room during the negotiations are excluded. For instance, in the wake of the 
1989 revolution in Romania, the National Salvation Front (NSF), a military-led body, came to 
power after overthrowing the pro-Communist regime in early 1990. The NSF then refused to 
step down and transfer power to civilians, which resulted in protests and the Timisoara 
proclamation. Some limited, mostly façade negotiations are mentioned in the literature (Shafir, 
1990). The NSF managed to stay in power after the 1990 elections. However, the opposition 
was represented only partially, and the NSF and the most important representatives were never 
sitting in one room. Thus, the Romanian case is not treated as an attempt at a pacted transition 
in my project. 
Transitions that have a cooperative character but do not include explicit negotiations are not 
understood as pacted transitions. If there are no negotiations mentioned in the available 
academic literature, reports, and newspapers, the case is excluded even if a transition looks 
cooperative. Some transitions are cooperative but not negotiated—at least, explicitly. 
 
17 The theoretical justification can be found in the first chapter, in the section “What is a pacted transition?” 
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Examples are Indonesia (in 1999), Thailand (1992), and Ghana (2000). In these cases, the 
ruling party ceded power peacefully but without any negotiations as such. 
The reasons why certain cases are excluded often overlap. For instance, in the case of El 
Salvador, in 1992, negotiations to resolve the civil war took place outside of the country and 
were largely dominated by the US. Thus, the case is excluded for three reasons. The cases 
excluded due to the inexplicit character or lack of negotiations are Romania (in 1990), Mexico 
(2000), Indonesia (1999), Thailand (1992), and Ghana (2000). The cases excluded because the 
two-player game was interrupted by external actors or the question at hand was not regime 
transition are Moldova (in 1991), the Central African Republic (1993), Fiji (1970), Botswana 
(1966), El Salvador (1992), and Comoros (1990). 
My understanding of the successful pacted transition neglects the levels of violence as long as 
it did not lead to a civil war before a pact. In my understanding, even if the phase preceding 
the negotiations is violent, what really matters is the negotiated character of the power transfer. 
For instance, in Tunisia in 2012, the transition had a revolutionary character, with the dictator 
Ben Ali being forced to resign and flee the country on January 14 due to mass protests 
connected with violence. Nevertheless, Mohamed Ghannouchi, a former prime minister under 
Ben Ali, managed to form a cabinet that started negotiations with the opposition. In the end, 
the transfer of power from Ghannouchi’s regime was negotiated. For this reason, I understand 
this case as an example of a successful pacted transition. My position thus contradicts most 
existing theories, which would treat the Tunisian transition as a revolutionary one due to the 
initial violence that characterized it. Two cases with the same level of violence as in Tunisia—
Ukraine in 2014 and Egypt in 2011—are coded as failed pacted transitions because the 
negotiations ultimately failed and violence continued. However, had these negotiations 
succeeded and led to a peaceful transfer of power, the cases would be coded as successful 
pacted transitions despite the initial spread of violence. 
2.2.6. Variation among pacted transitions 
The attempts at pacted transitions in my database vary by the extent to which the incumbent 
and the opposition control the situation, by the extent the incumbent and the opposition are 
represented in negotiations, by the extent of what is discussed, by the extent of how the foreign 
powers intervened, and by the scale of violence and contention. This section introduces the 
borderline cases of the maximum extent of the deviation from my understandings. 
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Albania in 1990 is an example of negotiations that were controlled entirely by the incumbent. 
In this case, Ramiz Alia, Albanian authoritarian leader, completed a round of negotiations with 
students, acceding to almost all their demands, but nevertheless maintained full control of the 
situation in the country. The opposite situation where it is difficult to say whether the 
incumbent had already entirely lost by the time negotiations began is Georgia in 2003. After a 
day of severe anti-government protests and Russia’s sudden decision to withdraw its support 
for (then president) Eduard Shevardnadze, Igor Ivanov, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, 
gave an encouraging speech to the protesters. After that, Ivanov deliberately brought 
Shevardnadze and then opposition leader Mikhail Saakashvili to negotiate the terms of exit. In 
this case, with the Kremlin openly supporting the opposition, one could say that Shevardnadze 
was effectively on the way out. The Polish case in 1989 is most neutral in this regard. Had the 
character of contention between the Solidarity movement and the ruling party become 
completely noncooperative and violent, it is impossible to guess which side would have 
prevailed. One case that has been excluded from the database because the incumbent did not 
control the situation is Kyrgyzstan in 2010. The ousted President Bakiev started the 
negotiations only after he had fled the country. 
The scope of the issues negotiated during a pact varies from complete constitution-making to 
the mere clarification of the terms of exit. In the Visegrad countries in 1989, the number of 
matters discussed was all-embracing, in some cases even covering detailed aspects of the new 
institutional structure down to the rules for municipal elections. On the other extreme, the failed 
negotiations in Ivory Coast in 2011 merely included the terms of President Laurent Gbagbo’s 
exit. Besides, this case is on my borderline of the tolerated foreign influence. Although the 
pressure by the UN was severe and the country eventually ended up with direct military 
intervention, Gbagbo still managed to behave independently. 
Although both the opposition and the incumbent should be present during the negotiations, 
they can be represented unevenly. In 1989, the negotiations in Czechoslovakia were heavily 
dominated by the opposition, with the prime minister, Ladislav Adamec, being present only 
briefly four days out of ten. There is no direct evidence that Togo’s dictator—Gnassingbé 
Eyadema— showed up to an (eventually failed) attempt at negotiations in 2006, but he sent 
delegates. However, there is the other extreme of an underrepresented opposition. In Spain in 
1977, the ruling Adolfo Suarez seemed to have had a perfect grip on the selection of 
organizations that participated in pacting. As a result, Spanish trade unions, although extremely 
 
 39 
strong, did not participate in the Spain`s main event of negotiations known as the Moncloa 
pact. 
The amount of contention resolved by pacts varies drastically from a very comfortable 
coexistence to mass violence with thousands of victims. In 1993, bottom-up pressure was 
almost absent in Mongolia, but a pact was still negotiated between the established Communist 
Party and a newborn opposition with almost no contention involved. In Ukraine in 2014, by 
the time negotiations had started, not only was Kyiv, the country’s capital, but also the main 
squares in the large cities in the west of the country, were covered with thick smoke as the 
protesters that occupied them were burning tires and throwing firebombs at the police. 
2.2.7. Data 
Among the forty-five attempts at pact I have collected, twenty-nine were successful and led to 
democratization, nine failed (meaning that the negotiations collapsed). In the remaining seven 
cases, while negotiations turned out to be successful, democratization did not follow (see Table 
2.1). None of the countries with failed negotiation attempts experienced full democratization 
afterward. In the analysis of democratization, the cases of failed attempts at pacts are lumped 
together with and treated as those of non-democratization—therefore, I analyze sixteen cases 
of non-democratization. 
Political parties, in my sample of forty-five negotiations, participate in every pact with only 
two exceptions. Trade unions are represented in sixteen negotiations, while religious 




Table 2.2: The excerpt of the calibrated database of forty-five attempts at pacts. 
 






Combined success of 
negotiations and 
democratization 
(calibrated, fuzzy value) 
TU The Church  Party/militar
y 
dictatorship 
Albania 1992 0 0 .53 0 1 0 
Albania 1997 0 .07 .53 0 0 0 
Argentina 1983 0 1 .97 1 0 1 
Bangladesh 1990 1 .51 .01 0 0 0 
Benin 1991 0 .98 .97 1 1 0 
Bolivia 1982 0 1 .97 1 1 1 
Brazil 1985 0 1 .97 1 1 1 
Bulgaria 1990 0 1 .97 1 0 1 
Czechoslovakia 1990 0 1 .97 0 1 1 
Comoros 2001 0 .94 .53 0 0 0 
Congo DRC 1992  1 0 .01 0 1 0 
Dominican 
Rep. 
1978 0 .98 .97 0 1 0 
Ecuador 1979 0 1 .97 1 0 1 
Egypt 2013 1 .06 .01 0 0 1 
Georgia 2003 0 1 .97 0 0 0 
Greece 1974 0 1 .97 0 0 1 
Hungary 1989 0 1 .97 1 1 1 
Iran 1979 0 .01 .53 0 0 0 
Ivory Coast 2000 1 .97 .05 0 1 0 
Ivory Coast 2011 1 .01 .01 0 0 0 
Kenya 2008 0 .07 .53 0 0 0 
Madagascar 1992 0 1 .97 1 1 0 
Malawi 1994 0 1 .97 0 1 0 
Mali 1991 0 1 .97 1 0 0 
Mongolia 1993 0 1 .97 0 0 1 
Myanmar 1988 1 0 .01 0 0 1 
Nepal 2006 0 1 .53 0 0 0 
Nepal 1990 0 .38 .53 0 0 0 
Nicaragua 1990 0 .98 .97 0 0 1 
Peru 1980 0 1 .97 1 0 0 
Poland 1989 0 1 .97 1 1 1 
Slovenia 1990 0 1 .97 1 1 1 
South Africa 1994 0 1 .97 0 0 1 
South Korea 1987 0 1 .97 1 1 1 
Spain 1977 0 1 .97 0 0 1 




This dissertation adopts a mixed-methods design. Its core part consists of QCA and statistical 
analysis of mid-N data. Namely, my research uses the database that was collected for this 
research. It describes organizations that participated in forty-five attempts at pacted transitions 
since 1974. The results of the analysis are further elaborated with case studies. The next chapter 
will present the QCA and statistical analysis of the data described in this chapter. 
 
 
Taiwan 1990 0 .12 .53 0 0 1 
Togo 1991 1 .03 .01 0 0 0 
Togo 2006 1 .02 .01 0 0 0 
Tunisia 2011 0 1 .97 1 0 1 
Ukraine 2004 0 .98 .97 0 0 0 
Ukraine 2014 1 0 .01 0 0 0 
Uruguay 1984 0 1 .97 1 0 1 
Yemen 2011 0 0 .53 0 0 0 






Chapter 3.  
The role of opposition organizations in 
pacted transitions to democracy 
This chapter presents the fuzzy-set and crisp set QCA analysis. First, it introduces the analysis 
of necessity performed separately for my two outcome variables: first, crisp set analysis for the 
success or failure of negotiations; then, fuzzy-set analysis for democratization after a successful 
pact. Second, it provides the fuzzy-set analysis of sufficiency for the joint variable that 
combines successful negotiations and further democratization. Third, it supplements the 
findings from the QCA with statistical analysis. 
The QCA part shows that the presence of a trade union during the negotiations is sufficient for 
democratization, while the absence of a trade union in negotiations is necessary for both failed 
negotiations and non-democratization. In addition, party and military dictatorships with 
established opposition parties and the Church involved also negotiate successful pacted 
transitions even without trade unions. The t-test shows that the effect caused by trade unions 
is not a mere result of a higher level of economic development. Countries that have trade unions 
in negotiations do not have significantly higher levels of GDP per capita. The regression 
analysis reveals a very robust linear relationship between the share of the population with trade 
union membership and the increase in the level of democracy that follows in the three years 
after the transition. 
All the analyses were performed using R (version 4.0.2) and RStudio (version 1.3.1056) 
software with the QCA, SetMethods, and venn packages for the QCA analysis (Dusa, 2019, 
2020; Oana et al., 2020). For the statistical analysis, the arm, aod, and car packages were used 
(Fox & Weisberg, 2019; Gelman & Su, 2020). 
3.1. QCA analysis 
The QCA analysis is organized as follows. I start with necessity because knowing this allows 
for the exclusion of contradictory directional expectations in the analysis of sufficiency. I first 
present the analysis of necessity for failed negotiation attempts or successful negotiations 
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(independently of whether they lead to democratization or not). Second, I analyze the necessity 
for an occurrence of democratization after successful pacts—that is, cases where negotiations 
went successfully. Third, I present the analysis of sufficiency for the joint variable that merges 
the (non-)occurrence of democratization and the (non-)failure of negotiations. 
3.1.1. Analysis of necessity: The success or failure of attempts at negotiation 
Necessity implies that whenever the outcome is present, the condition is also present. Necessity 
(or at least necessity that is not tautological) occurs very rarely in reality. Therefore, most of 
the conditions illustrated in the full table of necessity in the text (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2) are 
not necessary. Conventionally, conditions that pass the consistency threshold of.9, which 
implies that fewer than 10 percent of cases are contradictory—i.e., the condition is present, but 
the outcome is absent—can be stated as necessary (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Since this 
occurs very rarely in reality, only those conditions that have a high consistency score are 
discussed in the text. Unlike in conventional quantitative methods, one can still claim the 
necessity even with lower consistency scores if one provides a justification as to why the 
outliers seem to be irrelevant (ibid.).  
Only one condition is necessary for the attempt at negotiations to fail (see Table 3.1), even 
though it is trivial. The absence of a trade union in the room is fully necessary for the collapse 
of negotiations, with a consistency score of 1. A statement of sufficiency can be inferred from 
this, which suggests that whenever a trade union is present, the attempt at negotiations 
succeeds. The coverage score for this condition is .32. This means that the number of cases 
with no trade union in the room is much larger than the number of cases with failed attempts 
at pacts, even though a trade union is absent whenever there is a failed attempt. This indicated 
the trivialness of the condition (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, pp. 145–147), so this condition 
is not very relevant, especially considering the skewed character of the data at hand. In line 
with that, RoN parameter that indicates the trivialness of necessity 18(Schneider & Wagemann, 
2012, pp. 233–235) is also quite low at .47.  
 
18 There are two types of trivialness of necessity: “first, X is much bigger than Y; second, X and Y are close to 
being constants.” 18(Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 146) RoN accounts for the second type of trivialness. 
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Table 3.1. Analysis of necessity for the (non-)failure of an attempt at negotiations with 
consistency, coverage, and relevance of necessity values, all conditions are included. The 
outcome is a crisp failure of negotiations. Notes: FAIL—a failed attempt at negotiations; 
~FAIL—a successful attempt at negotiations. 
 Consistency Coverage RoN 
Conditions FAIL ~FAIL FAIL ~FAIL FAIL ~FAIL 
TU is present .11 .48 .06 .94 .61 .96 
TU is not present 1 .47 .32 1 .47 1 
Party dictatorship .22 .50 .10 .9 .58 .93 
Personalistic dictatorship .78 .50 .28 .72 .52 .74 
Catholic Church is present .22 .36 .13 .86 .69 .94 
Catholic Church is not present .78 .63 .23 .68 .40 .70 
Established opp. party is present .55 .64 .19 .82 .43 .77 
Established opp. party is not 
present 
.44 .36 .24 .77 .68 .88 
3.1.2. Analysis of necessity: Democratization 
The necessity analysis that tests the condition of democratization (see Table 3.2 in the 
Appendix) shows that for democratization not to happen, the trade unions should be absent. 
The absence of a trade union in the room is fully necessary for the successful negotiations that 
did not lead to democratization with the consistency score of .95, which means that in all cases 
where a trade union is present, the initial success of negotiations is also followed by full 
democratization. The coverage score for this condition is .53, which means that among those 
countries that did not have a trade union in negotiations, more than half ended up having the 
outcome that the country undertook successful negotiations but did not end up with 
democratization. 
The coverage score for this condition is .32, which means that the number of cases with the 
absence of trade union in the room is twice as large as the number of cases without 
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democratization, even though whenever there is no democratization, the trade union is absent. 
This indicates the trivialness of the condition (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, pp. 145–147). 
The RoN parameter is relatively low at .59. Therefore, this condition is somewhat trivial. 
Two conditions—lacking a religious organization in negotiations and transitioning from a 
personalistic dictatorship—do not pass the threshold of.9, scoring about.85 and.75. This means 
that the statement of necessity is wrong in a quarter of cases. For both conditions, those multiple 
outlying cases do not seem to be exceptional. For instance, as many as nine countries coded as 
personalistic dictatorships still had at least limited democratization.19 Therefore, there are no 
grounds to accept the necessity of the two conditions. Moreover, the other conditions do not 
appear to be necessary for democratization. 
Table 3.2. Analysis of necessity for the (non-)occurrence of democratization as a result of a 
pact with consistency, coverage, and relevance of necessity values, the outcome is a fuzzy 
increase in democracy score. Notes: DEM—democratization. 
 Consistency Coverage RoN 
Conditions DEM ~DEM DEM ~DEM DEM ~DEM 
TU is present .57 .07 .95 .06 .97 .61 
TU is not present .43 .94 .47 .53 .55 .59 
Party dictatorship .53 .25 .87 .19 .81 .61 
Personalistic dictatorship .45 .75 .53 .47 .63 .60 
Catholic Church is present .42 .15 .86 .14 .93 .70 
Catholic Church is not present .58 .85 .59 .41 .55 .46 
Organizations older than 5 years .74 .39 .79 .21 .74 .44 
No organizations older than 5 
years 
.26 .61 .45 .55 .75 .79 
 
19 Namely, Benin (in 1991), Comoros (2001), the Dominican Republic (1978), Georgia (2003), Ivory Coast 
(2000), Madagascar (1992), Malawi (1994), Mali (1991), Nepal (2006), Peru (1980), and Ukraine (2004). 
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3.1.3. Analysis of sufficiency: A joint fuzzy-set test of the success or failure of 
negotiations and subsequent democratization 
The two outcomes (i.e., the success of negotiations and further democratization) are two 
consecutive stages of the same process—an attempt at pacted transition. As the analysis of 
necessity has shown, they are affected by similar conditions in the same direction. Therefore, 
the two outcomes are merged in the section with sufficiency analysis to avoid tautology in the 
first place (the two models are mostly similar if conducted on two separate outcomes). When I 
test for democratization (occurring as a result of a pact) alone, I thus make no distinction 
between the cases of successful negotiations but no democratization and the cases of failed 
negotiations. Creating the combined variable allows me to “partially include” cases with 
successful negotiations and no democratization that would be coded as “full exclusion” 
otherwise. On top of that, the number of negative cases that are failed negotiation attempts (9 
cases) and successful negotiations without democratization (7 cases) is limited (see the cases 
in Tables 2.2 and A2.1). Since the negative outcome cases are used in the analysis of 
sufficiency to calculate consistency scores and my data is skewed toward positive outcomes, 
merging different sorts of negative outcomes in one model while partially accounting for the 
difference solves this problem. 
To undertake a sufficiency analysis, I first create and then logically minimize the truth table 
(TT) rows (see Table 3.3). Each TT row is a possible combination of conditions, and the cases 
fall into TT rows depending on their membership in conditions. Since I have four conditions, 
sixteen combinations are possible. Each combination–row has one outcome—either 0 or 1. 
These combinations of conditions can be minimized (for instance, by omitting redundant 
conditions) to tease out the comprehensible pathways. Each row has a consistency score —
namely, the percent of case members that fit the outcome. During the minimization, a 
consistency threshold needs to be set, which is to say that we have to accept a certain percent 
of outlying cases before we can claim that belonging to a certain combination of conditions 
can still be accepted as sufficient for an outcome. I stick to the lowest conventional threshold 
of.75 (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012), which implies that I accept up to one-quarter of outliers. 
The borderline is indicated in a table. The rationale behind these decisions is based on case-
specific peculiarities and is discussed in detail together with the robustness tests in the 
Appendix. Therefore, cases below the line have more than a quarter of failed attempts or several 
successful negotiations that did not lead to democratization. 
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cases Consistency Cases 
1 1 1 1 1 6 .97 
Bolivia (1982), Brazil (1985), 
Hungary (1989), Poland 
(1989), South Korea (1987), 
Zambia (1991) 
1 0 1 1 1 4 .97 
 
Argentina (1983), Bulgaria 
(1990), Ecuador (1979), 
Tunisia (2011) 
0 1 1 0 1 1 .97 Czechoslovakia (1990) 
1 0 1 0 1 1 .97 Uruguay (1984) 
1 1 0 0 1 1 .97 Madagascar (1992) 
1 1 0 1 1 1 .97 Benin (1991) 
1 1 1 0 1 1 .97 Slovenia (1990) 
1 0 0 1 1 3 .83 
Mali (1991), Peru (1980, 
Sudan (1985) 
0 0 1 1 1 5 .78 
Egypt (2013), Greece (1974), 
Nicaragua (1990), South 




0 1 0 1 0 3 .67 
the Dominican Republic 
(1978), Ivory Coast (2000), 
Malawi (1994) 
0 0 0 0 0 8 .51 
Comoros (2001), Georgia 
(2003), Iran (1979), Kenya 
(2008), Nepal (1990), Togo 
(1991), Togo (2006), Ukraine 
(2004) 
0 0 1 0 0 3 .51 
Mongolia (1990), Myanmar 
(1988), Taiwan (1990) 
0 0 0 1 0 6 .27 
Albania (1997), Bangladesh 
(1990), Ivory Coast (2011), 
Nepal (2006), Ukraine (2014), 
Yemen (2011) 
0 1 0 0 0 2 .27 
Albania (1992), Congo DRC 
(1992) 
0 1 1 1 ? 0 - 
 




To reach a short, comprehensible result, a truth table should be minimized. In the minimization 
process, the different combinations of conditions that lead to positive outcomes are compared 
to tease out the solution that “is expressed in a more parsimonious yet logically equivalent 
manner” (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 9). In this process, an analysis should deal with 
logical remainders—the theoretically possible combinations of conditions (or TT rows) that 
have no matching cases in the empirical world and whose outcomes are therefore unknown. 
However, in the minimization process, one can make simplifying assumptions on their 
outcome—or refrain from doing so. 
There are three ways of minimizing truth tables. The complex solution makes no simplifying 
assumptions made on where logical remainders lead at all. This leads to the most precise yet 
possibly cumbersome result. An intermediate solution is based on manually set directional 
expectations that generally derive from theories and the analysis of necessity. Finally, in a 
parsimonious solution, simplifying assumptions are automatically made to lead to the shortest 
result. In my case, the parsimonious way of minimization is equivalent to the intermediate one. 
Both simplifying assumptions made by the computer simulation and my directional 
expectations are always set to 1. In other words, each of my conditions is expected to lead to 
the outcome, successful pact, and democratization, as it comes from theory (see the discussion 
in Chapters 1 and 2), while the same simplifying assumption is needed for the most 
parsimonious outcome. 
In the graphical form, the truth table is presented in Figure 3.1. Each oval-shaped figure 
indicates the presence of a particular condition—the presence of a trade union, the Catholic 
Church, party regime, and established opposition party. Each constellation of the conditions 
leads to a specific outcome. The outcomes are indicated with different fills. Vertical stripes 
stand for successful negotiations plus further democratization. No fill (white) is failed 
negotiations and no democratization. Finally, question marks indicate that the data for this 
constellation is absent.   
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The whole condition of the presence of a trade union is filled with vertical lines, which implies 
that democratization has happened in all of the cases where it was present in negotiations. 
However, cases with trade unions are always located in the constellations, including other 
factors contributing to successful negotiations. It is never the case that trade unions are present 
alone—the upper-left part of the shape corresponding to trade unions indicates a question mark. 
However, a second constellation where democratization almost always occurred can be seen 
outside of the trade union oval; in the party dictatorship, it comes together with established 
parties or the Church. 
The solution formula for the fuzzy truth table in the analysis of sufficiency (see Table 3.4) 
suggests that democratization follows in two general ways. First, countries democratize 
whenever trade unions are present during the negotiations. Second, they democratize when the 
initial regime is a party dictatorship (rather than personalistic) combined with one of the two 
favorable factors: established opposition parties or the Catholic Church. The sufficiency scores 
are as high as.95,.975, and.91, meaning virtually no cases deviate from this explanation. The 
coverage of this model (a close analog of R2 in regression analysis) is.68, which means that the 
model explains 68% of the cases where the outcome—democratization—has occurred, 
whereas 32% remain unexplained. 
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Figure 3.1. Venn diagram of constellations of various conditions that affect failed, successful 





20 Here and further TU stands for a Trade union present in negotiations; PARTY REGIME stands for initial a 
Party Regime type of initial dictatorship, CHURCH stands for representative of the Catholic Church present in 
negotiations, and ESTABLISHED PARTY stands for Established opposition party present in negotiations. 
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In other words, the model shows two pathways toward successful pacted transition: through 
the trade unions (I) and from party dictatorships (II). These two pathways are marked with 
numbers in Figure 3.1 and Table 3.4. They are not mutually exclusive, and do, in fact, overlap 
in eleven cases. Obviously, trade unions are more likely to emerge and sustain in a less 
restrictive, more institutionalized, and bureaucratized context (i.e., a party regime). 
Nevertheless, just having a trade union in negotiations, even if deriving from a personalistic 
dictatorship, is sufficient for successful democratization through the pact. Neither the trade 
union nor party dictatorship ever occurs alone. In most cases, the trade unions occur together 
with the constellation of almost every other condition possible. Speaking of the regime, party 
Table 3.4: The parsimonious solution for a truth table of the combined fuzzy outcome of both 
success of negotiations and a democratic outcome, covS—coverage, covU—unique coverage, 






covS covU Covered cases 
Trade union I .949 .523 .175 Mali (1991), Peru (1987). Uruguay (1984), 
Argentina (1983), Bulgaria (1990), Ecuador 
(1979), Tunisia (2011), Madagascar (1992), 
Benin (1991), Sudan (1985), Bulgaria (1990), 
Argentina (1983), Ecuador (1979), Uruguay 
(1984), Bolivia (1982), Poland (1989), Brazil 
(1985), Hungary (1989), Slovenia (1990), 
South Korea (1987), Zambia (1991) 
Party Regime 
and the Catholic 
Church 
II .975 .253 .032 Czechoslovakia (1990), Slovenia (1990), 
Bolivia (1982), Brazil (1985), Hungary 




opposition party  
II .910 .443 .127 Egypt (2013, Greece (1974), Nicaragua 
(1990), South Africa (1994), Spain (1975), 
Argentina (1983), Bulgaria (1990), Ecuador 
(1979), Tunisia (2011), Bolivia (1982), Brazil 
(1985), Hungary (1989), Poland (1989), South 
Korea (1987), Zambia (1991) 




dictatorships in my database are always accompanied by at least one more favorable condition, 
which is not surprising as these regimes provide a less restrictive context and allow for the 
opposition. Military dictatorships only result in successful negotiations and democratization 
when the other conditions are present: an established political party, a Church, or a trade union. 
The three military dictatorships that did not have any of these three conditions—Egypt in 2013, 
Myanmar (1988), and Taiwan (1990)—did not manage to negotiate or democratize. 
Table 3.5. Summary of the final solution for a truth table of the combined fuzzy outcome of 
both success of negotiations and a democratic outcome 
 




Argentina (1983), Benin (1991), Bolivia 
(1982), Brazil (1985), Bulgaria (1990), 
Czechoslovakia (1990), Comoros (2001), 
Ecuador (1979, Greece (1974), Hungary 
(1989), Madagascar (1992), Mali (1991), 
Nicaragua (1990), Peru (1980), Poland 
(1989), Slovenia (1990), South Africa 
(1994), South Korea (1987), Spain (1975), 
Tunisia (2011), Uruguay (1984), Zambia 
(1991). 
 
Bangladesh (1990), the 
Dominican Republic (1978), 
Georgia (2003), Malawi (1994), 




negotiations but no 
democratization 
Sudan (1985). Albania (1992), Albania (1997), 
Kenya (2008), Nepal (1990), 
Taiwan (1990), Yemen (2011). 
 
Failed attempt at 
negotiations 
Egypt (2013). Congo DRC (1992), Iran (1979), 
Ivory Coast (2000), Ivory Coast 
(2011), Myanmar (1988), Togo 




To sum up, this analysis shows that the same variable—the presence of a trade union in 
negotiations—is sufficient both for the success of negotiations and for the subsequent 
democratization. Its absence, therefore, is a necessary condition for the collapse of negotiations 
and democratization. But, at the same time, it is not the only pathway, and many party or 
military dictatorships that have resilient churches or established opposition parties (or both) 




3.2. Post-QCA statistical tests on trade unions 
Continuing the findings of the QCA analysis, this section will unpack the possible reasons why 
trade unions are associated with successful pacts. Namely, it will test the effect of the presence 
of the trade unions on democratization while controlling for economic development. As the 
QCA analysis has shown, the presence of a trade union in negotiations is sufficient both for 
successful negotiations and subsequent democratization. However, the cause and the character 
of this effect remain uncertain. Is it the presence of trade unions per se fostering 
democratization, or is there a confounding variable (namely, economic development)? The 
following section tests this argument. 
I offer and test two possible explanations for why trade unions lead to democratic outcomes. 
Hypothesis 3 suggests that countries with trade unions participating in pacts are more 
economically developed and therefore are structurally more likely to democratize, which, in 
turn, explains the democratic gain from the presence of a trade union. My hypothesis 4 is that 
the larger the membership of a trade union (union density) that participates in the pact, the 
greater the subsequent increase in the level of democracy. This echoes the proletarianization 
argument of Rueschemeyer and colleagues (1992), which contends that democratization is 
more likely when organized labor is strong. In contrast, I argue that the agency mechanism can 
explain the democratizing effect—trade unions always pose a credible threat and provide a 
credible commitment to their counterparts in negotiations. If the presence of a trade union in 
negotiations causes a fixed increase in the level of democracy, but this gain does not gradually 
increase with the size of the trade union, then it means that this effect stems from the actor 
level. 
First and foremost, the quantitative methods are useful in testing these hypotheses because of 
their correlational, probabilistic logic as opposed to the deterministic logic of QCA. This logic 
allows better testing of the hypotheses that address differences in degree as opposed to 
differences in kind, which is the precise question raised in this section. In addition, the variables 
GDP per capita and between the size of membership of the negotiating trade union lack clear, 
logical categories. Hence, they are hard, albeit not impossible, to calibrate. More than that, 
multiple regression allows us to control for particular variables to rule out their effects, as I do 
in Table 3.5 and, especially, in Table 3.6. Finally, supporting the findings of the QCA with the 
different family method (Table 3.6) serves as a robustness test. 
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To elaborate further on the results of the QCA analysis, I use the following statistical methods. 
First, I employ a t-test to check the economic difference between the countries that have and 
do not have a trade union included in negotiations. Second, I perform a regression analysis to 
test whether there is a linear connection between the size of membership of the negotiating 
trade union and the increase in democratization. 
Economic development differences do not explain the success of negotiations and subsequent 
democratization in countries with a trade union involved. The t-test shows a lack of statistically 
significant difference between the means of the two groups of countries. Although, on average, 
countries in which trade unions are present during the negotiations are slightly more developed 
economically (US$4,420 versus US$3,905 GDP per capita), the standard deviation is 
considerable, especially within the countries with trade unions. Therefore, this difference 
between the two samples is statistically non-significant, with a p-value as high as .65 (t = -.46; 
df = 33.73).21 In any event, the slight difference of US$500 hardly explains the strong effect of 
the presence of trade unions. 
The regression analysis shows almost a perfect linear relation between the membership in trade 
unions represented in a pact and an increase in the level of democracy (see Table 3.6). Each 
additional 1% of the population involved in trade unions increases the level of democracy by 
2.8% in the first three years after the negotiations alone. Furthermore, the trade union effect 
caused does not decrease when the control variable—GDP per capita—is introduced to the 
model, which demonstrates that the presence of a trade union produces an effect that is not 
dependent on economic development. 
  
 
21 However, one should bear in mind that p-statistics are prone to show low significances when applied to small 
samples, such as the one of this paper with 45 cases. 
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Table 3.6. The regression table with OLS parameters and standard errors with the increase in 
the level of democracy, the share of the population with membership in trade unions that 






Table 3.7. The regression table with OLS parameters and standard errors indicating the 














Regression analysis (see Table 3.7) on the extent of democratization in three years after the 
negotiations copies the QCA model22 except for controlling for GDP and not dichotomizing 
the increase in the level of democracy. Model 1 copies Pathway I in the QCA analysis, while 
Models 2 and 3 copy Pathway II in the QCA analysis. Moreover, Model 4 copies the entire 
solution formula, and Model 5 adds controls for GDP to Model 4. Regression analysis confirms 
the previous argument based on QCA. The presence of a trade union or a preceding party 
regime almost guarantees further democratization. At the same time, the trade union variable 
explains democratization better than the incumbent regime one. The presence of the latter adds 
20% to democratization in three years (p=.0005) (see Models 3, 4, 5), as opposed to a preceding 
party/military regime, which also adds 20%, albeit with lower statistical significance (p=.039) 
(see Models 2, 3, 4, and 5). In addition, the model that uses the TU variable has a lower AIC 
(392 as opposed to 395). The effect of economic development that is fully statistically 
significant in Table 3.4 is not statistically significant in Table 3.6 (p=.13). The other variables 
 
22 For the sake of similarity with my QCA models, I violate the assumption on multicollinearity and use variables 
that control for a political regime and a trade union in the same models, even though they are associated with each 
other (Chisq=4.59, p=.03). Thus, the R-square estimates in Models 4 and 5 should be treated with caution. 
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in the database produce a very small positive effect, which is statistically insignificant; they 
even have no effect when aggregated into an index.23 Estimates of these models are relatively 
strong, with R2 ranging from 25 to 40% and low p-values. 
To sum up, the countries that bring trade unions into the negotiations are not richer than those 
that do not. The effect caused by their presence is clearly not dependent on the country’s 
economic development. At the same time, the share of a country`s population involved in a 
trade union that participates in the negotiations has a positive linear relationship with the degree 
of democratization in the subsequent three years (see Table 3.6). Therefore, the effect of trade 
unions has no direct connection with a “modernization” explanation and is caused by the direct 
influence of these organizations. In addition, although the scope of countries that have a trade 
union partially overlaps with those that derive from a party/military regime, the regression 
models have shown that the explanation through a trade union explains the further 
democratization better. 
The regression analysis generally supports the results of the QCA analysis. At the same time, 
it helps control for economic development and check the character of the connection between 
the variables—and thus, to investigate the findings even further. The first difference between 
the two methods is that according to the regression analysis, the configurative logic of the 
party/military regime condition—namely, that it should lead to democratization when either 
the established opposition party or the Church is present during the pact—is not important. 
Second, the regression analysis allowed me to show that not only the presence of trade unions 
but also their strength is important. The larger trade unions are, the larger increase in the level 
of democracy that follows. 
 
3.3. Concluding discussion: Organized labor and successful pacts 
 
The main and the most robust result of the analysis is that the presence of a trade union alone 
is sufficient both for democratization and for the success of negotiations. Therefore, the lack 
of a trade union is necessary for the failure of negotiations. In addition, the negotiations can 
only fail when the Catholic Church is absent. Since there is no significant difference between 
the economic development in the countries with and without trade unions, modernization 
 
23 This is not shown in Table 3.7 
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theories cannot explain this effect. Therefore, this effect is most likely caused by the 
organizational capacity of trade unions. 
Also, trade unions were present in only half of the successful pacted transitions. The other half 
of the successful pacts were negotiated in those settings that allowed for the high organizational 
capacity of the opposition. Normally, those were party-based dictatorships permitting the 
presence of opposition parties, and those opposition parties were strong enough to provide a 
credible threat and a credible commitment. Alternatively, in many party dictatorships, the 
Church has preserved enough independence and strength to mediate the negotiations. In 
addition, there are rare instances of successful negotiations in societies that had none of these 
characteristics. 
Given that trade unions in the analyzed countries have shown themselves durable enough to 
survive the autocratic regime and, at the same time, resilient and significant enough to be 
represented during the negotiations, they would most probably also persist after the autocratic 
collapse. Therefore, their existence is far more robust and less dependent on leadership than 
that of political parties. It is especially relevant for the period after the collapse of autocracy 
when parties that have been in the opposition for decades are suddenly exposed to free and fair 
elections, a drastic change in the agenda, and the necessity to participate in government. Thus, 
party volatility in the new democracies may be overwhelming. 
Trade unions are less vulnerable to this problem. The trade unions will, in all likelihood, 
continue after the fall of the regime and thus retain their capacity to make credible threats—
the ability to start strikes. This strength helps ensure that the counterparts in negotiations do 
not renege on their promises right after the negotiations. Moreover, the prolonged status of 
trade unions as crucial meditators helps prevent any one power from becoming dominant and 
changing the rules of the game in its favor. Therefore, it might be the case that trade unions 
help ensure credible commitments and provide a credible threat that ensures politicians abide 
by their agreements in earlier stages and ensures democratization later in the first years after 
the collapse of an incumbent regime. 
This argument, however, goes beyond the QCA or quantitative analysis and requires delving 
into cases where trade unions participated in negotiations. What steps do trade unions take to 
produce this result? Moreover, is there an alternative explanation for those cases that lie beyond 
the trade unions? Do they remain active in a country’s political life in the first years of a new 
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fragile democracy? The next chapter answers these questions using a pair of Arab Spring 
transitions. 
Also, some of the real word cases remained unexplained by the QCA model—namely, those 
are the cases that do not have the conditions of the solution formula for sufficiency. Those 
unexplained cases still undergo attempts at negotiations—sometimes with success and 
sometimes with failure. Chapter 5 deals with a pair of Ukrainian revolutions. In both cases, the 
regime was closer to a personalist dictatorship, and neither the trade unions nor the Church was 
present during the negotiations. In those two cases, the attempts to negotiate a pact with 
established parliamentary parties that led the anti-government protests ended up differently—
with the failure of an attempt at negotiations in one case and successful negotiations in another. 
The models presented in this chapter fall short of explaining that difference because the 
conditions are the same and are not in the solution formula. The case study aims to find the 
reason for this difference in outcomes—is it the ability to make credible threats and credible 




Chapter 4.  
A successful pact in Tunisia and a failed 
attempt at negotiations in Egypt 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter compares two attempts at pacted transitions, Egypt (2011-2013) and Tunisia 
(2010-2014). The two transitions started in a very similar way, with a popular uprising forcing 
two leaders to resign—one was arrested, and the other managed to flee the country. Both 
countries had relatively equal levels of development and relatively similar political regimes, 
and both attempted a pacted transition from authoritarian rule during the Arab Spring. Thus, a 
Constitutional Assembly was to be formed, with the task of writing a new constitution, and the 
procedure of its formation had to be negotiated. Further, both countries had to decide about the 
legalization of formerly prohibited Islamist parties. In both cases, the Islamist parties have 
revealed some authoritarian aspirations. 
However, the outcomes of these two transitions are quite different. Tunisia had two rounds of 
negotiations at different stages, and both rounds succeeded. The first happened after the 
Tunisian authoritarian leader fled the country because of protests. His prime minister 
negotiated with the country`s main trade union, the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail 
(UGTT), via a platform called Instance Superieure por la realisation des objectifs de la 
revolution, de la reforme politique et de la transition democratique (ISROR),24 which 
eventually provided a roadmap for the further transition. The second round of negotiations 
helped overcome a 2013-14 crisis, when the strong, the UGTT-led alliance of trade unions, the 
so-called Quartet, successfully ran a National Dialogue with the government. In Egypt, 
however, every attempt at negotiations has failed. Although the agreements were constantly 
being signed, none of the counterparts have complied with them, and each demonstrated 
authoritarian aspirations. 
 
24 The French acronym for Instance Superieure por la realisation des objectifs de la revolution, de la reforme 
politique et de la transition democratique. 
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This chapter argues that the UGTT`s organizational capacities involved in the negotiated 
solution of political crisis explain the difference between the Tunisian successful pacted 
transition and the Egyptian failed attempts at negotiation. 
Tunisia is the typical case for the QCA model presented in Chapter 3. In contrast, Egypt 
deviates, having an established political party and a military regime but still failing to negotiate 
a pact. Pathway I suggests that having a trade union involved in negotiations is sufficient for 
successful negotiations and further democratization. This explanatory model stands especially 
strong for these two cases. The participation of a trade union was the major difference between 
the Tunisian and the Egyptian revolutions. At the same time, other characteristics that could 
possibly explain the outcome were similar (see Table 4.2). 
Therefore, the case study aims to shed light on the mechanisms at play, illustrating at which 
exact points the intervention of the UGTT was vital for Tunisian democracy-building and to 
demonstrate where the Egyptian failed attempt at democratization was missing organizational 
capacity. 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, I explain the research design arguing why and by 
which variables Tunisia and Egypt are most similar to each other and why the existing theories 
of democratization struggle to explain these outcomes. Second, I present the structure of the 
opposition organization in the two countries. The following three sections provide a paired 
comparison of the Tunisian and Egyptian transitions divided into three periods: first, during 
the collapses of old regimes, second while re-establishing the constitution in the early stages 
after the authoritarian breakdowns, and, finally, the crises of 2013. For each of those three 
periods, I first present the sequence of events in Tunisia, then the sequence of events in Egypt, 
and then summarize the differences. The last section summarizes and discusses the findings.
  
4.2. Dependent variables 
I compare the attempted pacted transitions of Tunisia and Egypt because, among my cases, 
they are the most similar to each other. As this section will show, their societies, incumbent 
regimes, the structure of the opposition, and even the sequences of events and very close, while 
one of the cases is typical for my QCA model and illustrates of one its solution formulas while 
another is deviant—it has a solution but does not have an outcome. Those are completely 
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different: in the Egyptian case, the results of numerous attempts at negotiations have never 
been implemented, and the transition ended with a coup d’état and a military dictatorship, 
whereas Tunisia has experienced successful negotiations and subsequent democratization (see 
Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1. The character of regime change and subsequent democratization in Tunisia and 
Egypt. 
Outcome Tunisia Egypt 
Negotiations fail no yes 
Democratization yes no 
4.3. Independent variables 
4.3.1. Similar societies 
Egypt and Tunisia, two Muslim Arab countries that are almost neighbors, share historical and 
cultural backgrounds. Both are located in the MENA region; both face the Mediterranean Sea 
and are relatively close to Europe. After being a part of the Ottoman Empire, they share the 
legacy of being European (French in Tunisia and British in Egypt) protectorates from the 1880s 
to the 1950s. After gaining independence, both became autocratic for the second part of the 
twentieth century. In both cases, there was a long-lasting dictator who ruled throughout the 
long part of a post-colonial period and a stable institutionalized autocratic regime. The 
transitions in the two countries happened in the same year—therefore, the geopolitical 
background was similar.   
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From a modernization perspective (see the discussion in Chapter 1), the two societies had 
similar chances at democratization. Tunisian economy is richer, with the GDP per capita being 
slightly higher than 4 thousand US$ per capita as opposed to the Egyptian GDP that was 
slightly less than 3 thousand US$ per capita (see Table 4.2 for this and all further indicators 
mentioned in this paragraph). Thus, these countries could be both democratic or autocratic.25 
The Human Development Index is the same in the two countries; CO2 emissions that 
approximate the level 
of industrialization are also on the same level. The life expectancy is four years greater in 
Tunisia. At the same time, Tunisia has a slightly higher inequality, as is reflected in its Gini 
index. Therefore, according to those explanations that derive from inequality, Egypt had 
slightly higher chances of democratization. The emancipative and secular values of the citizens 
that affect democratization (Inglehart 2018) are also similar in the two countries. In other 
words, the modernization paradigm is unable to explain the striking difference in the outcomes. 
According to the theories that explain the mode of regime change with the type of their 
incumbent dictatorship, both regimes shared very high chances of successfully pacting. Both 
regimes before their revolutions could be characterized as party-based in the terms of Geddes 
and colleagues (2012, 2018b), although there was a strong military component in Egypt 
(Geddes et al., 2018b, p. 98). In the GWF database, the Egyptian regime is coded as party-
military-personalistic. Party-military regimes are even more likely to negotiate their exit than 
their civilian party counterparts (ibid.), while the personalistic regimes are, of course, less 
likely to do so. 
However, these two cases are not typical for the theory because most of the processes of their 
transitions happened after the old authoritarian leaders were ousted; and the power was taken 
by collective decision-making bodies. In other words, the opposition never negotiated with the 
incumbent regimes that ruled the country before. Instead, after the political leaders lost their 
offices, in both cases, the collective decision-making bodies that were created by the former 
dictators (i.e., the RCD and the SCAF, espectively) remained in power and started to bargain 
with the opposition. Therefore, their regimes can be characterized as even less personalistic 
than they used to be before the revolution. Therefore, according to the theory of Geddes and 
 
25 Przeworski and Limongi (1997) claim that the democratization is guaranteed with GDP higher than 6 thousand 
US$ per capita and is highly unlikely with the GDP lower than 2 thousand US$ per capita. 
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colleagues, both regimes had relatively good perspectives for pacted transitions and 
democratization. 
In addition, as discussed in Chapter 2, attempts at pacted transitions in this study vary by the 
extent the incumbent and the opposition control the situation, the incumbent and the opposition 
are represented in negotiations, what is discussed, how the foreign powers intervened, and by 
the scale of violence and contention. In this sense, the cases of Tunisia and Egypt stay within 
the middle of this variation and are relatively close to each other. The only exception is that in 
Egypt, the incumbent`s control over who represented the opposition in negotiations was much 
higher. 
 
In fact, the two cases are so similar to each other that their comparison suffers an endogeneity 
problem, as we know that revolutionaries learn from each other (Bunce & Wolchik, 2006). In 
the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, they learn in a different sequence. In the first stage, before the 
leader left the country, Tunisia created an example not only for Egypt but also for the whole 
Arab world. While Egyptians were following the Tunisian example in 2011, copying their 
patterns, the Tunisian Islamist party Ennahda became much more cooperative after seeing their 




Table 4.2. Structural conditions relevant for the character of regime change and subsequent 
democratization in Tunisia and Egypt 
  
Condition Tunisia Egypt 
Economic development (in 2011)26 
GDP per capita PPP, US$ (WB 2018) 4,179 2,747 
Life expectancy (years) 74 70 
CO2 emissions (tons per capita) 2.5 2.5 
HDI .70 .68 
Gini index (in 2010) 36 31.5 
Attitudes (WVS 2010-2014)27  
index of emancipative values 0-1; 
standard error in brackets 
.28(s.e. .15) .30(s.e..15) 
index of secular values 0-1; standard 
error in brackets 
.28(s.e..15) .33(s.e..15) 






Bottom-up activism heavily repressed repressed 
Opposition parties completely banned 
or silenced; only 
present in the capital 
completely banned or 
silenced; only present 
in the capital 




members are in exile 
de jure banned, de 






26 Source: World Bank (2018). 
27 Source: Ingelhart et al. (2014). 
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Nationwide umbrella trade union: 
organizational presence 
exists for ninety 
years, developed 
network of local 
branches 
exists for sixty years, 
developed network of 
local branches 
Nationwide umbrella trade union: 
cooptation 
mostly co-opted on a 
national level but 
preserves autonomy 
in local branches 
completely co-opted 
Nationwide umbrella trade union: 





protesters in the 
early stage, from 
January 9, 2011 
national body gets 
involved 
no 
Nationwide umbrella trade union: 




4.3.2. The incumbent regimes 
Tunisia and Egypt share very similar histories after the Second World War. The quality of 
governance in autocratic political regimes ranges from economic miracles to humanitarian 
catastrophes, and “for every President Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore, there are many like 
President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire” (Rodrik, cited in Gelman, 2020, p. ). In this regard, 
Tunisia was closer to the latter. Shortly after decolonization, Tunisia became dominated by the 
Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) party headed by Habib Bourguiba. His reign lasted 
from 1954 to 1987, and he established a stable and highly institutionalized party dictatorship 
with a strong socialist inclination and warm relationships with the West at the same time. His 
socialist policies emphasized the introduction of mass education, including the university level, 
strong state participation in the economy, and a remarkably high level of unionism. His rule 
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was even associated with a failed experiment with radical socialist policies in 1964–69, headed 
by the former UGTT Secretary-General Ben Salah (Perkins, 2004, p. 146). 
The size of the Tunisian army was minuscule, especially in comparison with Egypt: Tunisia 
never needed any army in the first place. To begin with, before the independence, neither 
France attempted to develop an army in Tunisia, nor was its own resistance militant enough. 
During Bourguiba`s rule, Tunisia had cordial relationships both with the West and with the 
Arab League. Furthermore, due to its small size, it could never pretend to be a significant power 
in the region. Neither was the army needed or used for domestic political goals because the 
regime had a more sophisticated coercive apparatus (Abadi, 2013, p. 434). 
At the same time, the regime was restrictive toward political parties. As a result, the electoral 
component that we expect in modern dictatorships was missing throughout the times of 
Bourguiba and Ben Ali. The opposition parties were repressed to the extent that the ruling RCD 
and Bourguiba would end up earning more than 99% of the votes, and, apart from the initial 
two or three years, the situation did not change much with Ben Ali (see, for instance, Perkins, 
2004, p. 174). 
From the very beginning, the Tunisian regime was not only secular but also openly hostile to 
religion. At different points of time, it fought even against the tradition of Ramadan fasting. 
Moreover, Islamist movements inspired by the Iranian revolution in 1979 always were a red 
line for the regime. For instance, when Ben Ali came to power in 1987, he allowed some 
Ennahda members (see detailed discussion below) to participate in the 1989 elections as 
“partyless” nominees, but then, seeing their electoral success arrested some 25,000 members 
(Abadi, 2013, p. 508). 
Like in Tunisia, the Egyptian incumbent regime was party-led and socialist, but it also had a 
strong army and a more militant Islamic movement. The history of that regime started with the 
military organization, the Free Officers, seizing power via a coup d`etat. After its first years 
(when it was also ruled by the Revolutionary Command Council or RCC), the regime relied on 
the more quasi-civic party Arab Socialist Union (ASU). The regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser 
Hussain was extremely popular because it was the first completely independent government in 
modern Egyptian history. It provided popular socialist reforms and a strong independent 
foreign policy. The socialist reforms were somewhat similar to the Tunisian ones apart from 
that they took larger scale: they redistributed the farmlands from the large landowners to the 
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peasants and the state in the 1950s and 1960s, but then also nationalized many other businesses 
(Daly, 1998, p. 345). 
A different historical course was taken after Abdel Nasser, with Sadat having followed a 
different, nonsocialist policy, with greater political freedoms and a liberalized “open door” 
economic policy in the hope of Western and Arab capital and investment resulting in a 
revitalized economy. 
The Egyptian army remained very strong. To begin with, the regime was involved in three wars 
with Israel in the years 1948, 1967, and 1973. Since Israel enjoyed foreign support, Egypt had 
poor relationships with the West, which, together with its socialist nature, at a certain point 
pushed it toward the alliance with the Soviet Union (Daly, 1998, p. 353). This was especially 
relevant in the times of Nasser. Most importantly, the very nature of the incumbent military 
regime and the massive distributions within its first two decades made the military not only the 
most serious physical or political power in society but also allowed them to dominate the 
economic realm. Most of the property in Egypt belongs to the military cadres, and military 
state officials control most businesses. As Yezid Sayigh points out, “the military claims to 
employ 5 million people, but virtually all are in fact employed by private subcontractors 
working for the military” (2020). This disparity hardly favored democratization from the point 
of view of those theories that explain the political regime with the distribution of means of 
production (Vanhanen, 1997, 2003). 
The relationship between the Egyptian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was always 
extremely violent, with waves of escalation and de-escalation. Before coming to power, Abdel 
Nasser briefly joined the MB, which emerged in the 1920s. Although they had a common goal 
of getting rid of British imperial control, they differed ideologically. Being a socialist, he 
accused the MB of exploiting popular religious sentiment for their political goals. As a result, 
MB leaders were executed, while their less important members were subject to mass arrests. 
Repression started with the MB`s attempt to murder Nassir in 1954, followed by multiple 
executions of its leaders, with six people hanged and hundreds arrested. In the same fashion, 
the MB`s most important ideolog, Said Qutb, was hanged in 1966 (Daly, 1998, pp. 341–342). 
Brothers would also respond with assassinations and rely on violent methods. At the same time, 
many members of the ruling Free Officers were also members of the MB. For instance, Qutb 
even had his own office in the RCC`s headquarters building (ibid., p. 349). 
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Later, in the times of Sadat, coexistence took a slightly more peaceful character, him having 
tried a reconciliation policy with the Islamists. After Sadat’s assassination by the Islamists, 
Mubarak was more stringent toward them. Nevertheless, it remained de facto the only existing 
opposition party. The MB was once allowed to participate in the 2005 elections in a very 
limited fashion, and it immediately managed to earn as much as 20% of seats. They achieved 
this despite being oblige to pretend that run partyless. After those elections, their numerous 
arrests followed. 
Thus, before the revolution, the Tunisian political Islam was much more moderate than its 
Egyptian counterpart, although, somewhat paradoxically, the Egyptian MB was much more 
present (El-Sherif, 2014; Wolf, 2017). 
 
4.3.3. The organizational structure of the opposition 
The two societies share striking similarities in their macro-level characteristics and close 
historical trajectories and a lower level of aggregation in the composition and characteristics 
of their opposition organizations. The organizational structure of the opposition in both regimes 
is similar (see Table 4.2). The sets of these organizations in the two societies are the exact copy 
of each other and consist of: repressed bottom-up activist networks, completely banned classic 
opposition parties, banned major Islamist parties, and a co-opted umbrella trade union (see, for 
instance, Warkotsch, 2014). 
Despite being repressed, bottom-up activism was vivid in both societies, although it was only 
present in capitals. Nonetheless, activism was much more heavily prosecuted in Tunisia—as a 
result, Egyptian informal activist networks played a much more important role during the 2011 
mobilization (Pilati et al., 2019). Opposition parties in both countries were either banned or co-
opted. Those of them that enjoyed a small share in parliament had never expressed any serious 
critique toward the regime, although they were allowed to have their own opinion on minor 
issues. Their less servile counterparts were excluded from the competition. Both regimes made 
sure that the levels of fragmentation of their party systems remained high. 
Apart from secular political parties, both regimes had banned Islamist platforms. The Egyptian 
MB was headed by Mohammed Morsi, and in Tunisia, the Ennahda (or Renaissance) 
movement, formerly known as the Movement of Islamic Tendency (MTI), was led by Rached 
Ghannouchi. Despite the ban, the MB retained an organizational presence in Egypt. Its 
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members were tolerated so long as their participation in elections was “partyless,” although 
everyone understood their affiliation. In contrast, the Ennahda had been almost annihilated by 
state repression by the time of the revolution. Most of its members were imprisoned, while 
those who managed to flee attempted to act from abroad. 
To sum up, by 2011, every traditional form of opposition in Egypt and Tunisia was either co-
opted or repressed. Still, the remnants of opposition organizations were more present in Egypt. 
First, the activist networks were slightly less repressed by the regime. Second, whereas the 
Islamist party Ennahda was completely demolished and expelled in Tunisia, the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood was partially tolerated and therefore institutionally present. At the same 
time, as the next section will show, unlike in Tunisia, the main Egyptian trade union, the 
Egyptian Federation of Trade Unions, was completely co-opted and was actually displacing a 
bottom-up labor movement. 
4.3.4. Trade unions in Tunisia and Egypt 
Both countries had large umbrella trade unions with deep historical legacies. The Tunisian 
UGTT originated in pre-independence times and was created in the 1920s, whereas the 
Egyptian Federation of Trade Unions (EFTU) was created in 1957. However, the UGTT has 
bottom-up origins, while its Egyptian counterpart, the EFTU, originated as a top-down 
structure. At the same time, both organizations were somehow incorporated into the 
authoritarian regimes. The difference that played a role later was that the local branches of the 
UGTT started to gain independence during the decade before the revolution. The following 
section will elaborate on these historical developments. 
4.3.4.1. The embedded EFTU 
The EFTU was created in a top-down character by Nasser`s authoritarian regime in 1957. This 
labor organization attempted to incorporate the working class into the regime, and therefore 
from the very beginning, the union`s capacity to speak against it was very much limited 
(Warkotsch, 2014, p. 169). Furthermore, from a certain point, the EFTU’s monopoly started to 
thwart the emergence of an independent labor movement after the “law 35 of 1976 that 
established [the EFTU] as the sole legal trade union” (Beinin, 2012, p. 6) was implemented. 
Although the EFTU did organize strikes on occasion, it had never participated in any civil or 
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labor unrest during the whole decade before the Arab Spring. When labor protests began 
spontaneously, the EFTU never joined or attempted to mediate them. It is not a surprise that 
during the last decade of Mubbarak`s rule, the EFTU was inevitably losing its grounds to new 
independent trade unions. 
Unionis was existent in Egypt but would only be tolerated if it goes in the framework of already 
existing organizations and keeps its claims within certain limits. Namely, the red line were the 
demands going beyond what the regime perceived as a merely economical realm. For instance, 
a leftist political party called Togammu` joined the strike of railway workers in 1987, and 
because of this, both the labor activists and the party were repressed harshly (Daly, 1998, p. 
382). Therefore, workers would never make explicit political demands, and the protests of the 
intelligentsia were always separated from those of the labor movement during Mubarak`s time 
(Beinin, 2012, p. 6). As a result, by the beginning of the Arab Spring, trade unions had “no 
nationally recognized leadership, few organizational or financial resources, limited 
international support, no political program, and only a minimal eco- nomic program” (ibid., p. 
1). 
The EFTU became even more reluctant to represent the workers in the last decade of Mubarak`s 
rule. For instance, the neoliberal reform of the year 2004 (Beinin, 2012, p. 4) triggered labor 
protests. The EFTU, however, never challenged these policies (Blackburn, 2018). Both 
workers` demands and the government’s responses were not addressed to the EFTU, which 
refrained even from mediating between the workers and the government (Warkotsch, 2014). 
Throughout the final years of Mubarak’s rule, workers were constantly campaigning for a 
minimum wage and organized large-scale strikes in 2008 and again in 2010 (Beinin, 2012, p. 
6). 
In other words, the EFTU became so much incorporated into the state that it failed to serve its 
original function—to channel workers` demands. The new, more independent trade unions 
were sometimes registered as NGOs (“Center for Trade Union and Workers” Services, see 
(Beinin, 2012, p. 7)) or even, exceptionally, against the rules of the incumbent regime, as trade 
unions: namely, the Independent General Union of Real Estate Tax Authority Workers, and 
two unions of teachers and health-care technicians in 2008 and 2010 (ibid.). But, again, none 
of those had any explicit political agenda. 
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It is not a surprise that the EFTU never supported the opposition during the Arab Spring. The 
alternative alliance, the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU), was 
organized, which was, again, impossible and illegal within the rules of Mubarak`s regime 
(Blackburn, 2018, p. 11). By 2012, this movement claimed to have as many as three million 
members, compared to 3.8 million for the pro-regime EFTU (Beinin, 2012, p. 6). It would 
campaign not only for democratization but also for the dismissal of the EFTU. However, it 
would quickly face hostility from both the ruling military body called the Supreme Council of 
the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the MB, and —as I will show later—it would never get 
represented enough in the new governments. 
 
4.3.4.2. The Tunisian UGTT’s trade-off before the Arab Spring. 
As I have argued in the previous section, in 2011, all “conventional” organizational forms of 
opposition in Tunisia were either co-opted or repressed. However, Tunisia had one 
organization—the UGTT, its principal trade union—which had historically had partial 
independence from the regime and a very articulated position on political participation. 
The UGTT originates from the times Tunisia was a French protectorate, based on a grievance 
that the workers who were Tunisian nationals would be paid half as much as their French 
counterparts. Therefore, when the UGTT emerged, it had two different goals: a classic labor 
rights agenda and national liberation. Becoming a socialist-inclined party dictatorship, the 
Tunisian regime favored trade union activity and cooperated with the UGTT. Now, if the 
UGTT only persuaded the labor rights, and never challenged the regime per se, then, in a short 
run, it had very high chances of fulfilling workers` demands. Also, it would guarantee its own 
survival. Nevertheless, in this case, it faced risks of becoming a mere part of the regime and 
losing workers` trust. On the other extreme, if the UGTT became too rebellious, it would not 
only fail to deliver better conditions for workers but would also risk being repressed. Since the 
extent to which the UGTT could afford itself to be militant would always change, the 
discussions on this trade-off became a part of the union’s routine (see, especially, Yousfi, 2018, 
pp. 116–122). This allowed it to quickly adjust to the changes brought by the Arab Spring. 
The UGTT`s militancy always differed spatially: its regional branches were always 
autonomous enough to be more opposition or even militant than its headquarters (Netterstrøm, 
2017; Warkotsch, 2014; Yousfi, 2018). Its headquarters are also heterogeneous. Its two wings 
are defined by their regions of origin: the Achourists, who are more pro-regime, and their more 
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militant Gafsa counterparts. It always took the organization much effort to find a balance 
between the two groups, and the price of any miscalculation was always high. The highest price 
was paid in 1978 when the UGTT appeared to be too rebellious and was harshly repressed by 
Bourguiba (Yousfi, 2018). 
However, the UGTT started to regain more independence ten years before the Arab Spring 
events: it achieved a less co-opted central leadership in 2000 and more militant regional 
leadership in 2000, 2003, and 2008. In 2011, during the revolution, it once again changed its 
leadership, with Houcine Abassi—who was markedly anti-regime—taking over. The wave of 
changes began in September 2000, with UGTT`s Secretary-General: despite the regime`s 
pressure, loyal Ismail Sahbani was removed with a slightly more militant Abdessalemm Jrad. 
Then, Ben Arous was the first regional branch that had a changed its leader: froma completely 
pro-regime RCD member Habib Attig to an openly rebellious Belgacem Ayari. This leadership 
change had been so much unwanted by the regime that the episode resembles a spy movie. At 
a certain point, the six UGTT leaders who had to vote for Attig were hiding in a secret house 
for fifteen days before the elections to avoid being persuaded, intimidated, or arrested. In the 
end, this operation turned out to be successful for the UGTT (Netterstrøm, 2017, p. 58). 
The same power turnover occurred in the Kairouan region in 2003 when the more rebellious 
Houcine Abassi challenged the RCD-controlled Sghair Saïdane. Like in 2000, the police were 
unsuccessfully attempting to stop Abassi on his way toward the UGTT`s headquarters where 
he would be elected. Apart from that, the UGTT `s militant local branches had posed a 
significant challenge to the regime twice during this decade: partially during the 2003 Tunisair 
crisis and especially during the 2008 severe Gafsa mining basin crisis. Some claim the latter 
completely changed the interaction dynamics between the UGTT and the state (Warkotsch, 
2014, p. 168). Paradoxically, in the two aforementioned cases, the different branches of the 
same organization were openly allying themselves with opposite political camps. The UGTT`s 
headquarters aligned with the government and acted openly against its own regional branches. 
At the same time, these branches were in open confrontation against the regime and organized 
strikes and protests. In other words, the diversity within the organization was enormous. 
During the revolution, the UGTT was constantly balancing between belonging to the 
government versus being beyond the struggle. It always took the organization much effort to 
find a balance between the competing forces. For instance, on 18th of February 2011, when the 
UGTT switched from the completely opposition CNPR to the ISROR that enjoyed some formal 
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power, the very fact that the UGTT acquired political office caused much dissent in its ranks 
(Yousfi, 2018, pp. 88–94). During the intra-UGTT Tabarka Congress on 28th of December 
2011, a massive campaign called “Jrad out” managed to remove Abdessalem Jrad (the UGTT`s 
Secretary-General from 2000 to 2011), who by 2011 was deemed too much co-opted into the 
Ben Ali`s regime, even though ten years prior he had been perceived as a rebel. Amore 
independent Houcine Abbassi succeeded him (Yousfi, 2018, p. 162). In the same fashion, the 
UGTT does not have any single affiliated party—for instance, in certain periods, there were 
four labor parties in Tunisia, each of which had its roots in the UGTT. During the 2012 and 
2013 negotiations, many members of the Troika government were at the same time the 
members of the UGTT. Therefore, it was not competing with the parties but rather penetrating 
them, and this partyless position has allowed it to acquire more rather than less power. 
To sum up, the Tunisia’s UGTT managed to find a balance that allowed it to avoid complete 
cooptation into the authoritarian regime and repression simultaneously. In addition, it gained 
some independence during the last decade of Ben Ali’s regime, especially in its regional 
branches. The UGTT had a habit of adjusting between cooptation and militancy. Therefore it 
did not take much time to join a revolution and provide its great organizational capacity to the 
opposition. The Egyptian EFTU, in contrast, became that much co-opted into the regime that 
eventually its influence faded. The new trade union movement was emerging despite the 
prohibitions even before the revolution approached. After Mubarak was ousted, the new trade 
unions were especially mushrooming. These newborn unions tried to participate in political 
life, but they certainly lacked organizational capacity. 
4.3.5. Summary: independent variables 
The two regimes had similar socioeconomic backgrounds, the same level of economic 
development, and they had strikingly close combinations of opposition organizations that 
existed on the ground. The main socioeconomic difference is that Egypt historically had a 
strong military and a highly state-led economy. The main difference in the level of 
organizations was that Egypt did not have strong independent trade unions because they were 
prohibited. On the contrary, Tunisia had an extremely strong trade union the UGTT that was 
only partially co-opted into the regime. 
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4.4. The processes leading to successful and failed negotiations 
The following part will demonstrate how the participation of the strong and organized trade 
union the UGTT in Tunisia was beneficial to the successful pacting and the democratization 
through it. In addition, it will indicate moments when this UGTT intervention was crucial in 
Tunisia and where it was missing in Egypt. 
4.5. Period I: Before the revolution 
4.5.1. The outbreak of the Tunisian revolution 
The Tunisian revolution (and the Arab Spring) was triggered by the self-employed street 
vendor Mohammed Bouazizi of the Sidi Bouzid region setting himself on fire on 17th of 
December 2010. That morning, he had been accused of trading without a license, and his goods 
were confiscated violently. After the police had refused to return his goods or even to speak to 
him, he committed suicide. Although this story was not an exception, either for Tunisia or for 
the entire region, it fell on fertile ground. The protests started the same day, quickly spreading 
throughout the country. 
The only parts of the UGTT that would participate in the initial stages of the protest were its 
militant local branches but not its headquarters. They helped with mobilization, resources, and 
spreading the information (Warkotsch, 2014, p. 176). First, the local branches would call for 
strikes. Second, the physical offices and means of the UGTT`s local branches were massively 
used by activists. Third, the UGTT helped spread the information on the protests. Since the 
Tunisian media did not cover the protests of the regions, foreign media such as Al-Jazeera were 
the primary source of information who would take interviews. The officials of the UGTT local 
branches would cover the events of protests in their region, and their interviews were known 
to be the most reliable source of information at the time (ibid.) 
Already by 28th of December 2010, Ben Ali started to react to protests, appearing in public and 
reshuffling the government. As the protests were spreading across the country, the regime`s 
response had become more and more violent, with hundreds of victims. After massive 
massacres in Kasserine and Thala 9th-10th of January 2011, the UGTT`s headquarters had 
joined the protests calling for a general strike. By this time, the violent, large-scale protests 
were tearing the country apart, and almost 300 people were already killed (Fox News, 2015) 
by the riot forces. Unlike in Egypt, the Tunisian army refused to shoot the protesters (Maclean, 
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2011). The dynamics of the revolution and the low odds of Ben Ali`s regime would be that 
obvious at the moment that the UGTT had no choice but to join the protesters (Warkotsch, 
2014, p. 168). The defection of the UGTT`s leadership from the ruling coalition increased the 
speed of the regime's collapse, but it hardly determined it. 
On the 10th of January massacre, Ben Ali started to make concessions and major promises not 
to run for the 2014 elections. Four days later, on January 14, 2011, Ben Ali tried to dissolve 
the government, called for the new elections without attempting any negotiations with the 
opposition. Finally, the Tunisian dictator that ruled the country for twenty-three years had to 
flee to Saudi Arabia. 
4.5.2. The outbreak of the Egyptian revolution 
Although Tunisian events inspired some instances of self-immolations in Egypt, none of those 
provoked a protest wave comparable to the Tunisian. The Egyptian unrest began on 25th of 
January 2011 when a bunch of small newborn (none of which was older than three years) 
secular democratic opposition NGOs—such as the April 6 Youth Movement, We are all Khaled 
Saeed, and the National Association for Change—organized demonstrations connected to the 
National Police Day. In other words, nothing out of the ordinary was expected. What made the 
difference, in this case, was the overwhelming number of protesters—exactly like in the 
Ukrainian revolutions described in Chapter 5. The regime, as always, responded with violent 
repression. Nevertheless, this time repression did not manage to calm down the protesters. The 
unrest had spread across the country, being especially viral after Friday prayers on 28th of 
January (Sowers & Toensing, 2012). The next day, unlike in Tunisia, the Egyptian army had 
been called to repress protesters. 
Although numerous religious and party leaders called for protests, empirical evidence suggests 
that the mobilization mainly occurred through several small informal activist networks (Pilati 
et al., 2019). In addition, these networks existed only in Cairo (Warkotsch, 2014), while the 
protests took place everywhere. 
Unlike in Tunisia, there was no unified organization that could potentially organize protests in 
the beginning, and it had never emerged later. In Tunisia, the trade union UGTT played this 
role, but, as I have described above, there was no chance that its Egyptian counterpart, the 
EFTU, would take part in the revolution. Thus, neither at this moment nor later did it participate 
in any protest activities. At the same time, the newborn associations of trade unions, including 
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the EFITU (see above), joined the protesters with strikes, with “tens of thousands of workers 
… engaging in some 60 strikes” (Beinin, 2012, p. 7), but those were never nationwide. As a 
result, Egyptian labor was relatively active despite the lack of organizational capacity. For 
instance, the ACLED database (Raleigh et al., 2010) also mentions dozens of cases of local 
labor strikes (mainly with an economic motive) that counted hundreds of workers participating. 
The first outbreak of violence happened on 2nd of February 2011, with the infamous “Camel 
Battle,” when unidentified men riding camels attacked the protesters. Nevertheless, after a day-
long battle, the defenders managed to remain in the square, having, however, two people killed 
(Sowers & Toensing, 2012, p. 79). From that point, the number of protesters started to increase 
even further. 
As the protests skyrocketed, the first failed attempt at negotiations took place on 6th of February 
(Davis, 2016, p. 120). By this moment, the number of protesters in Tahir square approached 
one million. The talks were held between Vice President Omar Suleiman, representing the 
incumbent, and most of the opposition leaders, including Mohammed Morsi (MB) and “50 
prominent Egyptians and opposition figures, including officials of the small, recognized 
opposition parties” (Kirkpatrick & Sanger, 2011). The Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak himself 
was not present (ibid.). The US government strongly supported the idea of negotiations (ibid.) 
However, in a way those were organized, these negotiations could potentially increase elites` 
chances at a prolonged dictatorship with minor concessions. The EFTU officials were not 
present during these negotiations, nor were the representatives of the newborn EFITU. 
The resulting agreement was published on the same day and proposed very general terms for a 
peaceful transfer of power. However, it seems like this document was imposed by Suleiman 
and was not really discussed since many of the meeting participants (including the most 
important player, the MB`s leader Mohammad Morsi) did not agree with it. Neither did the 
protesters in the streets seem satisfied. Their main objection was that the concessions offered 
by Suleiman were insufficient. First, the resignation of Mubarak nor the dismissal of 
government was an option; second, the cancelation of the constitution was not considered. 
Suleiman, in response, was trying to appeal to the reasons of “peacefulness” and the opinions 
of certain representatives of the crowd. 
The opposition movement did not have any unified organization to negotiate with, and 
Suleiman tried to exploit this weakness. Even if a further compromise was found, there was no 
guarantee that the opposition would be able to pose a credible threat in case even these minor 
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concessions were aborted. Had Suleiman`s maneuver succeeded, Egypt would have probably 
experienced a pact without democratization. Nevertheless, Suleiman and Mubarak had a 
second problem—the same fragmented opposition could not deliver any credible commitment. 
Because the opposition consisted of several completely non-coordinated camps that were even 
hostile to each other, no one could guarantee Mubarak his personal safety should he sign a pact 
with one side and leave office. Moreover, many powerful opposition players, including MB, 
were hostile to the agreements. As a result, street contention continued to skyrocket, and the 
attempt at negotiation did not seem to decrease the scale of the struggle. Labor joined the 
protest massively after the 6th of February. The newborn EFTU organized multiple strikes 
(Davis, 2016, p. 122; Raleigh et al., 2010) that are even argued to be decisive Mubarak`s 
displacement (Beinin, 2012). 
In his speech on 10th of February, Mubarak offered many concessions during the negotiations 
except for the main one—his resignation. This fostered a public outburst with several senior 
army officers joining the protesters, which raised doubts in the large groups of military 
officers.28 The next day, February 11, the military body called SCAF ousted Hosni Mubarak 
with a coup d`etat. This move was met very warmly by the protesters during the first day. Some 
authors even claim this coup to be a somewhat necessary but “tough decision” (Davis, 2016, 
p. 122). 
4.5.3. Summary 
Both revolutions had a violent character, with at least 100 victims in Tunisia (BBC, 2011) and 
300 in Egypt. Tunisia never attempted to negotiate a transition during that stage, but this tells 
us almost nothing about the country`s capacity to negotiate (see Table 4.3 below). One does 
not know whether Tunisia would be able to remove Ben Ali in a negotiated way shall they 
attempt to do so. Egypt, in contrast, attempted a pact, but the actors quickly showed themselves 
incapable of negotiating. The incumbent was not ready to make concessions and did not seem 
entirely credible. For its part, the opposition was not united enough to make joint demands and 
stick with the agreements already made. In other words, the opposition was not able to show 
 
28 In addition, many of military officers were unhappy with Mubarak`s son Gamal Mubarak who was responsible 
for economic policy during last five years of the regime, and seemed to redistribute resources away from the 
military. Gamal assuming power from his father seemed like a feasible scenario at the time, which could be an 
additional reason for the coup (Allam, 2011). 
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neither a credible commitment nor a credible threat. As I will show further, the Tunisian actors 
could solve crises cooperatively, but at this stage, actors did not attempt to choose this strategy. 
Egyptian negotiations would always be a twofold attempt at a zero-sum game in the later stages 
precisely because of the lack of capacity. 
The second difference between the two cases lies in the character of mobilization—whereas, 
in Egypt, it happened solely through the informal networks, the Tunisian activists employed 
the organizational capacity of the UGTT`s local branches in addition to the informal networks. 
However, the Tunisian trade union headquarters only joined the protest when the regime had 
almost collapsed. In Egypt, the EFTU never participated in nor called for strikes. The third 
difference is that the military forces were deployed to repress the street protests in Egypt, and 
they openly refused to do so in Tunisia. 
By the beginning of the Arab Spring, both Egyptian and Tunisian trade unions were largely co-
opted into their respective regimes (see discussion on trade unions above). However, the 
UGTT`s local branches enjoyed significant autonomy. As a result, the UGTT made its 
organizational structures available to the protesters during the protests: for instance, the local 
branches called for strikes or offered their office spaces and shared the information on the 
events with the independent media. On top of that, after the 8th, 9th, and 10th of January 
massacres of 2011, even the national body of the UGTT started to call for strikes. However, in 
Egypt, the top-down-created EFTU never offered its organizational capacities to the protesters. 
The only labor mobilization occurred through the personal connections of workers or newborn 
independent trade unions (Warkotsch, 2014, p. 176), such as the EFITU (Beinin, 2012). 
One cannot claim, however, that the presence of a strong trade union such as UGTT was 
essential to start a revolution in Tunisia because every other country of Arab Spring has proven 
its ability to overthrow their dictator even without having this high organizational capacity of 
the opposition. Neither do we have evidence that the UGTT had mobilized a statistically 
significant number of people (Pilati et al., 2019). On top of that, during the beginning of the 
revolution, the headquarters of the UGTT stayed reluctant (Warkotsch, 2014, p. 167). Thus, 
although the UGTT`s headquarters participated in mobilization during the last week of the 
incumbent regime, their defection has only catalyzed the process that was not reversible. As a 
result, UGTT`s role was never crucial before Ben Ali fled the country. In addition, Egyptian 
labor also managed to create a new independent trade union called the EFITU quickly and 
organize a strike in the last week of Mubarak’s rule. 
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There is no statistically significant evidence based on mass surveys to confirm that any 
meaningful part of the mobilization of the Tunisian revolution happened through the UGTT or 
any other organization. Instead, the evidence suggests that both in Tunisia and Egypt, the bulk 
of the mobilization happened because of the informal face-to-face small group ties rather than 
any organization as those are the most likely to survive in repressive contexts. (Pilati et al., 
2019). 
 
Table 4.3. Sequences of steps in Egypt and Tunisia before the breakdown of the incumbent 
regime 







First failed attempt at 
negotiations 
Dictator lost power 





No Dictator lost power 
(fled the country) 
 
One should bear in mind that although these differences seem numerous, they are carefully 
searched for. In almost everything apart from the aforementioned, the two authoritarian 
collapses are highly similar. It is hard to find any pair of contentious action events resembling 
each other in every category: by the organizations involved in it, dynamics, extent of violence, 
and the outcome. In both cases, the violence of repression escalated until the moment of the 
dictators` departure, and the situations after the leaders left their posts were very similar. 
However, the two countries’ paths later separated. 
4.6. Period II. Constitution writing 
After the incumbent dictator was ousted (fled the country in Tunisia and was arrested in Egypt), 
the power remained in the hands of the strongest force of the incumbent regime: Mohamed 
Ghannouchi, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali`s prime minister in the Tunisian case, and Mubarak`s 
former small ruling military body called the SCAF in the Egyptian case. They ended up 
representing the incumbent in the negotiations over a new constitution. Still, there is one 
difference between the two cases. As the next section will show, it lies in the extent the 
opposition was represented in negotiations: whereas in Tunisia, after the pressure organized by 
the UGTT and the creation of the ISROR, the different forces of the opposition were united 
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and in control of the situation, in Egypt, the SCAF managed to divide the multiple warring 
factions of the opposition and to negotiate with its parts separately. 
4.6.1. Tunisia. Constitution writing after Ben Ali’s flight 
After the fall of the regime in Tunisia, “the two most influential institutions were the army and 
the UGTT” (former Deputy Secretary-General of the UGTT Mohammed Trabelsi, cited in 
Yiousfi, 2018, p. 78). Some even exclude the army and call the UGTT “the most influential 
structured and structuring force of resistance and social contention in independent Tunisia” 
(Omri, 2015, p. 18). 
Despite this, in the very beginning, the UGTT was not included either in planning the 
constitution or into the government, and the first two months, it had to fight for its guiding role 
in a transition. After the events of 15th of January 2011, former Ben Ali`s prime minister 
Mohammed Ghannouchi formed an interim government that mostly included the incumbent 
regime`s elites and co-opted opposition. The influential UGTT was underrepresented, with less 
than 5% of seats in Ghannouchi`s two cabinets. That is why it refused to participate and 
preferred instead to fight for power, organizing the so-called Kasbah I and Kasbah II protests. 
In addition, the UGTT organized collective decision-making platforms for the opposition. 
On the same day of Ben Ali`s flight on January 15, 2011, the UGTT established a body called 
the Council for the Protection of the Revolution (CNPR)29 and hosted it (Stepan, 2012). The 
CNPR united virtually every force that is not included in the Mohamed Ghannouchi 
government under the leadership of a powerful unionist, Ben Anchor. However,the CNPR still 
cannot be called an attempt at pact according to my definition because the Incumbent was not 
present there, it only united opposition. 
The CNPR did not have any official power at this stage but still enjoyed some de facto influence 
as the UGTT could call for strikes and protests using its organizational capacities. In two 
weeks, this led to a deadlock between the government and the CNRP. On 27th of January 2011, 
the first Kasbah square sit-in succeeded in forcing Ghannouchi to dismiss his first government 
that had an obvious bias in representing the incumbent regime elites. The sit-in was organized 
mostly by the UGTT (Omri, 2015, p. 22; Yousfi, 2018). 
 
29 Sometimes called the Higher Political Reform Commission. 
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The first sit-in changed the dynamics. On 18th of February 2011, what Stepan (2012) calls “one 
of the most effective consensus-building bodies in the history of ‘crafted’ democratic 
transitions” was officially created. This UGTT-dominated body was called the ISROR (High 
Authority for Realization of the Objectives of the Revolution, Political Reform, and 
Democratic Transition). It was headed by unionist Ben Anchour, who used to lead the CNPR 
before. The ISROR had a diverse set of members that included both the CNPR and government 
figures. Most importantly, this body enjoyed legal power to organize elections and electoral 
laws (Stepan, 2012; Yousfi, 2018) and a substantial de facto authority in many other questions. 
Despite this compromise, the street pressure continued with the Kasbah II in front of the 
government building. The main objection of the protesters was the same: now the ISROR was 
formed, but still, the government mainly consisted of incumbent elites. This led to the interim 
prime minister Ghanouchi having to resign on 27th of February 2011. The next interim, 
“technical” government, did not have any former RCD members.  
The first phase of Tunisian pacting finished in two months. By 11th of April 2011, this UGTT-
hosted Commission agreed to call elections for the Constituent Assembly that would draft a 
constitution, later approved by referendum and made everything to ensure free and fair 
elections. Its main product, apart from an electoral design, was a roadmap for a transition that 
had several elegant solutions: first, it decided not to hold presidential elections before a 
constitution is enacted because then the president could manipulate the process of constitution-
making; second, it delegated the Constitutional Assembly parliamentary powers and a power 
to appoint or dismiss a government. The results of the Commission`s work are summarized in 
detail by Stepan (2012, pp. 92–94). 
One aspect of this transition, as anywhere else in the cases described in this thesis—was 
different from the classic understanding of a pacted transition (O’Donnell et al., 1986). If the 
Incumbent, in this case, Ghannouchi and his first two governments, had not been exposed to 
constant street pressure by the opposition, there is a chance that they would try to stay in office 
with minor concessions. One should keep in mind that Mohammed Ghannouchi had initially 
almost failed to include the opposition and the UGTT in the first government—before they 
were forced to do so. It was the constant street pressure of the two Kasbah sit-ins accompanied 
by the UGTT`s capacity to tease out additional powers to influence and guide the transition 
that allowed Tunisia to approach the first elections with an RCD-free government together with 
the UGTT-led ISROR. At the same time, one cannot call this transition entirely peaceful or 
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nonviolent as is generally expected of pacted transitions because Mohammed Ghannouchi 
resigned after and because of the five victims of street violence. The transition had a 
cooperative character, it also involved successful pacting, and it is adequate to O'Donnell and 
Schmitter`s understanding of pacted transition. However, it was not, by any means, elite-led. 
This varies from Schmitter`s classic understanding, which assumed every pacted transition like 
this to be initiated and guided by ruling elites while the role of street pressure and the opposition 
was considered of somewhat secondary importance. 
4.6.2. Egypt: Constitution writing after Hosni Mubarak’s arrest 
Met with public enthusiasm and having dismissed the government and the constitution of the 
incumbent regime, exactly as the Tahrir square protesters demanded, the military started to 
prepare a process of writing up a new constitution. In addition to that, the SCAF dissolved 
Mubbarak`s secret service called the SSIS and made several other popular steps. During the 
first month of transition (i.e., from 11th of February 2011 to the moment of the referendum), 
the SCAF led a series of consultations with legal experts (Farouk, 2013, p. 4). The Incumbent 
had a perfect grip on writing this constitution, and there was no counterbalancing actor. On top 
of that, the consultations were rather taken with experts rather than with the opposition. That 
is why I would not consider this instance a case of negotiations—the opposition was not 
present. A referendum on the principles of the organization of the Constitutional Assembly was 
held on 13th of March 2011. It had adopted rules designed by and favorable to the SCAF, thus 
institutionalizing its de facto power using mass support. From this moment until the end of 
April, it had a de facto control over who participated in the Constitutional Assembly. 
During this stage, taking advantage of liberalization, the new trade unions were mushrooming 
and were very active. For instance, only in one month, February 2011, “15,0000 [workers] 
participated in 489 strikes” (Beinin, 2012, p. 8). Apart from the democratization agenda, they 
were demanding basic labor rights such as the “right to form independent trade unions, [and] 
the right to strike” (ibid.). Also, they advocated dissolving the pro-government EFTU. The 
latter remained loyal to the SCAF and would help them thwart any bottom-up unionism. Morsi 
made EFTU even more subordinated after he issued a decree that allowed a Manpower Minister 
to appoint each of the sixty members of the EFTU board (Blackburn, 2018, p. 11). In fact, the 
EFITU had found itself opposed by virtually any power of a new regime: “the ETUF30 
 
30 Some sources abbreviate the EFTU as the ETUF, and the EFITU as the EFIUT. 
 
 85 
leadership, the SCAF, and the Muslim Brothers” (Beinin, 2012, p. 17). Even the Egyptian 
Block, the liberal-left alliance in the parliament, was anti-unionist (ibid., p. 18). The 
parliamentary Labor Committee was chaired by an anti-unionist “manager in a petroleum 
sector enterprise” (ibid.). Therefore, the old EFTU became even more embedded into the 
regime while virtually every actor thwarted the newborn EFITU in the country. 
However, the SCAF`s popularity started to fade with the trial of Hosni Mubarak seeming to be 
too merciful and the SCAF itself having more power than what is needed to just ensure the 
democratic transition. The more protests they faced, the more brutal the repression was. The 
two massive Tahrir square protests on 1st of August 2011 and 9th of September 2011 were 
violently dispersed by the riot forces (Kirkpatrick, 2011; Shenker, 2011). One month later, the 
third protest was already repressed with extreme brutality and twenty-five protesters being 
killed, becoming known as a Maspero Massacre (Heo, 2013). By the moment of parliamentary 
elections, almost every secular opposition party had become openly hostile to the SCAF and 
demanded it leave office. 
Negotiations about the members of the Constitutional Assembly were repeatedly taking place 
from the moment of the referendum until the end of April 2012 between the SCAF and 
representatives of numerous fragmented opposition parties that were present in the parliament 
(a good description can be found in Farouk, 2013, p. 5). They were again performed as a series 
of informal talks. But, again, the ruling SCAF had perfect control over selecting with whom it 
would negotiate. Therefore, the SCAF was never fully counterbalanced by the opposition. 
The duality of powers that brought the Egyptian transition to its collapse started with the first 
free and fair parliamentary elections on 11th of January 2012. The new parliament had been 
dominated by the Islamist, which is, again, de facto the Muslim Brotherhood.31 After these 
elections, the SCAF assumed control over the Constitutional Assembly, MB—over the 
parliament. But, as I will show later, both counterparts had obvious authoritarian aspirations 
and would always renege from their guarantees whenever convenient. 
The first time all the informal negotiations at this stage had failed was on 11th of June 2012. 
Six days before the presidential elections, the SCAF dissolved the parliament by court order, 
thus failing to fulfill its promises of 13th of March 2011—beginning of April 2012 negotiations. 
 
31 Officially, the Muslim Brotherhood adopted the name of Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) to work around the 
government prohibitions, but I prefer to use its de facto name for the sake of simplicity. 
 
 86 
It became evident that the SCAF-affiliated candidate would have almost the same chances of 
winning the elections as that of the MB. Therefore, the rationale of the SCAF had been that if 
the MB won the presidential elections, it would have achieved unlimited power. Dissolving the 
parliament, the SCAF seized even more power. Before that, it had only control over the 
Constitutional Assembly. Now, one week before the presidential elections, the SCAF 
controlled everything as the Assembly now had parliamentary powers (Farouk, 2013, p. 5). 
Again, the lack of counterbalance allowed the SCAF to act unilaterally. If we do a thought 
experiment and imagine an action of this kind happening in Tunisia, series of the UGTT-led 
strikes and calls for negotiations would have followed. 
The balance of power was restored three days after this point, on 17th of June 2012, when the 
results of relatively free and fair presidential elections had been declared. The two presidential 
candidates competed—Mohammed Morsi representing the MB and Ahmed Shafik 
representing the SCAF. Morsi won a narrow victory with 51.8 percent against 48.27 (Weaver, 
2012). On the same day, the SCAF issued a decree that handed almost absolute power over a 
Constitutional Assembly (Farouk, 2013, p. 5). On August 12, 2012, Abdel Fattah Saeed 
Hussein Khalil el-Sisi was appointed the head of the SCAF, the main military body. Again, the 
fragile Egyptian chances at democratization were threatened by the two sides, and both were 
the only organized players. 
4.6.3. Summary 
In both cases, the strongest actors from the incumbent regimes assumed power after the old 
authoritarian leaders left their offices to mass protests. In both cases, this was obviously not 
enough for the protesters, and these new governments would face constant and severe street 
pressure to leave and ensure a democratic reform. In both cases, the transition had a negotiated 
character during this stage, although the street protests sometimes were dispersed with violence 
(See Table 3.4 below). 
However, the dynamics and directions were different: the incumbent regime`s heir lost all its 
power in a month in Tunisia and seized the dictatorial power in Egypt. In Tunisia, the two 
Kabah sit-in protests organized by the UGTT first resulted in the platform for negotiations that 
the government did not completely control, and second, drove this government away—in one 
month. In Egypt, the military body SCAF, taking advantage of its initial popularity, was 
increasing its power and omitting checks on itself, first, with a referendum in March and, 
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second, by dissolving a government in June. Thus, what used to be a special body that emerged 
as a result of public pressure together with the UGTT`s organizational capacity to reach a 
consensus in Tunisia—ISROR—was substituted with a “limited non-transparent consultations 
with “trustworthy” legal experts” (Farouk, 2013, p. 4) in Egypt. 
The reason is that although they did not have any formal power initially, SCAF members 
enjoyed serious popular support alongside many resources available, including control over the 
police and the army. At the same time, during that period, the SCAF was never checked by any 
organization that would be in any way comparable in its organizational capacity during that 
period. As a result, the new unionist movement did not manage to achieve any political power, 
while the old ETUF remained completely controlled. The MB already participated at this stage 
of a transition, but it would only become a serious threat later, and at this stage, it did not gain 
its full power yet. Although the protests were acute, no single person was speaking in the name 
of these protesters. Therefore, the SCAF successfully used these initial advantages to seize 
more de jure and de facto powers. 
At the same time, in Tunisia, the civilian government of Mohammed Ghannouchi, even though 
he had infinite formal powers in the very beginning, was always constantly checked by the 
government and the opposition players. As a result, he had to give up power quickly. The 
protests were not only strong, but they were also always backed by the established organization 
with high organizational capacity—the UGTT. The union also worked hard to unite the 
opposition and advance its demands. The Ennahda party was not particularly strong during this 
period, nor did it play a major role in the protests.   
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Table 4.4. Constitution writing in Egypt and Tunisia after the breakdown of the incumbent 
regime 






Reaction to a demand 




Roadmap for a 
transition? 
Egypt Remnants of 
incumbent 





Government dismissed No 
Tunisia Remnants of 
incumbent 





Government dismissed Yes 
 
4.7. Period III. The rise of radical Islamism: The political crises of 
2013-2014 
4.7.1. The Tunisian National Assembly 
The overall problem Tunisia was facing with the Ennahda in power was the rise of the Salafism, 
a form of religious fundamentalism. The outbreak of this crisis was triggered by the killings of 
two leftist activists who are also members of the UGTT—Chokri Belaid on February 6, 2013, 
and Mohamed Brahmi on 25th of July 2013. This led to a stalemate, where the UGTT helped 
oust the Ennahda government. 
The elections to the Constitutional Assembly (later— the ANC) were held on 22nd of November 
2011 with the plan that it will write a constitution approximately in one year to be later changed 
with a proper parliament. However, the process of constitution writing took longer than it was 
expected. The Assembly was heavily influenced by the Islamist Ennahda party that not only 
won eighty-six out of 215 seats but also had four times more seats than the second-biggest 
party. Right after the day of the elections, the relationship between the UGTT and the Ennahda 
swung wildly, from peaceful coexistence in some regions and situations to open hostility in 
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others. Since the organizations came from different realms, they would sometimes overlap: 
many members of the Ennahda were also the UGTT unionists. 
At the same time, the two could be extremely contentious. The Ennahda would constantly 
accuse the UGTT of doing political action that goes far beyond the trade union`s economic 
interests (Yousfi, 2012). For instance, the UGTT and the Ennahda had a violent conflict on 25th 
of February 2012 in the Sidi Bouzid region when the Ennahda activists dumped garbage in 
front of the UGTT offices. Another instance of street clashes was the UGTT`s demonstration 
on the 1st of May 2012 that was aggressively counter demonstrated by the Ennahda (ibid.). 
The first calls for a new advisory body that would help foster constitution writing started the 
following summer. On 18th of June 2012, the UGTT called for a council to resolve 
disagreements between the parties without having any official power. The initiative, however, 
did not work because the Ennahda defected from its reasoning that such body would simply 
duplicate the functions of the Constitutional Assembly (Yousfi, 2018, p. 197). This initiative 
was also paired with a later canceled national strike on the 5th of December that would demand 
a roadmap for the transition (Yousfi, 2018, p. 198). 
On 6th of February 2013, an anti-Ennahda leftist activist Chokri Belaid was killed by a group 
of radical Salafists. The subsequent wave of protests did not change the pace of events. On 25th 
of July 2013, another leftist activist Mohamed Brahmi was killed. The reaction of most of the 
leftist opposition was to run protests asking to dissolve both the government and the National 
Constitutional Assembly. However, the UGTT agreed on an intermediate solution—to dissolve 
the government while keeping the Constitutional Assembly. 
The same day, the UGTT entered a strategical alliance with the three other professional 
unions—the Tunisian Union for Industry, the Order of Lawyers, and the Tunisian Human 
Rights League. This alliance was called the Quartet and was established to increase the 
UGTT`s weight during the forthcoming negotiations. This alliance with the high-skilled 
professional organizations also signaled to investors and the IMF that at this stage, the UGTT 
was not seeking to pursue a leftist economic agenda. Already on the next day, 26th of July 2013, 
the UGTT`s Quartet organized a first general strike. Then the Quartet`s pressure continued. 
Two days after the UGTT started to step in, on 28th of September 2013, the Ennahda-led Troika 
government agreed to resign and run the UGTT-led negotiations. The first reason is that, again, 
contrary to the protesters, the UGTT was offering a compromise: the Ennahda would save its 
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right to participate in politics, and the UGTT-dominated Assembly stayed intact. In three 
months, the UGTT-led Quartet drafted a roadmap for the (1) appointment of a new technocratic 
government, (2) four weeks of constitution-making, and (3) an electoral commission. Second, 
the military takeover that finished with many thousand people bloodshed in Egypt for more or 
less the same reason had happened in a neighboring country just one month ago. Therefore, 
this made the Ennahda's leadership more cautious. At the same time, there was widespread 
concern that, unlike in Egypt, Tunisia lacked the coercive apparatus that would be able to stop 
large-scale violence shall the attempts at pact fail—that made both parts more willing to 
negotiate (International Crisis Group, 2014, p. 5). Third, the power of the Quartet, together 
with the protesters, was overwhelming, and the street demonstrations persisted during the work 
process of this dialogue (ibid.). 
The third series of Tunisian pacting (called a National Dialogue) began on 26th of October 
2013. The opposition Quartet of the UGTT was negotiating against the ruling Troika 
government. The process of constitution writing illustrates the organizational capacities of the 
UGTT. “[Houcine Abbassi, the president of the UGTT] facilitated discussion. Sometimes he 
imposed his decisions. He would even require representatives from political parties to stay in 
the room after the meeting if no decision had been made” (Yousfi 2018, p. 202, reciting  
International Crisis Group, 2014, p. 4). Therefore, the UGTT used its capacities to farce actors 
to reach agreements rather than to assume power. The only question is why did not the UGTT 
just assume a full dictatorial power as the SCAF did in Egypt. 
One month and a half later, on 14th of December 2013, this UGTT-led National Dialogue 
appointed a new prime minister, Mehdi Jomaa, together with a technocratic government ( 
International Crisis Group, 2014). On 26th of January 2014, the National Dialogue succeeded 
in adopting the constitution (International Crisis Group, 2014, p. 7). The first parliamentary 
elections were held on 26th of November 2014, and they were free and fair. As of now, 2021, 
this UGTT-promoted democratization proves itself to be durable. All the democracy indexes 
rate Tunisia as a democracy. 
 
4.7.2. The Egyptian coup d’état 
After winning the presidential elections on June 17, 2012, by a narrow victory, Morsi gradually 
took control over the Constitutional Assembly by 2013. The authoritarian manner in which the 
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MB dominated over a Constitutional Assembly raised many concerns. The extent to which the 
civil society organizations and the 6th of April movement were represented in this period was 
minuscule (Farouk, 2013). By this time, both the MB and the SCAF seemed to play a zero-sum 
game ignoring any promises and rules whenever convenient. The MB was criticized for a 
complete ignorance toward the secular opposition. 
At a certain point, the MB’s policies caused numerous protests that started on 30th of June 
2013, led by secular activists of the April 6 Youth Movement. (Housden, 2013). These forces 
were factionalized. They lacked any capacity to deliver credible threats and credible 
commitments to force the MB to negotiate with them. However, this gave another power—the 
SCAF—a legitimation for the more drastic actions. It made a tactical alliance with secular 
liberals to get rid of the MB. Finally, the negotiated coexistence of the SCAF and the MB ended 
with the coup d’état of 3rd of July 2013. The MB (including its FJP) was banned, and Morsi 
was arrested and sentenced to death. 
United in their criticism of the Muslim Brotherhood and Morsi, all the trade unions, including 
the controlled EFTU and the independent EFITU, have initially supported military coup d`état. 
In exchange, the EFITU leader Abu Eita held office as minister for human resources in 2014, 
but he did not spend much time in office. In 2016, the independent trade unions were once 
again banned, and the old law about the EFTU monopoly was once again implemented 
(according to Blackburn, 2018, p. 12). 
In response to the coup, ousted MB-affiliated MPs, members, and their families started protests 
and occupied two squares in Cairo and virtually every important city (Ketchley, 2017, p. 130). 
First, the ruling SCAF guaranteed safety to the protesters. However, these promises were not 
worth much: in ten days, 14th of August 2013, the military dispersed the sit-ins using lethal 
firearms and heavy vehicles. (Human Rights Watch, 2014). The bloodiest of the dispersals is 
widely known as the Rabaa massacre. Attacking the epicenter of anti-coup protests, the military 
forces killed or injured most of the protesters in the square. This is known to be “one of the 
world’s largest killings of demonstrators” (Human Rights Watch, 2014), with up to 1,000 
people killed, 4,000 injured, and 40,000 arrested (Ketchley, 2017, p. 131) in one day. The most 
famous MB leaders were arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment, but some were allegedly 
killed in the years afterward. After the dispersal, Brothers still protested with other methods 
than sit-ins (ibid., p. 139), trying to reverse the coup—but unsuccessfully. To suppress dissent, 
the new government imposed a state of emergency for two months. 
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In Egypt, two forces—the SCAF and the MB—were trying to achieve unlimited power, and 
no consensus or (quasi)democratic power-sharing was possible with these aspirations. As a 
result, all the negotiations, pacts, national dialogues, and constitutional bodies, starting from 
the most informalized talks and finishing with the most institutionalized assemblies, performed 
within the two years between 2011 and 2013 appeared to be meaningless. Now, in 2021, the 
SCAF remains the dominating political force in Egypt. 
4.7.3. Summary 
The third period shows the most crucial difference between the Tunisian and Egyptian 
transitions. The Egyptian events and the grievances of the secular opposition are very close to 
those that informed the events on 8th of September 2013 in Tunisia. There, the UGTT forced 
the Ennahda to resign to the intermediate government and negotiate. The lack of mediation and 
capacity to deliver credible threat and credible commitment of the Egyptian fragmentized 
secular opposition, in the end, had just opened a window of opportunity for the SCAF. The 
latter also achieved great power by the time and found itself able to commit a coup d’état 
unopposed. As a result, Tunisia ended up having a pact while Egypt had a coup. See Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5. Solutions to Islamist crises in Egypt and Tunisia. 
 Challenge Solution Outcome 




Coup d’état against 
Morsi 
Dictatorship 




Negotiations of the 






This chapter shows that one of the most important determinants of the success of the Tunisian 
pacted transition, and Egypt`s failed attempt at negotiations and the lack of democratic 
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transition lies in the organizational capacity of the opposition—in this case, the presence and 
the participation of an independent trade union, the UGTT, in Tunisia and the absence of such 
in Egypt. Speaking of a broader perspective, the dominant role of the military in Egypt that 
determined the structure of its political economy together with its more militant Islam also 
played an important role. The absence of Egyptian unionism is thus embedded within this 
political context. 
The UGTT could help facilitate a compromise, and it could force the dictator to agree when he 
did not want to. The UGTT was large, influential, and rebellious enough to speak for protesters 
yet co-opted enough to speak with political elites. Also, it had enough capacity to organize sit-
ins and round tables, or, as they are typically called in Africa, National Dialogues, and keep its 
promises. In Egypt, independent unionism was prohibited, and such actors simply did not 
exist—although the labor`s potential to organize remained strong. 
At the first stage of the transition, before a dictator left the country, the participation of a trade 
union did not make much difference. It only slightly affected the character of mobilization, but 
the outcome was the same—in both countries, dictators lost their power. In both countries, the 
labor strikes accompanied the protests in the last days of the incumbent regimes, and both were 
thought to merely speed up their demise. Of course, in Tunisia, they were organized by the 
established UGTT, in Egypt, the newborn EFITU organized them, but in both cases, the strikes 
took place and were successful. 
The UGTT`s capacities for credible commitment (to negotiate with the state and mediate 
conflicts) and credible threat (to organize strikes and sit-ins) have played a crucial role after 
the Tunisian dictator left the country. As a result, the UGTT formed at least three successful 
platforms for dialogue— the CNPR, the ISROR, and the 2013 National Dialogue.32 Each time, 
the UGTT changed the pace of reform, forcing the incumbent to the negotiating table by calling 
a nationwide strike. Therefore, this mediation was possible thanks to the UGTT`s capacity for 
credible commitment and credible threat. In other words, I claim that there were two focal 
points when the UGTT changed the pace of revolution using its organizational capacity for 
credible threat: forcing Ghannouchi to dismiss his government on 28th of September 2011 and 
forcing the Ennahda-led Troika to resign on 28th of September 2013. Subsequently, in both 
 




episodes, the UGTT`s organizational capacity for credible commitment—to organize 
dialogues, keep promises, and deliver guarantees—turned out to be even more important. 
Namely, the UGTT organized ISROR on February 18, 2011, and the National Dialogue on 26th 
of November 2013. 
Egypt faced the same challenges—the sudden failure of an old dictator, the interim government 
consisting of incumbent elites that strived to preserve the status quo, the debate on constitution 
writing, and later the rise of Salafism, and the uncooperative behavior of the incoming Islamist 
governing party. However, in those situations where the strong UGTT was able to mediate, to 
force players to negotiate and to abandon a zero-sum game while not striving for power itself, 
the Egyptian SCAF military body used the blunt repression to seize unlimited power. In 
Tunisia, this strong and, at the same time, anti-democratic actor did not exist. Throughout its 
history, it has always had a very limited army. In addition, the democratic movement in Egypt 
had limited organizational capacity and could not bargain much. It consisted of a bunch of 
newborn, weak, and fragmented organizations. The main Islamist party was not capable of 
credible commitment. For instance, it failed to reach an extrication agreement with Mubarak 
during the first phase of the revolution. Neither the ruling SCAF was—for instance, while 
preparing one of the bloodiest crackdowns on street protests in a modern human history, it 
promised safety to the anti-coup protesters. Egyptian trade unions were created after the 
revolution began; they could potentially become a strong power if not thwarted. Although 
Egypt’s democratic opposition managed to initiate a revolution, they, paradoxically, had 
limited electoral success and minimal influence later. So much so that later they were 
constantly ignored both by the SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood. As a result, the two 
dominant actors left were almost openly anti-democratic, leaving almost no chance for 
Egyptian democratization. 
Most modernization theories do not help explain the difference because they do not consider 
the organizations and institutions. The only structure-oriented theories that could explain the 
pair of Tunisian and Egyptian cases well are those that account for inequality and the interests 
of class groups—see, for instance, Acemoglu & Robinson, 2009; Rosendorff, 2001; Vanhanen, 
2003. Nor does a purely voluntaristic approach (i.e., that only analyses the interactions of 
actors) explain much because, until the very end, the sequences of steps were very much similar 
in Tunisia and Egypt. In this case, it is the difference on this lower, institutional level of 
aggregation that has played a role: namely, the restrictions and regulations on certain types of 
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political activities and opposition organizations that are present in the end. Egypt had the 
potential of both developing strong opposition organizations and of forming a strong unionist 
movement. However, the repressive nature of its incumbent regime limited the development 
of both, and trade unions were de facto forbidden in 1976. Thus, the union movement that 
should have emerged according to the modernization perspective was thwarted. The difference 
with Tunisia here is that the bottom-up trade unionism was always tolerated there; parties, 
however, were also banned. It is not a surprise that in both countries, the secular political parties 
did not play any role. Egyptian political Islam was much more militant than a Tunisian one that 
also played a major role. Tunisian unionism eventually played a major role—in the political 
realm. In addition, the modernization scope does not consider the military forces that were 
especially powerful in Egypt because of its geography and history—and their position was 
dominant also in political and, most importantly, economic realms. 
The story of the UGTT also explains what is particular in trade unions that means they are the 
drivers of pacted democratizations and demonstrates the two characteristics that were not 
theoretically expected. First of all, the UGTT preserved the balance between being independent 
enough from the regime to still represent the interests of labor while at the same time being 
loyal enough not to be banned. Had the UGTT become too incorporated into the regime, it 
would have lost workers’ trust and been eventually replaced. Another part of the trade-off was 
no less dangerous: whenever the UGTT became too rebellious, it was harshly repressed by the 
regime. This balance was not the result of wise and careful decision-making. Quite the 
opposite—it was the fruit of endless re-negotiations, discussions, compromises, various forms 
of contentious action, and state repression. Maintaining this balance was possible because the 
UGTT`s goals lay primarily in the economic realm, and its existence per se did not contradict 
the authoritarian regime. This was impossible for a political party, at least in the Tunisian 
autocratic context. Only after the regime fell, and only temporarily, did it enter the political 
realm. This resulted in its second characteristic—the UGTT did not strive for political power 
as political parties do. At a certain point, it enjoyed the position of being the strongest political 
entity in the country. Any political party that comes to office would be tempted to preserve 
power as long as possible, even at the cost of undermining the fragile young democracy. A 




The Tunisian case illustrates very well the mechanisms at play in the first pathway to pacted 
transition. The Tunisian secular opposition parties did not have enough organizational capacity 
and resources, which the UGTT was able to provide. Also, the two cases show very well the 
concepts of credible commitment and credible threat. The credible commitment in these cases 
was demonstrated by the UGTT when it organized various platforms for negotiations. 
Moreover, it managed to pose credible threats with sit-ins and strikes—and those seemed to 
have always worked. 
The Egyptian case study unpacks very well why it is an outlier in a truth table row with a 
party/military regime and an established opposition party. The Egyptian case is very different 
from other countries in the same row—namely, Greece in 1974, Nicaragua (1990), South 
Africa (1994), and Spain (1975). Egypt is the only one to have a very long-lasting military 
dictatorship and a radical opposition organization at the same time. Among those countries, 
only Greece is a military dictatorship. However, in Greece, it was relatively short-lived. There 
existed an entire group of responsible civilian political parties and leaders who used to rule the 
country before and were ready to take power. All other countries were long-lasting party 





Chapter 5.  
The successful Ukrainian pact in 2004 
and failed attempt at negotiations in 
2014 
5.1. Preface 
At 5:30 a.m. on February 20, 2014, a phone went off in the bedroom of Andrey Shevchenko, 
one of the leaders of the Euromaidan protests. It was a riot police commander calling, with 
whom he had just recently exchanged phone numbers in case the conflict between protesters 
and the police should escalate. The commander told him that someone had started to shoot at 
the riot police officers from the second floor of the conservatory building controlled by the 
protesters and that eleven officers were already wounded. Shevchenko was told that his time 
to sort the situation out was short; otherwise, the police would eventually shoot back. He called 
the commandant of the Euromaidan, Andrey Parubii, who allegedly sent his people to search 
the conservatory building, but they did not find anyone. By the time Shevchenko reached the 
Maidan, already more than a dozen protesters had been shot dead.33 The police started to 
retreat, returning fire. The protesters began to take chase, albeit chaotically, following the 
police down Institutskaya Street as the snipers shot at them. By the end of the day, the number 
of protesters killed counted in the hundreds, with scores of riot police also killed. 
Even now, in 2021, it is uncertain who started shooting that day. Allegedly, it was neither the 
main body of the protesters nor the police officers in the square who started to shoot. It is likely 
that the first shots were fired by an unknown third force because both the police officers and 
the protesters had been shot. Each side blames its rivals. Nevertheless, the most recent and 
reliable analysis of bullets shows that the riot police were responsible for most of the shootings 
and killings that day (Stanko, 2020). 
 
33 The recounting of this episode was derived from an interview with Andrey Shevchenko in the “Maidan 
Massacre” documentary (at the timestamp 12:25). In addition, it can be found in an article by Gatehouse (2015).  
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This shooting resulted in (but was also preceded by) an earnest attempt at making a pact the 
same day that lasted overnight until February 21 and would also fail. After the agreement was 
reached between the political elites and the representatives of the Maidan, opposition leader 
Vitalii Klitchko made a speech to the protester about their deal with the president. The two 
main conditions were that Ukrainian president Victor Yanukovitch resigned in nine months, in 
December 2014, in exchange, the protesters had to unblock the streets34 (Wilson, 2014, p. 92). 
To say that Klitchko was booed (once again) is to say nothing. On the night when the crowd 
did not accept this pact, Yanukovitch had to flee the country. 
How did it happen that Ukraine, which already had a successful pacted transition with the same 
leader who willingly gave away power in 2004, failed to achieve the same thing in 2014? What 
was the characteristic of the Maidan 2004 that enabled pacting then but was absent ten years 
later? 
5.2. Introduction 
This chapter compares two attempts at pacted transitions in Ukraine in the years 2004 and 
2014. The two transitions started in the same country with more or less the same generation of 
political leaders. The level of economic development in Ukraine was more or less the same 
(see Table 4.1), with a slight increase ten years later. Even more, in both cases, the same 
political leader, Victor Yanukovitch, a presidential candidate in 2004 and a president in 2014, 
had to step back due to mass protests, which on both occasions occurred in the Maidan 
Nezaleznosti.35 Each of these crises was to be solved by negotiations, which in both cases was 
an explicit and publicly explicated event with the participation of the representatives of the 
European Union and those of Russia. In both cases, the political leaders had finally reached 
agreements. 
However, the negotiations in the same society between almost the same group of people ended 
in strikingly different ways. The results of the 2004 negotiations were successfully 
implemented and served as a roadmap for the further transition. On the contrary, the results of 
the 2014 negotiations, after being accepted by political leaders signing it, were angrily declined 
by the rank-n-rifle protesters and numerous organizations which led to the failure of the 
negotiations. 
 
34 These were two concessions that I find the most important, while I list the others further in the text. 
35 Literally – Square, or just The Maidan, The Square. 
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In this chapter, I claim that this difference lies in how the two revolutions were triggered and 
organized. The protests in 2004 were triggered by the contested elections that were known to 
take place long in advance, while those of 2014 took place spontaneously because Yanukovitch 
decided to abandon the association agreement with the EU at the last moment. Therefore, in 
2004, the protests were organized in a top-down way inherent to the electoral revolutions (see, 
among many others, Levitsky & Way, 2010). The core organizational structure of the 2004 
Maidan was the party of Yuschenko, the leader of the opposition. Therefore, the protest 
movement had a hierarchical structure and could be controlled by its leader. The Euromaidan 
protests of 2013-2014 emerged as a series of sporadic bottom-up protests resembling those in 
Egypt in 2011 (see Chapter 4). There were, of course, numerous opposition organizations and 
party leaders, but none of them could control or represent the protesters. The organizational 
network was evolving together with the protest. Of course, the Euromaidan developed its own 
decision-making body at later stages, but still, people on the streets and even some Euromaidan 
commanders, sotniks, could challenge and defy its decisions. In other words, the Maidan 2004 
was organized and orchestrated by a cheated rival. Its leader could represent and command the 
protesters, while the 2014 Maidan had a network structure where political leaders representing 
it during negotiations could hardly control the situation. 
I find the two cases analytically important for this dissertation because it is a rare pair of regime 
changes when the conditions—including even the person to be ousted by the protest—were not 
merely similar but, in fact, the same. Therefore, structural conditions such as historical legacy, 
level of economic development, inequality, education (see Table 4.1), and the like can hardly 
explain the difference. However, the outcomes were entirely different, and the organizational 
capacity of the two opposition movements seems to be the explanatory variable in the two 
cases. This chapter shows the sequence of events and the mechanisms involved in a failure to 
implement the pact signed in 2014 and compares it with the relatively disciplined solution in 
2004. 
The cases of Ukraine 2004 and 2014 have different outcomes that are not explained, unlike in 
the pair of Tunisia and Egypt, through the presence of a trade union. The case of 2004 is not a 
part of any solution formula from the QCA model presented in Chapter 3. It has both successful 
negotiations and successful democratization while neither the trade unions nor a party/military 
regime exists. However, the protest movement of 2004 can be characterized by the combination 
of other favorable factors that are not a part of my QCA model. For instance, it is bundled in a 
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single umbrella alliance, and it has organizations older than three years. Also, both the 
candidate and the coalition had more than 40% of the votes, and more than 2% of the country`s 
population was present on the streets of Kyiv. The case of 2014 is yet another typical case for 
my QCA model regarding the success of negotiations: neither the trade union nor the Catholic 
Church was present, which substitutes the necessary condition for the failure of negotiations. 
Thus, the organizational capacity of the opposition was the major difference between the two 
Ukrainian revolutions, whereas almost every other societal characteristic that is normally used 
to predict democratization was the same (see Table 4.2). During both revolutions, Ukraine was 
developed to the extent that it could be easily found both among democracies and autocracies. 
Therefore, this case study aims to demonstrate how Yuschenko`s capacity to control the 
nonviolent protest in 2004 was crucial for the successful pacting, while the decentralized, often 
non-hierarchic structure of the 2014 protests undermined its capacity to negotiate with the 
dictator. The only problem in this pair is the element of time. The events of 2014 were built on 
the experience of 2004 and its consequences. In other words, the two cases are not entirely 
independent from each other. 
The 2014 case, however, deviates from the other cases in my database in the second dependent 
variable—democratization. As I show later, unlike the other cases, the democratization after 
the 2014 revolution happens notwithstanding the failed pact. Its uncooperative character, 




Table 5.1. Structural conditions relevant to the character of regime change and subsequent 
democratization in Ukraine 2004 and 2014. 
 
Condition 2004 2014 
Economic development36 
GDP per capita PPP US$(WB) 5,255 8,647 
Life expectancy 68 71 
CO2 emissions (tons per capita) 7.2 5.9 
HDI .69 .75 
Gini index  28.7 24 
Attitudes (WVS)37 
index of emancipative values 0-1; standard error in 
brackets 
.38 .40 
index of secular values 0-1; standard error in brackets .47 .47 
Opposition organizations 
Bottom-up activism Not strong but exists on 
an individual level; 
activists sometimes are 
harassed or killed 
Not strong but exists on 
an individual level; 
activists sometimes are 
harassed or killed 




the citizenry  
Those that participate in 
parliament are co-opted 
to a certain extent and 
represent economic 
elites—oligarchs—rather 
than the citizenry. A 
leader of a major 
competing party—Julia 
Timoshenko—is in jail. 
Nationwide umbrella trade unions do not exist do not exist 
 
Finally, the cases are among the most typical for my database. As discussed in a previous 
chapter, attempts at pacted transitions in my database vary by the extent to which the incumbent 
and the opposition control the situation, by the extent to which the incumbent and the 
opposition are represented in negotiations, by what is discussed, by whether and how the 
 
36 Source: World Bank (2018). 




foreign powers intervened, and by the scale of violence and contention (see on variation 
between transitions in the database in Chapter 1). The cases of Ukraine stay within the middle 
of this variation. Concerning the stage of negotiations, these two cases almost do not vary in 
the extent to which the incumbent and the opposition control the situation, nor in the extent of 
what is discussed. The violence is absolutely absent in the first case and is overwhelming in 
the second.38 They do, however, deviate from the average in the extent the foreign powers 
intervene. In 2004, Russia enjoyed as much control over the situation as it wanted while its 
intervention was present yet reluctant; the EU countries were supportive of the opposition, and 
the US subsidized the democracy-promoting agents. In 2014, both Russia and the EU did not 
control the situation, and both were acting desperately. Russian reaction was growing more 
and more violent as the revolution spread and ended up with the notoriously known annexation 
of the Ukrainian Crimea and openly supporting the armed rebels in the East of Ukraine with 
its regular army. 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, I discuss the dependent variable—the success of 
negotiations—while explaining why issues of democratization are not included in this chapter. 
I show that the negotiations failed in 2014 while they succeeded in 2004; then, I show why 
there was significant democratization in both cases. Second, I discuss the initial regimes in 
both cases and show that Ukrainian regimes in 2004 and 2014 are what Levitsky and 
Way(2010b) call “competitive authoritarianism.” Third, I show my independent variable—the 
organizational capacity of the opposition. I describe how the two Maidans were organized, 
arguing that the opposition's organizational capacity was relatively higher in 2004 than 2014. 
The second part of the chapter tells the stories of the two Maidans, is organized in chronological 
order, and has three essential parts. First, I trace how the well-known 2004 Orange Revolution 
emerged, how it led to negotiations, and how the negotiations ended. Then, I briefly describe 
Ukrainian history between the two transitions and argue why what Yanukovitch had done in 
2010 is a typical democratic backslide. Then, I show how the 2014 revolution emerged and 
evolved. Last but not least, I deconstruct as many steps of the negotiations in 2014 as possible 
without taking interviews with participants. Then, showing how negotiations collapsed, I argue 
why it is a non-hierarchical network structure of the Euromaidan protest that did not allow for 
the successful negotiations and a subsequent pacted transition. In the conclusion, I summarize 
 
38 Here I, of course, refer to the situation as it stood before the negotiations began. 
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various reasons that explain the outcome and relate them to the theories on modes of regime 
change. 
5.3. Dependent variable—the success of negotiations 
 
Whereas in the previous pair, Tunisia, and Egypt, the success of both negotiations and 
democratization in the first country and the collapse of both in the second is obvious and does 
not require additional explanation; this is hardly the case for Ukrainian transitions. Different 
scholars, reports, and indexes show contradicting results when it comes to the Ukrainian 
Maidan campaigns. Of course, the attempt at negotiations succeeded in 2004 while collapsing 
in 2014. Therefore, according to my definition presented in Chapter 1, Ukraine 2004 is an 
occurrence of successful pacted transition (i.e., negotiations were successful and led to 
democratization)39 while Ukraine 2014 is a failed attempt at negotiations. This section 
elaborates on my stance. 
In 2004, the negotiations and the following pact were successful, and a very fragile democracy 
followed. The pact, however, did not have any grassroots character and was signed by political 
leaders—Yanukovitch, Yuschenko, and Kuchma alone (i.e., it was not supported by any 
organization on the ground). After that, Yuschenko, one of the two antagonists, lost elections 
and office in 2010 to the second one, namely Yanukovitch. This event left no strong 
organization that would be able to enforce this treaty, which eventually allowed Yanukovitch 
to dismiss it unilaterally. 
In 2014, the attempt at negotiations failed even though Yanukovitch and the leaders of main 
opposition parties managed to reach an agreement. First, the concessions made by the ruling 
Yanukovitch as a result of negotiations were too minor and implied that he would resign in 
nine months while the protest should have finished right after the pact was signed. Second, the 
opposition leaders who signed the agreement did not manage to implement it (i.e., convince 
the protesters to return home). Finally, it would have been impossible to deliver a credible 
threat if the Maidan had left the square: since it did not have any identifiable organizational 
base, it would have been impossible to summon it again if Yanukovitch had not followed 
through on his part of the agreement. 
 
39 Democratization is calibrated as a.15 increase in the V-Dem liberal democracy scale in the three years after the 
transition. See Chapters 2 and 3 for the justification. 
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5.4. Independent variables: the organizational capacity of the 
opposition—Ukraine 2004 and 2014 
 
The organizational capacity of civil society and opposition parties on the country level always 
remained low during the three post-Soviet decades of Ukrainian history. For instance, in the 
non-revolutionary times, the level of participation according to the Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index was 7.75 in 2006, 6.0 in 2013-4, compared, for instance, with a level of 
10 for Poland. Quite typically for this kind of regime, the citizenry only participated during 
times of mobilization while being absent in normal times (Levitsky & Way, 2010a). This, of 
course, undermined the development of political institutions: it allowed Yuschenko to be 
corrupted and reluctant after coming to power in 2004, it did not interrupt the democratic 
backslide in 2010, and the like. Whereas the opposition organizations always had low 
organizational capacity, the two protest movements, however, differed drastically in the way 
they were organized. 
The Orange Revolution in 2004 was more centralized than the Euromaidan in 2014 because 
the former was headed from above by the rival presidential candidate, whereas the latter had a 
spontaneous origin. First, the organizational basis of the 2004 Orange Revolution was an 
umbrella alliance of three large parliamentary parties that not only enjoyed more than one-third 
of voters` support but also had about half of the seats in a parliament. Therefore, the protest 
enjoyed the organizational means of parties: parliamentary coalition, professional 
administration cadres, resources, offices. Second, the Coalition was prepared long in advance 
for both electoral competition and post-electoral protests. It was ready and able to lead a protest 
that was mobilized in a top-down way. As a result, the Orange Revolution had a very 
straightforward hierarchical structure. The protest was always subordinated to one leader, 
Victor Yuschenko, who was capable both of credible threat having one and a half million 
people on the streets and of credible commitment proven to have a veto power against radical 
aspirations to capture government buildings. 
In contrast, the Euromaidan 2014 was very decentralized and had shallow organizational 
capacity because it emerged spontaneously. First, the opposition parties were weaker than ten 
years ago. The Maidan only had three small parties, two of them having less than 10% of the 
votes and seats in the parliament. The largest opposition party, Fatherland, was beheaded. 
Second, no one expected neither that Yanukovitch would abort the association agreement with 
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the EU at the very last moment nor that it would bring a million to the streets. The opposition 
parties joined the Euromaidan late after its protesters started to organize the logistical 
support—that is, security, food, housing, medicine—on their own, and bottom-up 
organizations were mushrooming. The parties became merely a part of this network. The 
Euromaidan was not subordinated to any single leader: it was a network that had a dozen 
completely independent bottom-up organizations, at least three influential parliamentary 
politicians pretending to control it, a committee responsible for the logistical support claiming 
to have leadership, one influential field commander subordinated to the committee (Way, 2014, 
p. 38), and several entirely independent combat units outside of its main perimeter. Needless 
to say, no actor had veto power over the entire network of the Euromaidan. The two following 
sections elaborate on this argument. 
5.4.1. The organizational structure of the opposition in 2004 
The Ukrainian 2004 protest was organized by the powerful Orange Coalition, an umbrella 
alliance that consisted of pro-democratic political parties. The sum of the votes of these parties 
would comprise 37.7%, according to the electoral results of 2002. Therefore, the Orange 
movement had about half of the MPs behind its back.40 Its leader Victor Yuschenko (who used 
to be a prime minister of Ukraine in 1999-2001 under the rule of Kuchma) won slightly more 
than half of the votes in presidential re-elections of 2005. The umbrella alliance consisted of 
two political factions: the Our Ukraine [Наша Украина] political alliance of Yuschenko 
together with The Block of Yulia Timoshenko [Блок Юлии Тимошенко] allied with the 
Socialist Party. The Our Ukraine was yet another pollical alliance of Yuschenko formed in 
2001 together with twelve smaller parties.41 The Our Ukraine achieved 23.6% of the votes 
during the 2002 elections and a plurality of 112 seats42 out of 450 (Szajkowski, 2005, p. 603). 
The Yuliya Tymoshenko Block was formed in 2001 and based on the All-Ukrainian Union 
“Fatherland” (created in 1999) allied with smaller parties: “the Ukrainian Social Democratic 
 
40 It does not make sense to calculate precisely because MPs of both sides could constantly defect or be bribed 
from day to day.  
41 These were the “Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists; Forward Ukraine!; [the] Liberal Party of Ukraine; [the] 
Party of Christian-Popular Union; [the] Popular Movement of Ukraine; [the] Reforms and Order Party; [the] 
Republican Christian Party; Solidarity; [and the] Youth Party of Ukraine” (Sagar, 2009, p. 597) 
42 Though, later this majority was corrupted by Kuchma who managed to bribe enough MPs to have a coalition 
of 172 members (ibid). 
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Party, the Ukrainian Republican Party, and the Ukrainian Republican Party Assembly,” and 
achieved 7.3% of the votes and twenty-three seats (Sagar, 2009, p. 597). Finally, the Socialist 
Party that allied with the movement achieved 6.9% of the votes and twenty seats during the 
2002 elections (ibid., p. 603). 
Apart from political parties, the rival Orange Coalition included a popular youth movement, 
Pora! [ПОРА!].43 It was headed by Oleg Yatsenko and was often instructed by Yuschenko 
himself.44 It is a close sibling of Georgian “Khmara!” and Serbian “Otpor” (see especially 
Bunce & Wolchik, 2006; McFaul, 2007). Pora activists are known to have studied from their 
Serbian counterparts some six months before the protests. The Pora had been arguably 
receiving its funding from the US (McFaul, 2007, p. 70). Since the movement had never been 
registered officially, it is impossible to receive its reports. However, it is known that, according 
to the US official figures, the US spending on Ukrainian democracy promotion within the two 
years before the revolution was scoring as high as fifty-eight million dollars (Brinkley, 2004). 
Apart from Pora, the Freedom of Choice Coalition and the Committee of Ukrainian Voters 
mobilized citizens to vote (McFaul, 2007, pp. 58–59). Together with a Democratic Initiatives 
Foundation NGO, the latter organized careful monitoring of the fairness of the electoral process 
and rang a bell about the electoral fraud of the first two rounds, thus mobilizing the protest 
(ibid., p. 59). 
Although the media were largely controlled by the state and President Kuchma, democratic 
enclaves existed. Namely, Chanel 5 was controlled by Yuschenko and belonged to his ally 
Petro Poroshenko. The further the revolution went, the larger the audience of the independent 
media grew. Together with this trend, the mainstream media would become more and more 
independent. (see, especially, ibid., pp. 61-62; ) 
In 2004, the alliance of Yuschenko and Timoshenko was prepared to organize a post-electoral 
protest in advance because they knew that the usage of electoral fraud was likely. Six months 
before, the Orange Coalition had started to buy tents, sleeping bags, and mobile canteens 
(Homenko, 2014). The opposition leaders booked Maidan Nezalezhnosti square in advance for 
a “music festival” and installed45 a stage, a screen, and speakers so that everything was ready 
 
43 Literally – “It`s time!” 
44 For instance, it was Yuschenko`s direct command to the Pora activists to start constructing tents. 
45 Opposition MPs had to install the stage literally, by hand, taking advantage of their immunity (See McFaul, 
2007, p. 64) 
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for election day. The number of people in the crowd was hundreds of times larger than 
expected, with 200,000 turning up on the morning of November 22 (ibid., p. 125) and reaching 
as many as 1.5 million by the end (McFaul, 2007, p. 65; Rennebohm, 2011). Because the 
Maidan was carefully organized in a top-down way with serious financial investments, it 
nevertheless managed to deliver food and supplies even to a million of people. The opposition 
camp also had its own security apparatus—Self-Defense—which consisted, as opposed to the 
2014 Maidan, of a limited number of staff with a police or military background hired by the 
Orange Coalition and directly subordinated to it. It was only playing internal security functions. 
As a result, the whole sit-in resembled a music festival with a cheery atmosphere: apart from 
ruble-making speeches and collective prayers, many of the famous post-Soviet rock- and pop- 
bands played there. The public was granted places in tents and free food (McFaul, 2007; 
Wilson, 2005, p. 126). Thus, there was no need to create an independent network of bottom-
up NGOs that would collect and deliver essential goods to the protesters, and the hierarchy was 
not alternated. 
Most importantly, Yuschenko had proven himself to be able to control the protesters. Every 
step and every event were carefully pre-planned and were constantly under control (Homenko, 
2014). During most of the time, protesters were surrounding the government buildings. 
However, at a certain point, Timoshenko, together with the radical wings of the Pora 
movement, carried out a plan of seizing the building by force, hoping that the security would 
not use fore. Yuschenko had enough authority to prevent them from doing so (McFaul, 2007, 
p. 65). 
To sum up, the organization of the Maidan 2004 had a perfectly vertical hierarchy where 
everything was subordinated to a single leader throughout the organizational capacities—that 
is, cadres, money, offices, resources—of political parties. No alternative centers of power 
existed, and the protest remained completely controlled and nonviolent. 
5.4.2. The organizational structure of the opposition in 2014 
As Way (2014, p. 38) has pointed out, “much of the organization behind the Euromaidan 
emerged spontaneously during the crisis … the process involved a good deal of chaos.” 
Although it had three established opposition parties in its basis, none of their leaders were 
authoritative during the protests. Many of them were perceived somewhat alien to the 
spontaneous movements; there were countless occasions when MPs were booed by the crowd. 
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The leaders of the three main opposition political parties were somehow associated with the 
protesters and therefore despised (Homenko, 2014). They, however, enjoyed a certain degree 
of control over what were the executive bodies of the Maidan. 
The organizational core of the protest and most of its financing (see below) consisted of the 
alliance of three opposition parties that sought to unite against Yanukovitch during the 2015 
elections. The largest party in this alliance was the beheaded Yulia Timishenko`s Fatherland 
(Ukr. Батькивщина) (see below on democratic backslide in 2010). It was led by Arsenii 
Yatsenuk substituting the arrested leader and had almost 25% of the votes and the (later 
destroyed) plurality of seats in the parliament after the 2012 elections. However, at the time of 
the Euromaidan, its popularity was fading, and later, during the 2014 elections, it only achieved 
5.4% of the votes. On the other hand, the UDAR46 (Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for 
Reforms), led by an ex-boxer Vitalii Klitchko, which was created in 2005, had about 10,000 
members and later achieved 13% of the votes within a big alliance. Finally, it was accompanied 
by Tiagnibok`s Freedom (Ukr. Свобода) that had twenty thousand members and later achieved 
as few as 1.7% of the votes that I describe below in the text. 
The Euromaidan had its own centralized decision-making body (see Figure 1). It was called 
the Maidan Council47 (Rus. Рада Всеукраинского Объединения «Майдан»). The Council 
was building on the alliance of political parties accompanied by the influential leaders of the 
Maidan and had about fifty members. As Arsen Avakov said in his interview, “you need to 
represent at least 100 people to be in the Council” (Gordon, 2014a). This Council was 
somewhat a board. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the Council appointed the members of the 
headquarters of the National Resistance (Rus. Штаб Национального Сопротивления), 
commandants, and gave orders to the headquarters. The headquarters was somehow an 
executive body responsible both for street fights and for logistical support. Therefore, its 
commandants were divided between the Chief Commandant (Ukr. Комендант Наметового 
Містечка) who was also a commander of the Self-Defense of Maidan (Ukr. Самооборона 
Майдану), and those commandants responsible for the logistics. See ibid.) A certain number 
 
46 Удар can be translated from Russian as “stroke.” 
47 There were, however, numerous attempts at creating alternative bodies, each of them can be translated into 
English as Maidan Council: Рада Майдану, Громадяньска Рада Майдану, Громадяньский Сектор Майдану, 
Суспильна Рада Майдану. None of them, however, enjoyed any significant power. When I refer to The Maidan 
Council further in the text, I mean Рада Всеукраинского Объединения «Майдан».  
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of commandants represented opposition parties, and the others were elected directly. At the 
same time, the degree to which the Maidan Council actually controlled the situation was 
limited, to say the least (Homenko, 2014; Wilson, 2014). 
The Self-Defense was organized in a fashion inspired by the Cossack armies. It consisted of 
forty-two Sotnias,48 each having about 300 members rotating by shifts, among which about 
100 were constantly present. Most of the sotnias were independent units organized in a bottom-
up, somewhat feudal way. According to Arsen Avakov, the Maidan`s Commander did not have 
a right not appoint or change a Sotnik, the leader of Sotnia, because they were elected directly 
from below(Gordon, 2014a). This, however, contradicts my interview with one of the field 
commanders of the Maidan, who assured me that Sotniks of the inner perimeter were dependent 
on and even paid by political parties. Each Sotnia represented a particular political orientation 
or city and was subordinated to the commander through its leader, Sotnik. Sotnias consisted of 
Roi, or Desiatok—i.e., ten members that also enjoyed relative autonomy. 
On top of that, most of the sotnias of the Maidan on the frontiers, outside of the main 
perimeters, were not subordinated to the commander and independent from the entire system 
of Self-Defense. The four levels of barricades of the Gruschevskogo street were completely 
independent of the Maidan Council. This would play a significant role in attempts at 
negotiations (Gordon, 2014a; Author's interview with Maidan participant, 2020). At a certain 
point, the opposition leaders were allegedly even ready for direct sabotage to eliminate the 
Grushevskogo street people. Yet, they were sometimes coordinating their activity with the 
main Maidan`s commandment. Sotnias were not only in charge of street fights but would also 
serve as the inner militia that would detect Yanukovitch`s agents—titushki—to prevent 
kidnapping and maintain order. (Most of the information on the internal organization was 
retrieved from the interview of Arsen Avakov with Hromadanske TV 2014 (Gordon, 2014a) 
and from my own interview my own interview with the person who fought for sotnia on 
Grushevskogo street (My own interview with Maidan participant, 2020). 
The main facilities of the Maidan were organized around its buildings. Everybody present on 
the Maidan could be fed: citizens donated fresh food that as many as 1,500 activists later 
cooked in the peak times (Ponomarev et al., 2018). The buildings had Wi-Fi provided by 
companies the DataTelecom and the NetAssist (ibid.). Those who volunteer for any of the 
 
48 Сотня can be translated from Russian as “one hundred.” 
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Maidan`s works could be housed: in the routine times, about 500 people in the tents, 2,000 
people in the buildings, and the rest in the flats of citizens of Kyiv (Gordon, 2014a). The street 
fighters, members of Sotnia could also receive ammunition collected through donations. Since 
the government started to arrest and kidnap from hospitals those injured on the Maidan, it had 
to develop its own network of field hospitals called People`s Hospital (рус. Народный 
Госпиталь). To volunteer in the People`s Hospital, one had to have a medical education 
diploma (Ponomarev et al., 2018). The Maidan was surrounded by the perimeter of barricades, 
and the militia from Self-Defense would check any person entering the Maidan to avoid drunk 
and homeless people (ibid.) The daily costs of the Maidan were allegedly comprising 
US$70,000 (most of which was spent on food, ammunition, electricity, and medicine), with 
about three-quarters of the budget coming from political parties and one-quarter coming from 
donations collected right in the square (Gordon, 2014a). 
As Diuk points out, “As the Maidan drew more residents and visitors, its daily routine took on 
a self-organizing character” (2014). A dense network of grassroots organizations accompanied 
the main organizational hierarchy of the Maidan. Those were coordinated with the Maidan`s 
main bodes but not subordinated to the Council. The AvtoMaidan, the voluntary organization 
of car owners who brought supplies to the Maidan and made car marches (one of which was to 
Mezhyrie, the main palace of Yanukovitch, that made him extremely angry), was the most 
influential. The EuromaidanSOS provided emergency support to the kidnapped and arrested 
activists. The logistical headquarters (Ukr. Логистичний Штаб) comprised of a hotline, the 
Dopomizhni Euromaidanu that was helping with the supply of goods, the Transfer 
Euromaidanu, and many more (see Ponomarev et al., 2018; Wilson, 2014). 
The role of far-right organizations in the Euromaidan has been largely overestimated. Their 
neo-Nazi slogans and banners had been initially propelled by Russian TV Channels to discredit 
the protest and then widely discussed even within the academic debate (see, for instance, Byšok 
& Kochetkov, 2014; Shekhovtsov & Umland, 2014). These organizations were, however, tiny. 
For instance, the most notoriously known Right Sector (рус. Правый Сектор) had been created 
after the Maidan started. It consisted, in fact, of only 450 members (Shekhovtsov & Umland, 
2014, p. 59), many of which had dubious connections with the Ukrainian president`s 
administrations (see, for instance, Wilson, 2014, p. 69). 
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On top of that, it was insignificant even during the street fights: it had only had one sotnia49 
out of 42, routinely under the command of Self-Defense, but also in many moments completely 
independent from the commandment (Author's interview with Maidan participant, 2020). The 
organization itself, of course, was always acting independently and was always radical. After 
the revolution, Right Sector earned only 1.7% of the votes together with the Svoboda during 
the 2014 elections (Szajkowski, 2005). The right-wing Svoboda headed by Oleg Tyahnibok, 
way less radical and more influential, instead resembled the so-called challenger parties of the 
West. It was created in the 1990s and had recently experienced its first and last sudden electoral 
success in 2012, enjoying thirty-six seats out of 450 in the parliament (ibid.). It is hard to 
measure its influence during the Maidan because it did not have its distinct sotnia but had many 
commandants and even council members. This influence, again, faded away with the electoral 
fiasco of 2014. 
The Euromaidan emerged in a bottom-up way and was organized as a network that was not 
subordinated to anyone. Although the Maidan Council had its own hierarchical structure (see 
Figure 5.1), it emerged later, its functions were always paralleled, and it was surrounded by 
numerous completely independent organizations. The logistical functions were supplemented 
with the newborn bottom-up organizations such as the AvtoMaidan and the MaidanSOS that 
were completely autonomous from the Council. The security functions were supplemented by 
many independent sotnias outside the main perimeter and organizations such as Right Sector. 
That is why no one had veto power over the Euromaidan.  
 
49 That later divided into two parts. 
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Figure 5.1. The organizational structure of the the Euromaidan 2014 protest movement. 
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5.5. The processes leading to successful and failed negotiations 
Ukraine 2004 
The story of the Ukrainian decade of instability started with the authoritarian aspirations of 
Leonid Kuchma, who used to be the president of Ukraine from 1994 to 2005. He could not 
participate in the 2004 presidential elections because he had already finished his second term. 
Kuchma’s power was undermined by a constant economic decay of the 1990s, several 
economic crises, and the protest campaign “Ukraine without Kuchma” of 2001. Therefore, 
changing the constitution became a too risky option for him. Kuchma`s initial plan was to 
transform Ukraine into a parliamentary republic with a president appointed by the parliament, 
giving him two more years in the presidency (Kuzio, 2005, p. 90). After failing to do so, 
Kuchma decided to find an heir who could represent his winning coalition. He chose Victor 
Yanukovitch, the prime minister during the last two years of Kuchma`s rule, and had ruled the 
Donetsk region from 1996. However, this choice was questionable, and the reasons invoked 
for this choice vary.50 
Victor Yanukovich was a weak public figure. First, he had a criminal past: he had to publicly 
admit having served two terms in prison in the past, one in 1968, at the age of 17.51 Second, 
Yanukovitch was educated as a car mechanic, even though he formally had his distance 
 
50 Some say he could rule behind Yanukovitch`s back while others even claim that Yanukovitch won a corruption 
“auction” for the position of Kuchma`s heir (Zygar, 2015, p. 186). In addition, when the possible heirs were 
allegedly going to Moscow to be chosen or declined by Putin, Yanukovitch was the least bad candidate for Putin 
compared to the governor of the eastern city of Kharkiv and the head of presidential administration Vladimir 
Litvin (ibid.). 
51 There is a widespread anecdote that he was stealing expensive fur hats fashionable at the time taking advantage 
of a combination of his tall height and low doors of the toilets at a railway station (Danilov, 2015, p. 238). 
Anyways, he was accused of robbing Mr. Soloviev together with members of a “Pivnovka” mafia clan and was 
jailed for two years, after that he was granted parole. Having spent less than one year free, he was jailed for the 
second time for two years for beating a person (Gorina, 2005). There were, however, many more accusations (for 
instance, rape in 1970 and corruption with four years in prison in 1977). However, these were unproven and 
contradictory because the evidence and the papers were removed later (Leschenko, 2010). 
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learning higher education at the age of 3052 53. This was impossible to hide in his public 
appearance. 
5.5.1. The events of 2004 
Presidential elections were held in two rounds, on the 31st of October 2004 and the 21st of 
November 2004. However, the incumbent`s heir Yanukovitch was blamed for using massive 
electoral fraud and for an attempt to poison his opponent Yuschenko that happened before the 
elections on the 5th of September 2004 (“RBC,” 2005b), which eventually provoked a popular 
mobilization. 
In the first round, Yanukovitch had to compete with several opposition candidates that were 
not consolidated. As a result, he obtained only 39.3% of the votes while his competitor 
Yushchenko took 40%, resulting in a second round. 
Opposition forces knew that Kuchma and Yanukovitch, having low public support but enjoying 
control over the state apparatus, would use electoral fraud, and they were preparing long in 
advance. The period before the electoral commission announced the results was already 
contentious: both sides declared exit polls to be predicting their victory. The difference lies in 
methodologies—the pro-Yuschenko KMIS and the Razumkov Centre used more anonymous 
survey techniques than the pro-government SOCIS and thus predicted more votes for rival 
Yuschenko (McFaul, 2007, p. 60). The next day after the second round of elections, on the 22nd 
of November, the electoral commission announced the preliminary victory of Yanukovitch. 
According to the official results, Yanukovitch achieved 49,4% of the votes, while his 
opponent—46.7%. 
 
52 This implies, given the overall crisis of higher education in the post-Soviet space at the time, that he hardly 
visited his school more than twice. 
53 Following a widespread tradition of post-Soviet elites, he had a fake doctoral degree in economics and a fake 
professor position. While being rather a norm for most of the state officials, this degree peculiarly contrasted with 
his personality as he was always making grammar and spelling mistakes during his speeches. Moreover, he 
became especially enfamous for writing a word “proffesor[проффесор]” in his statement for the 2004 presidential 
elections and then claiming it was proper Ukrainian spelling (Neftegaz, 2020). Since then, “proffesor” became 
his popular nickname and even became widely used as a label for any low-educated politician throughout post-




Numerous electoral observers, NGOs, Ukrainian MPs, and Western officials declared the 
victory of Yanukovitch to be a mere result of electoral fraud. Nevertheless, Russia and some 
other CIS countries congratulated Yanukovitch on his victory even before the official results 
were announced. The stalemate led to a widespread protest mobilization in the capital of 
Ukraine with 200,000 people on the streets in the beginning, on 22nd of November 2004, and 
reached up to as many as one million and a half on 27th of November, which constitutes more 
than 2.5% of the Ukrainian population and almost 40% of the population of Kyiv (Kuzio, 2005, 
p. 93; McFaul, 2007, p. 65). This number of protesters was shocking and unexpected to 
everyone. Although this text mostly concentrates on organizations and leaders, the number of 
people in the streets was the deal-breaker. This was the factor that enacted the potential 
organizational capacity of opposition parties, and this was the main factor causing elite 
negotiations that I describe later in the text. 
However, the coercive apparatus available to Yanukovitch and Kuchma was far from those of 
grim dictatorships of the first part of the past century. The Ukrainian regime was what Levitsky 
and Way (2010a, pp. 214–215) would later call competitive authoritarianism. Although the 
physical means of repressions were available, they were never openly used. The elections were 
competitive, i.e., it was impossible to simply ban the opponent from participating; fraud was 
used in a limited way. Thanks to the presence of some free media in the country, both killings 
and fraud would often become known immediately, thus causing street protests and pressure 
from the West when used. For instance, the single secret killing of Georgi Gongadze in 2001 
resulted in a massive protest campaign.54 
The members of the winning coalition of Yanukovitch started to hesitate half a year before the 
elections and to dissolve openly as he was making wrong steps and as the numbers of people 
on the streets were skyrocketing. Yanukovitch was a choice that was quite convenient for 
Kuchma himself but awkward and unsafe for Kuchma`s winning coalition. As Kuzio mentions, 
The pro-Kuchma parliamentary majority began to fall apart during the April 
2004 … moderates in the pro-Kuchma camp openly flirted with Yushchenko. 
The People`s Democratic Party was openly in favor of Yushchenko, especially 
its Democratic Platform. Kuchma`s allies from his first term in office refused 
to back Yanukovitch. Kinakh`s Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, 
 
54 See “Ukraine without Kuchma.” 
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which Kuchma had headed in 1993– 94 and which had helped him come to 
power, backed Yushchenko in round two” (Kuzio, 2005, p. 35). 
The state institutions also started to show support to Yuschenko by the outbreak of the crisis 
on the 25th of November: SBU (former KGB) promised to protect pro-Yuschenko protesters 
using force (“PRAVDA,” 2005) while the Supreme Court prohibited the electoral commission 
from declaring the results of elections (“RBC,” 2005a). The staff of TV channels that used to 
be controlled by the government also started to defect and join the protests (McFaul, 2007, p. 
63). Last but not least, the mayor of Kyiv, Oleksander Omelchenko, joined the protests after 
the 22nd of November, offering them “food, water, and sanitation.” (ibid., p. 65) 
These shifts made Yushchenko and Yanukovitch interdependent by the 25th of November, and 
none of them could unilaterally impose their decision on each other. In other words, the 
contention ended up in what is understood as a classic situation of pacting (O’Donnell et al., 
1986; Rustow, 1970). 
5.5.2. Time break of negotiations in Ukraine 2004 
Before going into the details of the negotiations, it is worth noting that the Ukrainian political 
elites were used to the process of constant bargaining with opposition for at least two years 
preceding the Orange Revolution in 2004, and the pacting of the 2004-5 was a mere 
continuation of this trend. The elections in 2004 happened to be only an upshot of a political 
crisis caused by Kuchma`s authoritarian aspirations paired with his low levels of popularity. 
Being almost overthrown by the protest campaign “Ukraine without Kuchma” three years ago, 
having won the 2002 election only by a very narrow victory, he was constantly forced to 
compromise and negotiate with his parliamentary opposition. In 2003 Kuchma tried 
unsuccessfully to negotiate a change to the constitution that would allow him to stay in power 
beyond his limit of two terms55—at least for several years (see especially Kudelia, 2007, pp. 
87–92). 
The talks over the electoral crisis started almost immediately after the protests erupted, on the 
26th of November in the Mariinski Palace. The negotiations between Kuchma, Yanukovitch, 
and Yuschenko were accompanied by many EU leaders and a representative of Russia (see 
 
55 The offer is known as draft law 4105. 
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Table 5.2), who, however, was always reluctant and late for meetings (Wilson, 2005, p. 139). 
However, the first round of the Ukrainian “Round Table”56 failed to lead to any compromise. 
Although the violence never erupted, its threat always remained acute during the following 
week—from both sides. When the negotiations began, the Orange protesters had already laid 
siege to several government buildings and successfully prevented state officials from entering. 
The protest, however, remained completely nonviolent. After the failure of the first round of 
negotiations, the main challenge for Yuschenko was to tame his radical ally Yulia Timoshenko 
and people on the streets who openly advocated for the escalation of the conflict (McFaul, 
2007, p. 65). It was the organizational capacity of the Orange Coalition that helped tame these 
aspirations. 
The government never used repression because the president of Ukraine, Kuchma, was to leave 
office anyway. Not only the radical parts of Kuchma`s administration were also the proponents 
for the forcible dismissal of protesters paired with the state of emergency. According to Kuzio 
(Kuzio, 2015, p. 74), the principal idea of lifting the state of emergency was supported by the 
emergency session of RNBO. The problem, however, was that Kuchma did not want to take 
responsibility for repressions—for a good reason. He would suffer the costs of repression and 
would increase the price of his exit while anyway giving away power to Yanukovitch. In the 
end, it was not a big difference for Kuchma whether Yanukovitch or Yuschenko would succeed 
him. In the parade of elite defections, his was the most crucial. At the same time, as prime 
minister, Yanukovitch did not want to (or prove unable to) take responsibility for the forceful 
dismissal on his own (ibid.). Even when Yanukovitch did try to order the police to disperse 
from the Maidan unilaterally, the police were tamed by the SBU and army, which openly 
supported the opposition (ibid.; Wilson, 2005, p. 136). What is most interesting, the SBU was 
allegedly acting with a direct Kuchma`s consent (Wilson, 2005, p. 137). On top of that, Putin, 
in his talks with Kuchma, was always advocating for the coercive solution. 
The main successful round of negotiations took place on the 1st of December (see Table 5.2 for 
participants). As Kudelia argues, “[Kuchma] saw the solution in adopting the political reform, 
while Yushchenko insisted on changing the election law to prevent further fraud during the 
third round of elections” (2007, p. 96). The political reform meant transforming into a 
parliamentary republic, guaranteeing the pro-Kuchma parliamentary majority some remnants 
of his political power for two more years. The label “electoral reform” hid a simple bundle of 
 
56 rus. Круглый Стол. 
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measures that would ensure the free and fair electoral procedure during the third round of 
elections. 
Some demands have never worked and even put negotiations at risk. There was one more 
demand for Yanukovitch to be fired (officially, he was on vacation) from his prime minister 
position paired with the dismissal of the government that almost collapsed the whole round of 
talks (Kudelia, 2007, p. 96). Yuschenko also risked making a mistake, almost promising to 
disperse the crowds immediately, which he would hardly manage to do (Wilson, 2005, p. 140). 
The last round of 7th of December was instead the re-negotiation of the earlier terms after the 
Supreme Court took Yuschenko`s side. It mostly fixed guarantees on vital interests of Kuchma 
and Yanukovitch. The secret part of the final agreement allegedly guaranteed Kuchma and 
Yanukovitch not to be prosecuted, which echoes with Kuchma`s appointee Sviatoslav Piskun 
taking the office of the chief prosecutor (Kudelia, 2007, p. 100). As a result, the regime was 
pressed to produce the third round of elections well-controlled by the electoral observers. As a 
result, Yuschenko won with 52% against 44% of the votes for his opponent. 
To sum up, the peaceful resolution of the conflict was not very likely in 2004 because radicals 
were strong on both sides, and Russia opted for the escalation. The negotiated solution was at 
risk in many moments. Putin`s directives to Kuchma seemed to be ignored for the first time in 
post-Soviet history. Timoshenko has almost ordered to capture government buildings and was 
stopped by Yuschenko; Yuschenko himself was prevented from the violent solution by his 
party on the 8th of December. The riot police of Yanukovitch coming to disperse the Maidan 
were stopped by the army and secret service at the very last moment. 
It was always organizations and institutions that prevented single actors from escalating the 
conflict. In the opposition camp, it was the Orange Coalition that first tamed Timoschenko`s 
aspirations for the violent action, and then it was the Our Ukraine that tamed Yuschenko. Then, 
it was the Ukrainian institutions that forced Kuchma to depart, which made repression useless 
for him. Thus, paradoxically, it was the Ukrainian secret service that stopped Yanukovitch 
from forceful dispersal of protests. 
Despite being at risk many times, the final agreement was a locus classicus of a pacted 
transition. It excluded radicals, ensured a peaceful solution for a crisis, and exchanged power 
(which here takes a form of the “electoral reform”) to the vital interests of Kuchma while 
agreeing on the new rules of the game—namely, a new 2004 parliamentary constitution. 
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Table 5.2. The participants of the negotiations in Ukraine on 26th of November, 1st, and 7th of 
December 2004.57 
Incmumbent Opposition Russia EU 
Leonid Kuchma, the 
president of Ukraine 
Victor Yushchenko, 
the rival presidential 
candidate, the leader 
of the Our Ukraine 













candidate, the prime 
minister of Ukraine 
 Vladimir Putin, 
the president of 
Russia, who was not 
physically present 
but allegedly rang 
several times58 
Valdas Adamkus, 




Vladimir Litvin, the 
Speaker of the 
Parliament 
   
   Javier Solana, the 
European Union 
high representative 
for the common 
foreign and security 
policy 




57 Source: Kudelia, 2007, p. 95. 
58 Source: Wislon, 2005, p. 140.  
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5.6. The backslide of 2010 
The rule of the Orange Coalition of Yuschenko and Timoshenko did not go as smoothly as it 
started. The alliance had fallen apart in less than one year (112ua, 2005), and Timoshenko was 
removed from her position of prime minister. Yuschenko`s health was undermined with 
dioxide, and he was spending much time in hospitals. The levels of corruption (including 
Yuschenko`s personal one) were continuing to skyrocket throughout the whole term of his rule. 
Nor did the Orange government become more “pro-Western” or “anti-Russian” than any other 
post-Soviet government. In the USSR and later in the CIS, any newly elected leader of a 
republic had to pay a visit to Moscow. As any other leader in this position, unwilling to break 
this tradition, Yuschenko first went to Moscow (Kremlin.ru, 2005). Also, the new government 
of Yuschenko became immediately involved into corruption scandals with Moscow (see, for 
instance, Wilson, 2014, p. 46). 
The political crisis started to pop up immediately after the split of the Orange Coalition allowed 
once overthrown Yanukovitch to challenge it. The parliamentary elections took place in 2006, 
and the parties of the Orange Coalition won. Although Yuschenko`s and Timoshchenko`s 
parties together would potentially have had a majority, they refused to ally with each other. 
Therefore, Timoshenko surprisingly allied with the party of Yanukovitch, who became a prime 
minister as a result. Since he had the resources to bribe state officials, at a certain point, his 
power increased that much that in 2007 Ukraine found itself again facing a stalemate between 
Yanukovitch as a prime minister and Yuschenko as a president. The crisis was solved by the 
parliamentary re-elections that eventually brought Timoshenko to the chair of prime minister. 
The economic crisis of 2008 made the ruling Orange Coalition thoroughly unpopular, and 
finally, they lost elections to Yanukovitch in 2010 (according to Wilson, 2014). 
Yanukovitch`s coming to power in 2010 resulted in a classic democratic backsliding. 
Immediately after assuming office, Yanukovitch did a thing that Bermeo calls executive 
aggrandizement, “when elected executives weaken checks on executive power one by one.” 
First, he managed to bribe just enough parliament members to have a narrow majority. Later 
he captured the judiciary, the constitutional court, which is the key turning point according to 
Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018). Then he got rid of his political opponents starting with putting 
Timoshenko in jail and proceeding with arresting dozens of her state officials (Wilson, 2014, 
p. 51). He did every necessary step of a democratic backslide. 
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Since the Ukrainian regime underwent a democratic backslide in 2010, by 2013, it was a non-
democracy. Wintrobe`s (1998) understanding of a tinpot regime—i.e., a dictatorship that seeks 
to maximize the incumbent`s personal consumption rather than his political power—is the most 
precise description of what Ukraine was in 2014. Deriving from the other theoretical 
perspective, the regime once again returned to what Levitsky and Way (2010a) call 
“competitive authoritarianism.” 
5.7. Ukraine 2014 
5.7.1. The events of 2014 
Yanukovitch wanted to get re-elected for his second term in 2015, and since economic 
development was not a card to be played, he needed something else. Since 2010, Ukraine and 
the EU had been preparing the Association Agreement that was later hampered by the obvious 
democratic backslide and froze in 2011 when the opposition leader Yulia Timoshenko was 
jailed (see above). However, by the end of 2013, the EU had relaxed its stance, and the 
agreement seemed close to being signed, while Yanukovitch turned this issue into his 
presidential campaign. During the whole year, his TV channels59 showed the Association with 
the EU to be virtually the best thing that could happen to Ukraine—and, of course, the main 
accomplishment of his presidential term. This would have allowed him to easily surpass what 
was left from the elections, especially since his opposition was beheaded. 
Yanukovitch miscalculated the Russian pressure. Trying to prevent Ukraine from signing the 
agreement, Russia practically banned trade with Ukraine which constituted a major part of its 
income (Ulianova, 2013; Welle, 2013), while Yanukovitch was forced to negotiate with Putin. 
A week before the agreement was to be signed at the Vilnius Summit, on November 23, 
Yanukovitch canceled the deal (Stepovik, 2013). 
Spontaneous protests started immediately (Wilson, 2014, p. 65), but their scale was relatively 
insignificant. Interestingly, the initial protests were not even supported by any remnants of the 
opposition organizations, not speaking of them organizing the protests. As Wilson argues, 
“Parliamentary leaders like Arseniy Yatsenyuk joined in with belated tweets but were far from 
setting the pace” (ibid., 68). Yanukovitch attempted for the first time to repress the small-scale 
and unknown student protest on the 30th of November 2013—and thus created an avalanche 
 
59 Yanukovitch captured most of the media after coming to power in 2010 – see above. 
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he could hardly stop. More and more people would come to the protest, and the police would 
use more and violent methods. Reacting to the violent government actions, protesters 
radicalized. They built barricades and occupied government buildings: the Kyiv 
Administration building and Dom Profsoiuzov60 on the 1st of December, and the October 
Palace on the 2nd of December (Ponomarev et al., 2018). In a week, most of the Ukrainian 
opposition forces started to join the initially spontaneous bottom-up protest. By the 8th of 
December 2013, the protest rally called the “Last chance” tried to gather as many as one million 
participants (Wilson 2014, p. 73). However, another massive attempt to disperse the protest 
with the police forces on December 11 failed. 
Since then, the stalemate of the Euromaidan lasted for two months, with the number of people 
occupying the streets fading. The parliamentary opposition that initially tried to dissolve the 
government proved weak enough to be simply ignored. The regime used to kidnap the most 
active participants of the Maidan, and this tactic succeeded in increasing the costs of 
participation. At the moment the movement was radicalizing and marginalizing, Yanukovitch 
managed to trigger the protesters for the third time. On January 16, Yanukovitch tried to pass 
the so-called “dictatorial laws,” a series of laws banning and criminalizing most protest activity 
in Ukraine (Sakwa, 2015, p. 262). Being passed by a blatant mock procedure that violated 
almost every Ukrainian rule, they provoked a massive public outburst, ending with huge street 
fights on Hruschevsky Street near the Maidan. By the 23rd of January 2014, 61the protesters 
occupied more of the government buildingsand took control of some of the regions to the West 
of Ukraine. 
By mid-February, the severity of violence was colossal. On the 18th of February, the opposition 
organized a march from Maidan Square toward the government building that demanded the 
government's resignation and the return of the 2004 constitution. The Maidan forces, armed 
with shields and firebombs, went beyond the barricades and assaulted the government 
buildings. The march managed to capture several buildings on Institutskaya Street, but the 
protesters had to retreat (Wilson, 2014, p. 87). The clashes between the police and the protesters 
left three dozen people dead (Sakwa, 2015, p. 279). That day and the two following, the 
 
60 In English this means Trade Unions building, but in fact the building had nothing to do with actual trade unions 
at the moment.  
61 Namely – “Kiev” TV Chanel building on 21st of January 2014, Parliamentary library on 22nd of January 2014, 
on 24th of January – Agrarian Ministry building; on 26th of January – Ukrainian House; and some more the19th of 
February 19 (Ponomarev et al., 2018) 
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contention of street fights escalated, with many protesters being killed. The government 
responded with its most serious attempt to clear the streets called “Operation Boomerang” 
together with “Operation Surge” the same evening. It failed, leaving more than two dozen 
people dead (ibid.) and Dom Profsouzov, the logistical heart of the Maidan (see above), being 
burned down. 
Throughout the entire February, and during the last day before the notorious shooting, 18th of 
February, there were numerous attempts at negotiations between the Ukrainian leader 
Yanukovitch and the parliamentary opposition leaders Yatsenuk, Tyahnibok, and Klitchko. 
Every attempt at these negotiations failed: “Yanukovitch was duplicitous, the parliamentary 
opposition did not speak for the Maidan” (Wilson, 2014, p. 86). Furthermore, as Wilson notes, 
“Every time an agreement was signed between the parliamentary parties and the president, the 
protesters ignored it or put on a show of force to demonstrate that they were not consulted” 
(Wilson, 2014, p. 86). 
In addition, the situation was worsened with a political conflict between the independent 
sotnias that were occupying Grushevskogo street and the opposition leaders. First of all, having 
independent fighting units was a big problem not only for the regime but also for the political 
leaders of the Maidan. Every preliminary peace agreement between the opposition and 
Yanukovitch made before the 18th of February would include giving up Grushevskogo street 
in exchange for the release of political prisoners. Allegedly, the opposition leaders even tried 
to bribe the commanders of Grushevskogo to give up the barricades after failing to convince 
them to do so (My interview with Maidan participant, 2020). 
The massacre described in the preface of this chapter happened the next day, February 19. A 
group of unidentified snipers started to shoot both at the riot police and the protesters, thus 
provoking a massive gunfight. Because Euromaidan supporters had already captured control 
over several regions to the West, it was armed, and so was Berkut, the riot police. Both sides 
started to use the firearms, as they thought, in response. Finally, the riot police started to retreat, 
and the protesters took control of some of the government buildings. The same night, the 
parliament forbade riot police to use force against protesters, and the conflict froze, leaving 
several hundred dead. 
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5.7.2. Time break of negotiations in Ukraine 2014 
Right after the massacre, Ukrainian politicians started to prepare the most serious round of 
negotiations. The representatives of the EU arrived in Kyiv on the same night. Those were 
foreign ministers of Germany, Poland, and France: Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Radoslaw 
Sikorski, Laurent Fabius62, accompanied by Eric Fournier, Director at the Continental Europe 
Department of the French Foreign Ministry (see names and affiliations of the participants in 
Table 5.3). They started preliminary talks with Yanukovitch right in the morning of the 
twentieth (Wilson, 2014). 
The official negotiations started when the representatives of Russia Vladimir Lukin, the ex-
ombudsman, and Mikhail Zurabov, the Russian ambassador in Ukraine, arrived on the 21st of 
February, 01:20 (ibid.). Fabius left negotiations the same night before the agreement was 
reached. The original version of the pact was prepared by the main pool of participants at 07:20 
(Potocki & Parafianowicz, 2014; Wilson, 2014). 
The opposition was represented by the leaders of three parliamentary opposition parties—the 
AUUF, the AUUS, the UDAR. At the same time, the leaders of numerous smaller organizations 
played important roles. However, they were not embedded into the Maidan Council hierarchy, 
such as AvtoMaidan, Pravii Sector, or independent Sotnias outside of the main perimeter were 
not represented. The three leaders alone could, of course, hardly represent the massive 
Euromaidan movement. However, the negotiators did everything possible to use all the main 
organizational capacities of the Euromaidan. Later, after the first document was reached at 7 
a.m., Yatsenuk, Klitchko, and Tyahnibok, accompanied by Western foreign ministers, went to 
the Council of Euromaidan, its main organizational body (see above). Therefore, the key 
decision was taken not entirely by the three leaders but also, or even mostly, by the Maidan 
Council with thirty-four votes for the agreement and two votes against it (Potocki & 
Parafianowicz, 2014). It took Sikorski a great deal to convince members of the Maidan Council 
that an alternative solution did not exist and that violent repression was likely. After that, the 
pact was signed officially, according to different sources, on the 21st of February at 16:00 
(Sakwa, 2015, p. 277), at 18:00 (Grani, 2014), or 18:45 (Wilson, 2014, p. 91). Police forces 
withdrew from the streets on the “evening” of the 21st of February (Wilson, 2014, p. 91). 
  
 
62 Fabius is only mentioned by Wilson. 
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Table 5.3. The participants in negotiations in Ukraine from the evening of 20 February until 
18:45 on February 21.63 
Incumbent Opposition Russia EU 
Victor Yanukovitch, the 
president of Ukraine 
Arsenii Yatsenuk (the 
AUUF or 
Batkivshchyna) later 
achieved 5.4% of the 
votes 
Vladimir Lukin, ex-
ombudsman (did not 
sign the pact claiming 
that he does not know 
whether Yanukovitch is 
still actually in power) 
Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier, German 
Minister of Foreign 
Affairs 
Andrey Kluev, 
Secretary of the 
National Security and 
Defense Council of 
Ukraine 
Vitalii Klitchko, the 
UDAR, 10,000 
members and later 
achieved 13% of the 
votes within a big 
alliance 
Mikhail Zurabov, 
Russian Ambassador to 
Ukraine. Left 
negotiations earlier “at 
night” (Wilson). 
Radoslaw Sikorski, 




Tiagnibok (the AUUS, 
or the Svoboda) had 
20,000 members and 
later achieved 1.7% of 
the votes.64 
 Laurent Fabius, French 
Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, “left later” 
(Wilson). 
 
   Eric Fournier, Director 
at the Continental 
Europe Department of 
the French Foreign 
Ministry. Left 








63 In this table, I only cited sources for the names that are not present everywhere in the literature, therefore, there 
is a potential contradiction. The other names are mentioned everywhere in the literature and press. With time 
estimation, I took the longest estimate offered by (2014, p. 91). 




The substance of this pact was favorable to Yanukovitch, to say the least, because he did not 
have to resign immediately and could even participate in the presidential elections nine months 
later. Protesters had to empty the streets and give up firearms immediately, which also applied 
to the riot police. In exchange, the old 2004 constitution was to be implemented within two 
days (the one that emerged through negotiations and was not diminished by the changes made 
during the 2010 democratic backslide), and the new “national unity” government had to be 
formed within twelve days. A new constitution that would “balance presidential and 
parliamentary powers” was to be drafted before September 2014, and presidential elections 
were to be held immediately after that but no later than December 2014 with the new 
independent electoral commission65 (Sakwa, 2015; Полный Текст Соглашения Оппозиции и 
Януковича, 2014). 
To begin with, the deal was disproportionate to the extent that the opposition controlled the 
situation: at least three regions—Volyn, Lviv, and Ternopil—were captured by its protesters 
at the moment (Sakwa, 2015, p. 263). Moreover, the deal was also extremely risky for 
Euromaidan, which did not have any stable organization behind it. Accordingly, it could be 
possible that the protest would not manage to mobilize again if Yanukovitch started to defect 
from his part of the agreement. Furthermore, Yanukovitch had to participate in elections three 
months later anyway. The compromise, however, was risky for Yanukovitch as well because, 
at least according to Sikorski, his hardliner elites were carrying out detailed plans for a violent 
crackdown of protests (Potocki & Parafianowicz, 2014), and such a pact was ruining these 
plans and upsetting hardliners thus increasing their probability to defect even further. 
What undermined the pact was the horizontal network structure of the Euromaidan. Even 
though Yanukovitch cut a deal with the largest and the most influential organization of 
Euromaidan—that is, the Maidan Council—he could never cut a deal with the entire network 
of Euromaidan. The compromise that has satisfied the Council was unacceptable for people in 
the streets and most bottom-up organizations. 
 
65 The problem is that the text of the pact was deleted from all Ukrainian official websites in March 2014 after it 




The same evening, at 21:36 the 21st of February, one of the three leaders of the parliamentary 
opposition Vitalii Klitchko made a speech to Euromaidan66 (Ukraine 112, 2014). He chose the 
wrong moment to pop up during the funeral procession of those who died two days before, 
during the 19th of February, right at the moment when the crowd was carrying the coffins. As 
a result, the mere fact of him negotiating “with the murderers” appeared wrong in front of the 
dead bodies. As a result, instantly, Klitchko was angrily booed by the crowd. After that, the 
footages show a Sotnia leader Vladimir Parasuk breaking his way to the stage and snatching 
the microphone from Klitchko`s hands (Espreso.TV, 2014; hromadske, 2014). First, he said 
that it is immoral to negotiate “with the criminals” and that the only thing they delegated to 
politicians was to make Yanukovitch resign, and they failed this task. Second, and most 
importantly, he gave an ultimatum that if politicians do not demand Yanukovitch to resign 
immediately, “they” (probably him and his sontia) were going to capture government buildings 
with arms67. His speech was cheered enthusiastically by the crowd. After that, Klitchko and 
others started to excuse unconvincingly for shaking hands and said that at the moment it was 
impossible to drive Yanukovitch out. This made the three leaders seem even worse. After that, 
several leaders were making speeches, and those calling for forbearance were always booed 
while those calling for the escalation were cheered. 
On top of that, many organizations of the Maidan did not support the agreement even before 
the public uproar. Most importantly, Dmitrii Yarosh, the head of the Right Sector (Pravii 
Sector), one of the forty-two sotnias of the Maidan (see above), made a speech at 20:55 that 
drastically declined any agreements and openly called for an armed fight. Likewise, 
AvtoMaidan (see above) refused to accept any conditions except for the resignation of 
Yanukovitch at 19:00 (Hadzhynov, 2014a, 2014b). Given only this evidence, it seems likely 
that neither the Maidan Council nor the opposition Troika would be able to tame the protests, 
especially without promising the resignation of Yanukovitch. 
The widespread discourse in the literature suggests that Yanukovitch fled after Parasuk`s 
“rabble-rousing speech got a big cheer” (Sakwa, 2015, p. 280; Wilson, 2014, p. 280). No matter 
how smooth and movie-like this version of events appears, the evidence suggests a different 
 
66 Richard Sakwa on page 279 claims that the three leaders made a speech together but in fact Yatsenuk and 
Tyahnibok were standing somewhere in the background of the stage. 
67 Later during his speech, he says that if Yanukovitch does not resign before 10:00 22nd of February “they” are 
going to capture government buildings. 
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sequence. The time code on the leaked footings from Yanukovitch`s CCTV cameras shows 
him physically leaving the building of his residence in Kyiv at 21:24, ten minutes before 
Klitchko was booed and Parasuk made his famous speech (Frolyak, 2017). Moreover, the same 
video shows his staff carrying a painting toward a truck around 15:24, even before the pact was 
officially signed (but after the agreement had been de facto made and approved by the Maidan 
Council). 
Yanukovitch first fled to Kharkiv, the main city of eastern Ukraine, and tried to build a coalition 
of eastern political elites. However dangerous to Ukrainian territorial integrity this move could 
be, it failed. The next day, on the 22nd of February 2014, he was impeached by an illegal yet 
legitimate parliamentary procedure with 338 votes out of 450 (Wilson, 2014, p. 93). Then he 
went to Crimea and finally to Rostov, Russia, continuing to claim that he was the “lawfully 
elected president.” The attempt at making a pacted transition failed. 
Each side claims that the counterpart started to cheat first, and each position has its weak sides. 
The pro-Russian pro-Yanukovitch position is that the deal was cut but the opposition cheated 
from the very beginning. Yanukovitch himself says that he was surprised that after having an 
agreement with the high-level EU and Russian mediators, “they played [him] for a sucker”68 
(Frolyak, 2017). After the police started to leave squares following the government`s part of 
the agreement, the numerous opposition leaders made militant speeches and, failing Troika`s 
promise to leave the square, started, on the contrary, to conquer government buildings. 
Therefore, Yanukovitch had no choice but to flee. Russia used this position to claim that a 
“coup d`etat” had led to a new state, the territorial integrity of which would not be respected 
by Russia. It has numerous contradictions. The first one is timing: as I have shown above, 
Yanukovitch started to pack long before the crowd had booed the Troika, and the government 
buildings were occupied only after he departed from Kyiv. Second, neither the Maidan Council 
nor the opposition Troika is responsible for the crowd's reactions and those of certain branches 
of the Maidan, and one cannot know whether they would have managed to implement their 
part of the agreement had Yanukovitch stayed in Kyiv. 
The pro-Maidan position (see Potocki & Parafianowicz, 2014; Wilson, 2014) argues that the 
deal was cut even though it was definitely not the best for the opposition. Most of the 
organizational capacities of the Maidan, including the three parliamentary parties and the 
 
68 My translation from the Russian: “Меня кинули как лоха!” 
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Maidan Council (34:2 votes), supported the deal and sent Klitchko to announce it to the 
Maidan. The mere fact that he was booed by the crowd and not supported by many radical 
organizations and sotnias does not mean that the main body of the Maidan and most of its 
sotnias would not follow it. Furthermore, there are claims that when he left his workplace, he 
had, therefore, automatically resigned from it. In other words, this position says that 
Yanukovitch ran because he overestimated the danger or had some other reasons. In Wilson`s 
(2014) words, he either fled because he “was a coward” or because he “finished packing.” This 
explanation, however, overlooks the rational reasons for this escape: considering the level of 
violence, the independence of many Maidan`s fighting units, the number of elite defections, 
and the absence of his (and anyone else`s) control over the situation, it was actually dangerous 
for him to stay in the capital. Not to mention, leaving the capital does not mean that the 
agreement becomes invalid or that he resigns as president—he did not even flee the country. 
Both positions are wrong because they seek the answer in agency when the problem lies in the 
structure. The two sides did make every step possible to achieve a negotiated solution for this 
crisis. Although one can speculate that Yanukovitch was slightly greedy and the Troika was 
slightly overconfident, they still did every action possible to implement the agreement they 
made: the Troika tried to calm the protesters down, while the government withdrew the police 
forces from the streets. The problem here was in the structure: the organizational capacity of 
the opposition here was so low that it is impossible to imagine any sequence of actions that 
would have led to a successful pacted transition. 
Because of its immanent bottom-up network structure, Euromaidan did not have an 
organizational capacity to provide compliance with the results of any negotiations. It emerged 
spontaneously three months before as a constellation of various independent organizations and 
sotnias that later joined the protest and had numerous wings independent of each other. 
Although it managed to develop its own organizational body called the Maidan Council, it was 
instead responsible for logistics than an entity that could command the protesters like an army. 
Not only could not it tame radical wings such as the Right Sector, but also the moderate parts, 
such as AvtoMaidan, could openly deny its decisions. Even within its ranks, the Maidan`s Self-
Defense had a Sotnik69, who could break his way to the stage, speak independently and even 
give an ultimatum to the government—obviously without his commander Andrei Parubi 
(subordinated to the Maidan Council) allowing it. There was no person or organization with 
 
69 A squad commander. 
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whom Yanukovitch could make a pact; the Maidan could not deliver a promise of any living 
person because no one controlled it. Here lies the answer to why Yanukovitch fled the country 
and why the negotiated exit while staying in the country—the solution that would satisfy most 
rank and file Maidan activists—was not an option for him. Nobody on Earth could guarantee 
Yanukovitch his safety if he gave up power and stayed in Kyiv because the city was full of 
armed Sotnias independent from the commandment. He started packing earlier while 
negotiating, and he fled when it became evident that he would lose power not because (or at 
least not only) he “was a coward” (Wilson, 2014, p. 93) but because “it was already clear that 
his life was in danger” (Sakwa, 2015, p. 211) and that there were at least four assassination 
attempts (ibid.) 
Apart from the network structure, the Euromaidan did not have enough organizational capacity 
because most of its organizations were even younger than the Maidan itself. The Maidan 
Council was summoned one month after the Maidan started, on the 22nd of December (BBC, 
2013); Pravii Sector was launched in December 2013 (Tarasenko, 2014); AvtoMaidan was 
created on 30th of November 2013 (Hodkovskii & Kozlovskaya, 2014). The only three 
organizations older than three years were the parliamentary political parties represented by 
Yatsenyk, Klitchko, and Tyahnibok, who joined the protests during the later stages, defecting 
from the Ukrainian parliamentary elite. The three proved themselves unable to control the 
Maidan`s actions and were mostly despised by the general protesters. On top of that, their 
parties did not have much public support. Two of them had earned only 5% of the votes during 
the 2014 elections, and the other had just 10% of the votes in a large coalition. The Maidan did 
not include any single large and influential organization that would be anything close to 
Poland’s Solidarity or the Tunisian UGTT. 
It is hard to say whether the intra-regime forces could protect Yanukovitch shall he stay in the 
capital. By the moment of the pact, different riot police units were surrendering one after 
another. Police completely withdrew from the streets during the day of negotiations, after they 
were in principle over—about 15:00. However, it remains uncertain whether this happened 
because Yanukovitch was sticking to his part of the pact or because of elite defections 
(according to Wilson 2014, p. 92). The army commandment was never ready to participate in 
the struggle (see, for instance, Braterskii, 2014). 
At the same time, the elite Alpha group, 200 bodyguards, and titushki, the radical youth 
movement that was used to harass the protesters, remained loyal to Yanukovitch. Moreover, 
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serious reinforcements of riot police were allegedly approaching Kyiv (Wilson, 2014, p. 93) 
On top of that, an authoritative journalist Dmitry Gordon later argued that the leaked 
documents revealing that the ruling elites, together with the SBU (the Ukrainian secret service) 
were carrying out a plan to forcefully disperse the protesters by military force using firearms 
(Bic, 2014; Gordon, 2014b). 
The reason for this situation can be attributed to a “political regime.” However, this regime 
was created by a human being, and if there is any person to blame for the situation when nobody 
could guarantee Yanukovitch his physical safety, it was Yanukovitch himself. He was the one 
who commited the executive aggrandizement after being elected in 2010 (see above), and he 
was the one who beheaded his main rival party—Fatherland—putting its leader Timoshenko 
in jail in 2011. Therefore, instead of a coherent opposition movement united around one leader, 
in February 2014, he faced a group of three petty leaders who could hardly influence the 
protest. Speaking in theoretical terms, he solved his Dictators` Dilemma by choosing repression 
as a method of staying in power, thus increasing his price of exit and making the negotiated 
exit option impossible. 
5.8. Conclusion. 
 
The processes of negotiations over the two political crises in Ukraine share many 
commonalities. To begin with, the same actors and the same organizations played against each 
other. It was the alliance of the Our Ukraine of Yuschenko and with the Fatherland of 
Timoschenko paired with the Pora! movement that campaigned against Yanukovitch then—
and it was the alliance of three parties the Fatherland of Timoschenko, the UDAR, the 
descendant of the Pora, and the radical newborn Freedom campaigning against Yanukovitch 
again. In both cases, the parties were in the heart of the Maidan`s organizational basis; in both 
cases, the Maidan was financed mainly by these political parties. Moreover, the direction of 
Russian influence and that of the EU was the same in these two cases. In both cases, the number 
of people on the streets was shocking, reaching almost half of the population of Kyiv. What is 
more, the negotiation rooms were packed with high-level EU representatives, whereas the 
Russian presence in the negotiations was rather a formality. Finally, in both cases, Russia 
preferred to directly command Ukrainian leaders to forcefully disperse protests, and in both 
cases, this never happened. 
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The key difference eventually led to the successful pact in 2004 and the collapse of negotiations 
in 2014. The Euromaidan 2014 movement was far more decentralized (if not to say chaotic) 
and had no control over the protesters. In contrast, the Maidan 2004 was organized in a strictly 
hierarchical way, and its organizers enjoyed complete control over the situation. First, the 
Maidan 2004 was prepared long in advance because the opposition Orange Coalition knew that 
Yanukovitch would rely on fraud. Hence, the protest movement had a hierarchical structure, 
was well-organized and centralized. 
In contrast, the Euromaidan 2014 was caused by a series of mistakes by Yanukovitch and 
suddenly triggered by an unexpected violent crackdown of a small student protest—in other 
words, it came as a surprise for the political parties that joined late. Additionally, the Orange 
Coalition umbrella alliance of 2004 itself was extremely strong and supported by the bulk of 
political and economic elites. The party alliance of 2014, in contrast, was weakened and 
beheaded after the democratic backslide of 2010. Therefore, in 2014, many logistical functions 
were taken by independent bottom-up organizations because parties were not fast and strong 
enough to take the initiative. As a result, these bottom-up organizations were instead 
cooperating with- than subordinated to- the main party-based body of the movement. Thus, in 
2014, the parties became nothing but a very important node in a network. 
On top of that, the leaders of the Euromaidan did not have a monopoly on violence inside of 
its perimeter, to say nothing of the street fights on its frontiers and bottom-up Euromaidans in 
other cities of Ukraine. Furthermore, the structure of the Maidan Self-Defense force was 
decentralized: many of its fighting units, sotnias, were summoned in their regions of origins 
and were subordinated rather to their commander than to the commander of the Euromaidan. 
Likewise, the three sotnias outside the main perimeter that participated in the most heated 
struggles openly did not subordinate to Self-Defense of Maidan. On top of that, the Maidan 
2004 was only organized in the capital and was, therefore, easier to control. The Euromaidan 
in 2014 was sparkling in a bottom-up way in almost any significant city of Ukraine and were 
rarely directly subordinated to their counterparts from Kyiv. 
 
In addition to the character of the movement, this pair of cases has two case-specific differences 
that go beyond my theoretical expectations: the scale of violence and the presence of a 
mediator. The conflict of 2014 was way more complicated to resolve by negotiations because 
it was way more escalated, and a strong mediator was missing in the negotiations. To begin 
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with, the contention of 2004 was perfectly nonviolent whereas, in 2014, the level of violence 
was unprecedented for the post-Soviet state, with the number of people killed approaching two 
thousand according to the GWF data set (Geddes et al., 2018b). However, most importantly, 
the 2004 Round Table included almost a perfect mediator—Leonid Kuchma, the president of 
Ukraine at the time. He was going to leave office anyway. His safety, after all, was more 
important for him than his heir, Yanukovitch, coming to power. At a certain point, his interests 
started to diverge from the ones of Yanukovitch, and he prevented him from escalating the 
conflict twice. The Round Table of 2014 did not include such a figure. 
 
The Ukrainian story enriches the argument presented in Chapter 3. It shows that to have a 
capacity for credible commitment and a credible threat, merely being strong is not enough for 
a protest movement. The capacity for credible commitment and credible threat requires the 
opposition movement to have a somewhat old-fashioned hierarchical structure with 
uncontested leadership and a monopoly on violence. The old-fashioned organizations such as 
trade unions and, especially, the Catholic Church, are characterized by these vertical 
hierarchies. The Euromaidan movement of 2014, even though it was incredibly strong, lacked 
this hierarchy. The QCA model presented in Chapter 3 fails to explain this difference between 
the two Ukrainian cases because it takes into account only the presence of certain types of 
organizations. It does so mostly because it was impossible to include the hierarchical/horizontal 
structure of a movement into a large-n analysis. Knowing whether a particular movement has 
a vertical hierarchy requires qualitative methods and deep knowledge of a case. At the same 
time, the logic of the argument of this research remains the same in the Ukrainian pair: to make 
a pacted transition possible, the opposition should have a strong organizational capacity—that 
is, to be able for credible commitment credible threat. These capacities can be achieved in 
numerous ways,—and the way they were achieved in Ukraine in 2004 and not achieved in 
2014 goes beyond my QCA model while following its logic. 
The pair of Ukrainian cases illustrates very well the theories of Geddes et al. (2018b) and Linz 
and Stepan (1996a). It is hard to put the Ukrainian regimes into one of the regime types offered 
by them. However, if one observes their requirements for pacted transition separately, they 
prove to have worked precisely in a predicted direction. To begin with, it is the “organizational 
presence” (Linz & Stepan, 1996a) of “moderate opposition parties” that allowed both attempts 
at pacts to happen. It is the presence of strong opposition parties that enabled the first pact in 
2004. The huge umbrella alliance tamed the aspirations for violent actions both from 
 
 134 
Timoshenko on the 27th of November 2004 when she wanted to capture the government 
buildings and from Yuschenko on the 8th of December 2004 when he wanted to cancel the pact 
because Yanukovitch was not fired as prime minister. At the same time, it is “some degree of 
intra-elite pluralism” (Linz & Stepan, 1996a) that allowed for the elite defections in 2004 that 
enabled the protests and forced the incumbent to pact in the first place and then prevented 
Yanukovitch from repressing the protest. The weakness and fragmentation of the party system 
—and the existence of many newborn challenger parties—were key reasons for the failure of 
the pact in 2014. The three leaders of small and beheaded parties could not convince the 
decentralized network of a protest movement to follow the pact and could not ensure the safety 
of Yanukovitch once he steps down. Geddes's (2018b) argument that less personalistic and 
more party-led dictatorships are more likely to pact also supports this stance—these were 
always party structures that de-escalated conflict on both sides. 
The theories do not stand, however, when the broad “regime type” categories such as 
“authoritarian” or “sultanistic” are applied. It was always rather a matter of a degree than of a 
kind that, combined with other factors, explains the success of negotiations in one case and 






This dissertation has investigated the preconditions for pacts to succeed and has shown that a 
society needs to have a very strong opposition movement if a transition from authoritarian rule 
is to be successfully negotiated. The opposition can realize high organizational capacity in two 
different ways. The most intuitive way is, of course, to have established opposition parties. 
Such parties are frequently united with the Church. However, an opposition movement has a 
second, less obvious yet more frequently met and more effective way to realize significant 
organizational capacity—namely, drawing it from the economic realm. Transitions with a 
strong independent trade union that organizes the opposition forces and participates in 
negotiations always lead to democratic results, and these attempts at negotiations never fail. 
The participation of trade unions leads to this result because they are good at organizing 
negotiations with the authorities. When the authorities try to avoid or renege on their 
guarantees, trade unions can force them to comply by organizing strikes. Indeed, strikes as 
opposed to protests seem to be the most effective lever at unions’ disposal in this regard. I have 
referred to this throughout the dissertation as the capacity to make credible commitments and 
credible threats. In line with the existing literature, it is expected that both pathways will be 
more likely in party dictatorships because those are normally more tolerant of the opposition 
(Geddes et al., 2018b; Linz & Stepan, 1996a; Wintrobe, 1998). 
Trade unions frequently participate in pacted transitions because they are generally the most 
organized opposition force in industrial societies. When authoritarian regimes in industrial 
societies are consolidated, trade unions are co-opted into them. At the same time, they are very 
likely to preserve some autonomy. When an authoritarian regime collapses, the trade unions 
can turn against the dictator and lead the opposition movement. 
The results of this dissertation strengthen the “working-class” democratization thesis. For 
Rueschemeyer and colleagues (1992), the participation of the working class has a 
democratizing effect, but only indirectly. Contrary to this view, Collier and Mahoney (1997) 
have claimed that there is little connection between the participation of the working class and 
the success of democratization. Against this backdrop, my own QCA analysis shows that the 
participation of a trade union (or “organized labor” in class terms) in a pacted transition has a 
direct and substantial effect. Moreover, my case study of the Tunisian Arab Spring events 
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supports this argument by showing that the participation of the UGTT was the most crucial 
reason for successful negotiations. The regression analysis finds a robust linear connection 
between the share of the population belonging to a trade union that participates in negotiations 
and the subsequent increase in the democracy score. This democratizing effect caused by a 
trade union might itself derive from structural social conditions. For example, countries with 
large trade unions might have a higher level of what Putnam (1994) calls social capital. 
However, even the proxy indicators of this variable are not available for the sample of my 
countries. Therefore, it was impossible to test this hypothesis. In one way, the results of this 
analysis support another argument of Collier (19 99), who claims that trade unions never act 
alone as agents of democratization. As I have demonstrated in Chapter 3 (see Figure 3.1), their 
presence always goes hand in hand with other opposition organizations. 
This analysis offers two significant contributions, first lending support to the argument of 
Geddes and colleagues (2018a), and second, revealing an alternative pathway toward pacted 
transitions. Geddes and colleagues claim that party regimes are most likely to make pacts; my 
empirical analysis confirms this result but also shows that there is another way. Several 
countries underwent successful attempts at negotiations (e.g., Sudan in 1985) and democratized 
through pacts (e.g., Peru in 1980, Madagascar in 1992, Mali in 1991, and Benin in 1991) 
despite not being party regimes. Those cases made successful pacted transitions thanks to trade 
unions. Thus, there is no contradiction between the two explanations on a theoretical level: the 
regime’s inherent institutionalization and a certain degree of internal pluralism can be indicated 
both by falling into a “party dictatorship” category and the presence of a trade union. Besides, 
the sets of countries with trade unions and party regimes overlap in eleven cases (see Table 3.1 
and Figure 3.1). 
On the empirical level, the presence of a strong organizational capacity of the opposition 
provides a more precise explanation than merely being a party regime. The two regimes that 
were more likely to undergo pacted transitions according to Geddes and colleagues’ (2018a) 
theory—the military dictatorships in Egypt in 2011 and Myanmar in 1988—have, in fact, even 
experienced failed negotiation attempts, while successful negotiations in Taiwan in 1990 
brought about very limited democratization (.06 points within three years). The organizational 
capacity of the opposition was low in all of these cases: in none of those, the trade unions, the 
Catholic Church, or established political parties were represented in negotiations.70 On the 
 
70 Even if they existed in a society in one or another form. 
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contrary, those attempts at negotiations where trade unions were present never collapsed and 
always led to democratization. 
This thesis speaks against the original “elitist” understanding of pacted transitions (O'Donnell 
et al., 1986; Rosendorff, 2001) that treated negotiations as an exclusive elite exercise that can 
hardly be affected from the streets. It instead shows that, paradoxically, these exclusive elite 
pacts are the most successful and democratizing when the working-class representatives 
participate. Such pacts were only successful when accompanied by constant street pressure. 
Finally, this analysis has shown that a successful democratizing pacted transition demands 
many more prerequisites than the goodwill of political elites. Specifically, either the incumbent 
regime must be a party dictatorship, or the opposition’s organizational capacity must be strong, 
which frequently derives from the efforts of a trade union or the Catholic Church. 
The level of aggregation of my explanatory variables always seems to lie exclusively in the 
organizational realm. Indicators at a macro-structural level of aggregation71—such as culture 
or economic development—hardly explain much of the success of negotiations and further 
democratization. Nor do the variables that belong to the lower level of leadership (the 
“voluntaristic” level) explain much. The agents ' actions were the same in the four transitions 
studied closely in Chapters 3 and 4, yet the outcomes that followed these interactions differed. 
The institutional level of aggregation (i.e., the political regime) also provides a plausible 
explanation. Nevertheless, that explanation is less focused than the one that deals with the 
slightly lower level of aggregation —namely, the social group. According to the results of the 
QCA analysis and the case study analysis, the best explanation lies at the organizational level 
of aggregation. To be even more nuanced, it belongs to the level of aggregation that is slightly 
lower than what can be called the “organizational capacity of the country’s opposition” and is 
somewhat closer to the “organizational capacity of an opposition movement.” These two are, 
of course, very close, but in some of the cases, the difference can explain the outcome. In many 
cases, the organizations present in a country do not necessarily participate in negotiations. For 
instance, influential Spanish trade unions were not included in the main Moncloa pact. 
The comparison of the pair of two Ukrainian transitions described in Chapter 5 illustrates this 
difference. Although the totality of organizations and overall organizational capacity of the 
 
71 I draw here on the terms used by Mahoney and Snyder (1999). For further discussion, see Chapter 1.  
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opposition in the country did not change much from the year 2004 to the year 2014, the 
organizational capacity of the two opposition movements varied drastically. The 2004 Maidan 
protests had a hierarchical structure that was controlled by a single leader, while the 2014 
Euromaidan had a network structure that by definition could not be subordinated to anyone. 
As a result, the former was capable of negotiations while the latter was not. 
Despite my acknowledged selection bias, which has led me to collect more known and 
successful cases while overlooking tacit and failed negotiation attempts, I believe that I have 
managed to show a clear difference between the two groups. I have partially solved this 
problem of selection bias by using QCA. I have collected all known attempts at pacted 
transitions from the beginning of the Third Wave of democratization and then compared the 
twenty-nine successful cases using the analysis of sufficiency. Because negative outcomes are 
less important for the analysis of sufficiency in QCA, it provided a clear venue for success 
stories. 
On the other hand, having said this, I did not come up with a succinct recipe of a failed attempt 
at negotiating a pact. Some countries do not have sufficient conditions for a pact but 
nevertheless negotiate one (as Ukraine did in 2004). At the same time, these countries can also 
have failed negotiations. In these cases, the outcome is explained with tiny case-specific 
nuances. Speaking in QCA terms, the analysis did not reveal any set of conditions that are 
sufficient for a failed attempt at negotiations. 
However, I have developed an intuition on what was common in failed negotiation attempts—
a zero-sum game. This intuition comes from the case studies and what I learned about failed 
negotiation attempts while collecting the data. Obviously, none of these cases had an 
opposition movement with strong organizational capacity as a whole: simply speaking, no 
single leader (or at least a single collective body) could call the mass public and radical 
organizations to a ceasefire (or vise-versa). However, most importantly, in each of the failed 
cases, the two sides were playing a zero-sum game. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood showed 
no intention to share political power with its opponents, the SCAF, which was equally 
intransigent in this regard. The Ukrainian and Egyptian authoritarian leaders, Yanukovitch and 
Mubarak, were not prepared to accept an agreement that would force them to resign 
immediately. At the same time, in both countries, neither the opposition organizations nor the 
mass public would allow them to stay. 
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This dissertation has contributed to the existing literature in several ways. To begin with, it has 
systematized all the attempts at pacted transitions since 1974 and collected all the possible data 
on opposition organizations participating in those transitions. The created database can be used 
in further research. Most importantly, the dissertation has bridged the gap in the existing 
literature on pacted transitions concerning the requisite characteristics of the opposition. First, 
it has unpacked those features that lead to successful negotiations and democratization. Second, 
it has shown the mechanisms underlying this—namely, how the organizations participating in 
negotiations contributed to their successful completion. Third, it has introduced an actor that 
the existing literature on pacted transitions has tended to downplay — organized labor. 
Specifically, the thesis has shown that in many cases, it was the participation of trade unions 
that helped negotiate the most plausible pacted transitions. In addition, combining a unique 
data set with innovative methods based on Boolean algebra, my dissertation has confirmed the 
old finding of existing literature that pacted transitions are more likely to happen in party 
regimes. Finally, it has demonstrated that “elite-driven” pacted transitions are, in fact, most of 
the time fueled by constant street pressure. 
There are fewer attempts at pacted transitions now than in the past, and they are becoming 
increasingly less likely to succeed when they are attempted. Besides, the typical composition 
of opposition actors is changing: the organizations that used to be the main drivers of pacted 
transitions are now disappearing. Before the end of the Cold War, rival trade unions were 
central to the successful completion of negotiations with autocratic elites. Nowadays, this 
phenomenon is fading: Tunisia in the years 2011-2013 is the only case of union-driven 
negotiations in the last two decades. The same holds for transitions that involved the Catholic 
Church. Since the year 2000, the Church has not participated in a single pacted transition. 
Modern autocrats are thwarting unionism and religious organizations, including the Catholic 
Church, preferring to tolerate authoritarian parliaments that co-opt puppet opposition parties. 
By reducing their risks of losing power to independent trade unions or the Church in this way, 
autocrats also diminish their chances of safe exit via peaceful pacted transitions. In addition, 
nowadays, the share of pacts that resolve contested elections is larger than it was two decades 
ago. Negotiations of this kind are less extraordinary and rule-setting by their nature. As a result, 
they tend to include a narrower circle of participants and bring about less change. 
Moreover, the development of IT technologies now allows protests to be organized with less 
organizational structure than before (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012), and political protests tend to 
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be more decentralized and spontaneous. In fact, the political crisis in Belarus in autumn 2020 
has demonstrated that mass-scale protests can be organized and coordinated through 
messengers without any organizational resources whatsoever. At the same time, it is almost 
impossible to negotiate a pacted transition with a network of this kind. For authoritarian leaders 
like Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus, this means that their chances of having a peaceful 
pacted transition and a prosperous post-tenure fate are decreasing. Having said this, I can 
anticipate that there will be fewer attempts at pacted transition in the future, and more of them 
will fail. 
Against this backdrop, an important question — one this study has deliberately avoided, but 
that must be addressed — remains: is it a pacted transition per se or its prerequisites that lead 
to democratic results? In 1999, Geddes wrote that only one-third of transitions that occurred 
in the world since 1974 was successful. Out of my thirty-six instances of successful 
negotiations, only seven did not end up with democracy. Moreover, even among those seven, 
many cases can be argued to be somewhat deviant in their process of pacting (see the section 
on variation between pacted transitions in Chapter 2) and would be considered irrelevant if 
thresholds are raised. On the other hand, it might be the case that literally almost every pacted 
transition leads to democracy—more than that, pacted transitions “facilitate” or are “more 
likely” to lead to democratic results, which is a consensus view now. Of course, democratic 
gains can be surrendered in the following period, but the initial impulse they give is colossal. 
At the same time, preconditions for pacted transitions are very demanding. I have now 
narrowed down the scope of the pacted transitions of the Third Wave and understood their 
prerequisites. Also, it is now evident that these prerequisites can be approximated with a party 
regime for this next design since we do not know which organizations would participate in the 
pacts were they to happen. Now, we know enough to address the second part of the question. 
One final question is of interest: What is more important for democratization—starting in a 
party dictatorship being negotiated cooperatively? Knowing the answer would enrich 
theoretical knowledge about authoritarian breakdowns and have significant implications for 
policymakers. For example, should the international community concentrate on moments of 
authoritarian breakdown or periods of peaceful authoritarian existence? Or should the 
opposition and the international community pursue a cooperated pacted transition in a highly 
personalistic dictatorship? Or, instead, would a pacted transition improve the situation even 
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Albania 1992 0 0 0 .75 .53 0 1 0 0 2 2.46 
Albania 1997 0 .05 .07 .75 .53 0 0 0 1 6 2.54 
Argentina 1983 0 .57 1 1 .97 1 0 1 1 53 8.48 
Bangladesh 1990 1 .10 .51 0 .01 0 0 0 1 41 1.10 
Benin 1991 0 .16 .98 1 .97 1 1 0 1 17 5.82 
Bolivia 1982 0 .36 1 1 .97 1 1 1 1 46 8.56 
Brazil 1985 0 .29 1 1 .97 1 1 1 1 20 2.57 
Bulgaria 1990 0 .31 1 1 .97 1 0 1 1 101 3.32 
Chechoslovakia 1990 0 .49 1 1 .97 0 1 1 0 1 0 
Comoros 2001 0 .15 .94 .75 .53 0 0 0 0 4 0 
Congo DRC 1992 1 0 0 0 .01 0 1 0 0 2 0 
Dominican Rep. 1978 0 .16 .98 1 .97 0 1 0 1 39 0 
Ecuador 1979 0 .35 1 1 .97 1 0 1 1 110 3.34 

















































Georgia 2003 0 .19 1 1 .97 0 0 0 0 2 0 
Greece 1974 0 .64 1 1 .97 0 0 1 1 18 0 
Hungary 1989 0 .52 1 1 .97 1 1 1 1 59 .47 
Iran 1979 0 .02 .01 .75 .53 0 0  0 0 0 0 
Ivory Coast 2000 1 .16 .97 .25 .05 0 1 0 1 18 0 
Ivory Coast 2011 1 .03 .01 0 .01 0 0 0 1 24 0 
Kenya 2008 0 .06 .07 .75 .53 0 0 0 0 3 0 
Madagascar 1992 0 .22 1 1 .97 1 1 0 0 2 0 
Malawi 1994 0 .28 1 1 .97 0 1 0 1 35 0 
Mali 1991 0 .32 1 1 .97 1 0 0 1 28 5.50 
Mongolia 1993 0 .42 1 1 .97 0 0 1 0 3 0 
Myanmar 1988 1 0 0 0 .01 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Nepal 2006 0 .21 1 .75 .53 0 0 0 1 12 0 
Nepal 1990 0 .09 .38 .75 .53 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nicaragua 1990 0 .17 .98 1 .97 0 0 1 1 8 0 
Peru 1980 0 .39 1 1 .97 1 0 0 1 56 4.03 
Poland 1989 0 .57 1 1 .97 1 1 1 1 9 13.17 
Slovenia 1990 0 .47 1 1 .97 1 1 1 0 1 0 
South Africa 1994 0 .27 1 1 .97 0 0 1 1 82 2.04 
South Korea 1987 0 .32 1 1 .97 1 1 1 1 41 3.55 
Spain 1977 0 .65 1 1 .97 0 0 1 1 54 0 

















































Taiwan 1990 0 .06 .12 .75 .53 0 0 1 0 4 0 
Togo 1991 1 .04 .03 0 .01 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Togo 2006 1 .04 .02 0 .01 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Tunisia 2011 0 .43 1 1 .97 1 0 1 1 68 4.80 
Ukraine 2004 0 .17 .98 1 .97 0 0 0 0 3 0 
Ukraine 2014 1 -.04 0 0 .01 0 0 0 1 23 0 
Uruguay 1984 0 .70 1 1 .97 1 0 1 0 0 7.22 
Yemen 2011 0 -.08 0 .75 .53 0 0 0 1 42 0 







Data file 1. Attempts at pacts database. 
country_name—the name of the country that experiences an attempt at negotiations. Text 
variable. 
year—year of the negotiations, or the last round of negotiations. This may vary from the other 
databases that conventionally use the date of the first elections. 
FAILED—dummy variable, indicating whether the negotiations collapsed in the initial stages. 
If the negotiations collapse because of either the incumbent or the opposition not holding their 
promises, the case is coded as 1, failed pact. If the negotiations do not collapse, regardless of 
whether they ended up with democratization or not, the case is coded as 0. 
DEM—dummy variable, showing whether the negotiations ended up with democratization. 
Democratization is operationalized in a very undemanding way as an increase in the level of 
democracy by at least 10% in the three years following the negotiations. The level of 
democracy is operationalized as a Liberal Democracy index by V-Dem. It has a scale of 0 to 
1, and therefore the increase by.1 means that the the level of democracy has increased by 10%. 
Dummy. (Numerical version of this variable is called v2x_libdem_change) 
TU—Dummy, which indicates whether a trade union participates in negotiations. 
The Catholic Church—A dummy variable that indicates whether The Catholic Church 
participates in negotiations. 
PARTY—The initial regime is a party or a military dictatorship (deriving from the GWF 
database (see GWF variable) 
org_votes_sum—the sum of the votes earned by all opposition parties present in negotiations. 
This data is mostly taken from the ‘Parties of the World’ encyclopedia(Sagar, 2009; 
Szajkowski, 2005; Day, 2002; Day et al., 1996; Day & Degenhardt, 1984; Day & Degenhardts, 
1980)), otherwise, the source is mentioned in the membership_source variable. Numeric. 
oldest_org_age—the age of the oldest organization that participates in the pact and represents 
opposition at the moment of negotiations. Data were taken from the two above-mentioned 
encyclopedias. Numerical. 
umbrella_alliance– A dummy variable that indicates whether most of the organizations in the 
movement belong to the same alliance. If there are many competing alliances, the case is coded 
as 0, because this variable gets a value of 1 for the unity of the opposition. 
org_membershipthousandsTUofth—the membership of a trade union that participated in the 
negotiations. This data is mostly taken from the ‘Trade Unions of the World’ encyclopedia 
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(Harper, 1987), otherwise, the source is mentioned in the membership_source variable. 
Numeric. 
TUshare100—the percentage of the country’s population involved in a trade union that 
participates in negotiations (org_membershipthousandsTUofth divided by population). 
Numerical, from 0 to 100. 
v2x_libdem_change—numerical version of change variable, indicates the difference between 
the country’s liberal democracy score at the moment of negotiations and three years after it. 
camp_size_num—a (very) loose approximation of the number of protesters on the streets. An 
encoded, ‘enumerated’ version of the camp_size variable from the NAVCO 2.0 database. 
Camp_size was coded into 5 categories, where 1 means less than 1,000 people on the streets 
and 5 means over 1,000,000 people on the streets during the political campaign. Numbered to 
calculate the protest_share variable. Numerical 1000 to 1,000,000. 
protest_share—the approximate share of the population that participated in the protest. 
Constitutes of the camp_size_num variable divided by the country’s population. Numerical. 
GDP_WB—GDP per capita, PPP (current international $), the source is Word Bank. 
population—population of the country, the source is Word Bank. 
v2x_cspart —Civil society participation index (from V-Dem v7.1 database). 
v2csantimv_osp (V-Dem v7.1)—CSO anti-system movement; from V-Dem v7.1 database. 
Numeric, 0 to 4 scale. 
org_names—names of the organizations that participate in negotiations. Kept for data 
replicability. It does not include organizations that were important in a revolution but were not 
participating in negotiations. Text variable. 
membership_source—the source from which the membership of a trade union for the 
‘org_membershipthousandsTUofth’ variable is collected. By default, it is the Trade Unions of 
the World encyclopedia, and if the source varies, it is here. 
source_numparticipants—a numeric variable that indicates the number of participants of 
strikes or protests that are evoked directly by the organization represented in the pact. This 
variable has too many missing observations to be included in the analysis. 





Data file 2. Text descriptions. 
A supplementary collection of fifty brief drafts of anecdotal descriptions of the processes of 
negotiations. Includes sources. Normally, the files briefly sum up the process of political crisis 
and dig into the negotiations; they sometimes include massive citations of what has happened. 
Please note that these files serve rather the replication purpose and also helped me to return to 









Robustness Tests and Assumptions. 
 
Initially, in the statement on the necessity of the absence of a trade union for the failure of an 
attempt at pact, the result was slightly hampered by one outlier—namely, Bangladesh 1990, 
which might have had a trade union involved in negotiations. Yet, this country has been coded 
the database as a failed attempt at pact because several academic sources cite the rumors that 
the secret negotiations took place. Moreover, any reliable information on the presence or 
absence of a trade union was not available, none of the academic sources mentions trade unions 
specifically. 
The robustness tests that separate the cases between those before and after the Cold War did 
not show a major difference. The results of the model are more or less the same. The only 
difference is that there are no cases with Trade Unions after 1993 except for Tunisia 2011even 
though its presence affects the outcome in the same direction. There are more failed attempts 
at pacts and fewer democratizations after 1993 (due to the rise of competitive authoritarianism 
with its inherent electoral revolutions and probably—due to selection bias). The way other 
conditions affect the outcome also did not change. 
More variables—a share of party`s votes, the presence of an umbrella alliance, a share of the 
country`s population involved in the street protests—were initially collected and tested, but 
they have shown virtually no connection with the outcomes and therefore were excluded from 
the final version of this chapter. 
The reasonable changes in calibration of the democratization variable and especially in the age 
of the organization variable do not change the model because both variables that require 
calibration have two peaks. With the extent of democratization, one country was close to the 
borderline of partial inclusion—that is, Sudan 1985. Within three years after the transition, it 
had an increase of democracy of.09, whereas my cutoff line was deliberately set at.10 to 
exclude it. The reason is that four years after the transition, the military faction made a coup 
d`etat and has thus undermined a fragile democratization and brought Sudan back to autocracy. 
In the analysis of sufficiency for the combined outcome of successful negotiations and further 
democratization, I used a somewhat unusually low consistency score inclusion cutoff of.75, 
whereas Schneider and Wagemann suggest that “In general, consistency levels (well) above 
.75 are advisable” (2012, p. 279). If this number is raised to.76, this will exclude the truth table 
row with the cases of Benin 1999 and Sudan 1985. Those countries had trade unions, a Catholic 
Church, and established opposition parties in negotiations but nevertheless derived from 
personalistic regimes. I would not like to exclude this TT row because it illustrates my Pathway 
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II very well. The case of Benin 1999 is very typical: the very strong and well-organized 
opposition movement manages to peacefully negotiate the exit with an aging personalistic 
dictator. The decrease in consistency is caused by the unstable character of democratization in 
Sudan in 1985 that has problems with conditions, outcomes, and even inclusion. First, in terms 
of outcome, the young democracy was overthrown in 4 years (see the discussion one paragraph 
above). That case is also problematic in terms of conditions: professional and student unions 
dominated above the labor unions, and the latter were present and active only formally. On top 
of that, much is known about the negotiations within the opposition, and less is known about 
the negotiations between the alliance of the opposition and the ruling elites, which is on the 
borderline of my inclusion rules (see in Chapter 2). Therefore, the case is deliberately coded as 
successful negotiations without democratization and, thus, when analyzed in a combined 
variable, has a fuzzy value of.53, which is if not the most ambivalent value that could be 
assigned. 
Nevertheless, raising the consistency score inclusion cutoff to.76 does not change the substance 
of the resulting solution formula much even though it makes it slightly more cumbersome (see 
Table A3.2) and sightly decreases the coverage (from.63 to.68). Without changing the 
interpretation substantively, it now pays less attention to the role of trade unions ascribing the 
cases with trade unions to “Party regime and Established Opposition Party” category instead. 
One should also note that the established opposition party was also present whenever the trade 
union was present. Finally, one must keep in mind that these changes are caused by the 
exclusion of the prototypical case of Benin 1999 and the potentially problematic case of Sudan 
1985, where the military coup d`etat in 1989 might have not too much connection with the 
negotiations. 
Raising the consistency score inclusion cutoff above.79 also does not put the entire argument 
at risk: substantively, it excludes the fourth solution formula from the model and decreases the 
coverage score by .174 (see Table A3.3). It would exclude the TT row with Greece 1974, 
Nicaragua 1990, South Africa 1994, Spain 1975, and Egypt 2013 because of the latter. All 
those cases underwent a transition from a party or a military dictatorship and had at least one 
established opposition party, and all of those are the well-known instances of pacted transitions. 
The case of a failed attempt at pact is Egypt in 2013 is investigated in a dedicated Chapter 4 of 
this dissertation. The case is different from the others in the same TT row because of a very 
radical, religious fundamentalist character of its established opposition party Muslim 
Brotherhood, to say nothing of an excessive amount of economic and political power in hands 




Table A3.2: The parsimonious solution for a truth table of the combined fuzzy outcome of both 
success of negotiations and a democratic outcome with the inclusion cutoff.76. covS—
coverage, covU—unique coverage, overlapping cases with trade unions and party regimes are 





covS covU Covered cases 
Trade union 
and no Catholic 
Church 
I .975 .221 .063 Mali 1991, Peru 1980, Uruguay 1984, 
Argentina 1983, Bulgaria 1990, Ecuador 1979, 
Tunisia 2011 
Trade union and 
no Established 
Opposition party 






II .975 .253 .032 Czechoslovakia 1990, Slovenia 1990, Bolivia 
1982, Brazil 1985, Hungary 1989, Poland 
1989, South Korea 1987, Zambia 1991 
Party regime 
and Established 
opposition party  
II .910 .443 .127 Egypt 2013, Greece 1974, Nicaragua 1990, 
South Africa 1994, Spain 1975, Argentina 
1983, Bulgaria 1990, Ecuador 1979, Tunisia 
2011, Bolivia 1982, Brazil 1985, Hungary 
1989, Poland 1989, South Korea 1987, 
Zambia 1991 






Table A3.3: The parsimonious solution for a truth table of the combined fuzzy outcome of both 
success of negotiations and a democratic outcome with the inclusion cutoff. covS—coverage, 
covU—unique coverage, overlapping cases with trade unions and party regimes are marked 











I .975 .221 .190 Mali 1991, Peru 1980, Uruguay 1984, Argentina 1983, 











II .975 .253 .221 Chechoslovakia 1990, Slovenia 1990, Bolivia 1982, Brazil 
1985, Hungary 1989, Poland 1989,South Korea 1987, 
Zambia 1991 
Whole model  .975 .506   
